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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
The election of Donald J. Trump as the 45th President of the United States has led to the 
widespread perception that America’s global engagement is in flux. The aim in the present 
report is to shed further light on this assessment by investigating both the longer-term trends 
and the more immediate dynamics of America’s global engagement.  
To accomplish this, the following analysis focuses on domestic, political and cultural develop-
ments, as well as strategic debates on foreign policy that have a bearing on the potential 
changes and continuities in American policymaking. The report also zooms in on the formu-
lation and execution of US foreign, defence and economic policies in the unfolding Trump era. 
The eventual aim is to shed light on the evolution of US global engagement and national 
interests in terms of the future of international order, evolving great-power relations and the 
strategic setting of Northern Europe, and furthermore, to enhance understanding of Finland’s 
broad security environment. 
At present, America’s global engagement is characterised by “change in continuity”.  Despite 
the prevailing climate of political polarisation and uncertainty, the broad parameters of Amer-
ica’s global role look to remain within the bounds of the long-term post-World War II bipartisan 
consensus (which can still accommodate considerable policy variance).   
First, the US will continue to have an important role in the world. However, the specific modes 
of this engagement are negotiable. There is contention over the extent to which the US should 
be a pragmatic arbiter of common global problems or a custodian of principle on a moral 
mission to remake the world based on cultural signifiers. 
Second, although the importance of America’s engagement with the world is rarely contested, 
there is considerable contention over the specific means it should adopt. The choice is fre-
quently articulated through the opposition between “hard” (military and economic) versus 
“soft” (diplomatic, institutional and cultural) means of power. 
Third, the importance of fulfilling existing international responsibilities and commitments is 
broadly recognised. Nevertheless, open questions remain over the extent to which these com-
mitments should be made conditional on the willingness of allies and partners to engage in 
more equitable burden-sharing and, relatedly, on the degree to which the US needs to ac-
commodate others’ interests by engagement in multilateral forums. 
The present report comprises five parts, each of which addresses different aspects of this 
change/continuity dynamic. 
Domestic Drivers of Change and Continuity 
In the domestic arena, a climate of deepening political polarisation continues to plague the 
United States. Tapping into this prevalent trend, Donald Trump has drawn upon polarising 
politico-cultural resources, two of which – the conservative narrative of decline and the revival 
of religiosity – have been of particular relevance in articulating his “America First” policy 
agenda. At the same time, the worldview of President Trump (and some of his advisors) 
breaks with secularist and liberal traditions, and instead emphasises the need to protect the 
Christian and European creed of the American way of life. With regard to foreign policy, the 
administration is thus likely to depart from the time-honoured American tradition of pragmatic 
arbitration and espouse a “custodian of principle” approach. In the global arena, this carries 
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the potential of muscular action against potential enemies that threaten the United States and 
the broader civilisation it purports to be defending. 
As for the balance of domestic political forces, the 2016 election handed the Republican Party 
a resounding victory as it gained control of not only the White House but also both chambers 
of Congress. Such a period of unified government should open up opportunities to advance 
a substantial conservative agenda at home and abroad. In practice, however, success will 
depend on the ability of the Trump administration and Congress to co-operate despite the 
considerable divisions within the Republican Party over ideology and policy questions, partic-
ularly when it comes to government spending. With regard to America’s foreign engagement, 
points of contention have arisen over the balance of investment between “soft” and hard” 
elements of US power, the future of the Iran nuclear deal, addressing the North Korea threat 
and, most pertinently, the Trump team’s links with Russia. Intra-party divisions combined with 
policy contention could therefore render it difficult for the Trump administration to advance not 
only its domestic initiatives but also its preferred global agenda.  
Foreign and Defence Policy 
Broadly speaking, US foreign-policy thought in the post-Cold War era has followed three 
prominent traditions: liberal internationalism, neoconservatism and realism. Neoisolationism 
has recently emerged as a fourth alternative, gaining more traction in public debates. Although 
President Trump has sought to posture himself as an outsider and disruptor, he – like any 
other policy maker – remains immersed in these broad, historically-evolved sets of ideas that 
enable and constrain American thinking on foreign policy. Not having explicitly endorsed any 
of these alternatives, the President (and his foreign-policy team) draws upon – or at the very 
least takes varying postures against – each of these traditions in his foreign-policy thinking. 
In its yet evolving form, the so-called “Trump doctrine” toys with neoconservative tropes in 
laying emphasis on unilateralism over multilateralism and stressing America’s civilisational 
affinities, although not in the traditional sense of advocating freedom and democracy. There 
is also a realist strand, most obvious in the build-up of and willingness to use hard power 
instruments, which suits the administration’s view of the world as an arena in which states 
compete. Furthermore, the Trump team bows selectively to the isolationist tradition with its 
transactionalist mind-set, favouring bilateral deals built on ad hoc sector-based bargains. 
These step changes can still be accommodated within the broad web of traditions of American 
foreign-policy thought. 
In the realm of defence policy, there are broad areas of continuity with the past despite the 
exceptional rhetoric of the President. America’s top defence priorities will be to counter chal-
lenges from the revisionist powers of China and Russia, to keep the rogue states of Iran and 
North Korea at bay, and to tackle transnational threats, particularly from transnational terrorist 
groups. In addition, US bilateral and multilateral defence ties with Europe and Asia will remain 
relatively stable, despite some friction over questions of spending levels and industrial coop-
eration on defence. Developments in nuclear-weapon and missile-defence policies are also 
possible, and these have potential implications for the already tense relations with Russia. 
The prospect of a more serious quarrel between the US and its allies lurks in the background, 
however, and might be realised if the Trump administration were to be perceived as partly 
responsible for a major military clash on the Korean peninsula or the collapse of the 2015 
nuclear agreement with Iran. 
Multilateral governance  
The Trump administration’s “America First” policy agenda has been widely interpreted as an 
expression of a newfound unwillingness on the part of the US to maintain its traditional role 
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as the leading proponent of the post-World War II liberal international order. Upon closer in-
spection, however, it becomes clear that Donald Trump’s rise to the presidency is sympto-
matic of the longer-term internal and external challenges faced by the current order, which 
include the “return of geopolitics”, the negative externalities of economic globalisation and the 
rise of nationalist populist movements in the broader West. As initially expected, the first year 
of the Trump presidency has seen America challenge some components of the institutional, 
normative and economic foundations of the liberal international order, most notably by down-
playing the promotion of liberal values and support for key multilateral institutions – the UN in 
particular – as well as treaties such as the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) and the Paris 
Climate Agreement. These strands of disruption have not led to a full-scale unravelling of the 
order, however. America’s espousal of its commitments looks to remain firm in the security 
sphere in particular, although it will continue to press for more equal burden-sharing from 
allies and partners. Despite calls for Europe to up its game and to show leadership, America’s 
willingness to maintain sustained support for the key components of the present order remains 
essential. 
When it comes to the global free-trade regime, there is widespread concern about the current 
White House and its “America First” agenda with its emphasis, at least rhetorically, on the 
negative aspects of globalisation and its focus on America’s bilateral trade deficits. Beyond 
withdrawing the US from the TPP and initiating renegotiations on the North American Free 
Trade Agreement (NAFTA), the current administration has also begun domestic processes 
that review key aspects of the US-China trade relationship. The US could also undermine the 
World Trade Organization by hampering the functioning of its dispute-settlement system. 
However, worst-case scenarios of trade wars and protectionist tariffs have not materialised, 
which points to the diagnosis that the President is, in fact, engaged in a bold negotiating tactic 
to achieve “better deals” for America. Over time, if not acted upon these tactics might even 
lose their effectiveness.  
New Great Power Politics 
In terms of US relations with the great power competitors highlighted in the 2017 National 
Security Strategy, surface-level change remains offset by long-term historical trends. In the 
case of Russia, President Trump, like many of his predecessors, came into office with the 
intention of improving relations between Washington and Moscow. However, the recalibration 
of the relationship appears extremely unlikely given the fundamental and persistent differ-
ences over various key foreign-policy issues such as Ukraine, Syria, Iran and North Korea, 
and on-going investigations into Russia’s election interference. The investigation into the 
Trump team’s possible collusion with Russia during and after the 2016 elections, along with 
allegations of obstruction of justice, have added another impediment to improving relations. 
Fears of a grand bargain between Washington and Moscow have thus largely subsided in 
Europe. However, assertive Russian behaviour and potential negative spill-over from crises 
in which both Russia and America are immersed continue to raise concerns. Although Presi-
dents Trump and Putin have both continued to entertain the possibility of improving the bilat-
eral relationship, Russian-American relations are now poor and seem likely to remain so. 
An increasingly assertive and self-confident China poses a growing challenge to US hegem-
ony in the Asia-Pacific region. References by President Trump to US disengagement from 
the region and the proliferation of perceptions that the US is a power in relative decline have 
raised further expectations of a regional power shift. Despite such harbingers, US engage-
ment in the Asia-Pacific is likely to remain, by and large, as laid out by the Obama administra-
tion. In an attempt to balance China’s rising prominence, the US will further build up military 
capabilities and continue its efforts to create a security network in the area. Such efforts will 
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include strengthening military ties with allies such as Japan and South Korea, and with stra-
tegic partner countries such as India. Support for liberal values, human rights and normative 
principles, however, are likely to have a less important role than during previous presidential 
administrations.  
The United States and Europe 
It is often argued that the United States and its allies and partners in Europe constitute the 
most mature example of a security community, wherein the use of force has been replaced 
with debate and negotiation in settling disagreements. President Trump’s belittling remarks 
regarding the European Union and his comments on the obsolescence of NATO have raised 
concerns over the foundations of the transatlantic relationship, including the ironclad nature 
of the Article 5 security guarantee. Fears have also been expressed about the smooth conti-
nuity of transatlantic free trade and the upholding of shared liberal values. However, amidst 
the apparent turmoil, it should be remembered that transatlantic unity has faced tensions and 
occasional crises throughout its history and has still endured. In this sense, the Trump admin-
istration’s “America First” approach could be seen as merely another American (re)articulation 
that US interests should matter more within the transatlantic security community. Institution-
alised security cooperation, extensive economic relations and shared values are likely to con-
tinue guiding the relationship between the United States and Europe, even if uncertainty over 
the normative and institutional common ground, in particular, raises some concerns for the 
future. 
The United States has also recently started to pay closer attention to the transforming circum-
polar north. Despite initial concerns, the US under the current administration appears to rec-
ognise enduring strategic interests in the Arctic, and continues to engage in practical co-op-
eration in the region. However, President Trump has voiced broader views on climate (and 
energy) policy, multilateral co-operation and America’s relationship with Russia that create 
strategic ambiguity, which is not likely to disappear overnight. Although the Arctic may not be 
on the White House radar, these more general policy tendencies have an Arctic aspect and, 
in the worst-case scenario, might result in “collateral damage” to the enduring elements of US 
Arctic policy, and regional co-operation in general. The fact remains that comprehensive and 
constructive US engagement in the region remains important, and has implications for the 
foreign and security policy environment in Northern Europe.  
The US has become more interested and has invested in the security of the Baltic Sea region 
during the past four years. Even though the Baltic Sea is a strategically important regional 
gateway to the global maritime (and other) commons, and therefore a security concern for the 
US in its own right, the mounting strategic uncertainty of recent years and an increasing sense 
of the “return of geopolitics” has drawn it deeper into the region. Given its multiple NATO allies 
as well as partners (Finland and Sweden) in the area, it is clear that failure to uphold its 
security commitments would undermine America’s global influence. As a response to the 
growing strategic uncertainty, the US has ramped up its engagement by supporting new forms 
of security cooperation, increasing its military presence and intensifying inter-personal con-
tacts in the region. These developments began before the Trump era, and highlight broader 
transatlantic and North European security trends. Despite initial concerns in the Nordic-Baltic 
region, the current administration seems to have come to the conclusion that supporting its 
European allies and partners is actually a good deal for the United States in the present geo-
political situation.  
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Coping with Change and Continuity  
In terms of security and stability in the Nordic-Baltic region and Europe more broadly, the 
United States remains the “indispensable nation”. The need to engage in and strengthen co-
operation across all levels (from high politics all the way to civil society) will persist, regardless 
of who is at the helm in the White House.  
Irrespective of the potential for disruption that Trump as a president sui generis presents, 
there are considerable continuities in America’s global engagement, especially in terms of 
guaranteeing its military ascendancy, maintaining its security commitments in Europe and the 
Asia-Pacific region, and continuing the battle against transnational terrorism. It is also possi-
ble that future US presidents will revert to an American foreign policy that is more traditional 
in terms of US dedication to the normative, institutional and economic foundations of the lib-
eral international order. The foreign-policy pendulum of US international engagement has his-
torically swung back and forth between more withdrawn isolationist and more expansive in-
terventionist periods, and the Trump presidency may yet turn out to be another chapter that 
fits into this long-term ebb and flow.  
It should nevertheless be borne in mind that the United States that emerges at the end of 
President Trump’s incumbency will not be the same as it was on January 20, 2017. Not only 
will the surrounding world have changed – more or less dramatically – so will the issue-spe-
cific content of the debates taking place within the US over America’s place in that world. For 
instance, it is highly likely that calls for more equitable burden-sharing within its broad network 
of alliances, along with a less benign attitude to economic interdependence and globalisation, 
will persist after Trump’s term(s) in office. Moreover, political polarisation in the country shows 
few signs of dissipation. In fact, it is possible that divisions will widen not only on the traditional 
liberal/conservative axis but also along educational, ethnic and racial lines as part of the in-
evitable process of demographic change. The more positive possibility is that the Trump pres-
idency will provide “lessons learned”, and will foster attempts by future leaders to return to 
pragmatic arbitration and bipartisanship.  
It is argued in this report that, in the short term, the Trump presidency offers both challenges 
and opportunities to Europe more broadly, and Finland in particular. It is becoming increas-
ingly clear that President Trump has little time for or interest in engagement in complex or-
ganisational forums and long-winded institutional processes. Even if his presidency takes a 
more traditional turn, this resistance to multilateral solutions and organisations is likely to re-
main a mainstay of the administration. In fact, Republican presidents in general have ap-
proached multilateral forays with more reservation than their Democratic counterparts.  
Even if the Trump administration has not been as radical a departure as initially feared, its 
attempts at reframing America’s foreign and security policy have raised serious concerns, and 
have led to the emergence of a new “waiting game” characterised by the interplay between 
expected continuities and newfound uncertainties concerning America’s future direction. Con-
sequently, European and Finnish policymakers could benefit from adopting a combination of 
strategic patience and selective sector-based proactivity to navigate the present situation.  
As a starting point, Finland and its European partners would do well to remember that aloof-
ness is not a substitute for engagement. Despite potential policy and value divergence be-
tween the United States and Europe on issues such as climate change and trade policy, there 
is a need to find avenues of cooperation that can be harnessed to sustain the transatlantic 
link through the potentially turbulent times ahead.  
  VI  
 
On the one hand, the Trump presidency does open up opportunities for mutually beneficial 
cooperation that could be framed as a policy triumph or economic gain for the US administra-
tion, which the President could then sell as a victory to his domestic constituents. Illustrative 
examples include NATO burden-sharing and the development of European defence capabil-
ities, as well as efforts to combat the threat of transnational terrorism and devise new ways of 
countering hybrid influencing.   
On the other hand, America’s willingness to act as a global leader that maintains a guarantor 
role in the institutions of the liberal international order has waned, at least for the time being. 
It is incumbent upon Europeans to take a stand against the United States (as they have in the 
past) on issues that are of importance to them, especially when America is charting a course 
that is detrimental to European interests and core values, and to the stability of the interna-
tional order in general. In such cases, declaration and policy need to be proportional to the 
magnitude of the disruptive action.  
In fact, although the temptation might sometimes be considerable, it would most likely be 
counterproductive to enter into escalatory public rows with the current US administration. Not 
only does Trump’s leadership style draw on public spectacles, such high-profile disagree-
ments might merely accentuate the “values gap” between the two shores of the Atlantic, or 
within respective societies. They might also render it more difficult for more moderate actors 
within the Trump administration and different government departments and agencies to push 
their agendas forward in Washington, and to cooperate with Europeans.  
The most important agenda item for small internationally networked states such as Finland is 
to ensure the US continues to support and defend the fundamental building blocks of the 
liberal international order. Given the current administration’s “America First” agenda, this pre-
sents a conundrum that could be reconciled by looking at each issue of contention on its own 
terms and utilising the European Union (or other multilateral constellations) as forums in which 
Finland can seek to defend the building blocks of the rule-based multilateral order. In situa-
tions in which America’s policy behaviour compromises Finland’s core principles and values, 
therefore, it is necessary – in bilateral talks with the US or in cooperation with its European 
and global partners – to remind the United States how important it is to adhere to legitimate 
international norms and institutions. 
The increasingly bilateral bent in America’s foreign policy means that state-to-state – as well 
as leader-to-leader – contacts may be prioritised more than in the past. Although not condu-
cive to important multilateral cooperation, this could open up opportunities through innovative 
bilateral diplomacy, which would not necessarily have been available during a more traditional 
presidential administration.  
On the question of security and trade ventures with the United States, Finland should attempt 
to drive home the message that US interests will be well served by cooperation: Finland keeps 
its promises, takes care of its own lot and is willing to engage the US in fair trade that also 
benefits Americans. This is a message that the US President and his administration could sell 
to domestic supporters.  
The interest of the United States in the Nordic-Baltic region has also increased as the geopo-
litical situation in Europe has evolved over the last few years. Although heightened tensions 
per se are of concern, the situation could also prove fortuitous for Finland if handled correctly. 
Paradoxically, this may well be the time for pragmatic initiatives and forays vis-à-vis the US.  
  
  
 
1 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Background 
This report investigates the evolution of America’s global engagement after the election of 
Donald J. Trump as the 45th president of the United States. In particular, the study maps out 
key internal and external tendencies that influence – even beyond one election cycle or single 
administration – how the US understands its role in the world. It also investigates the devel-
opment of US policies in the international arena, and highlights the potential implications of 
America’s current and future foreign engagement for Europe in general and the Nordic-Baltic 
region more specifically. In conclusion, a number of rules of thumb are suggested, which 
Finland as a small but internationally networked and export-oriented state could follow as it 
(re)formulates its approach to the United States now and in the future. 
As the results of the 2016 congressional and presidential elections illustrate, the American 
politico-cultural climate is experiencing profound polarisation. Conflictual cultural dynamics 
with long historical roots have accentuated the inability of the US political system to govern 
effectively through pragmatic compromise. The demographic makeup of the United States is 
also undergoing a historical transformation, as the proportion of ethnic minorities in the pop-
ulation keeps increasing. At the same time, perceptions of structural injustice have fuelled a 
protest mentality among certain sections of society, most notably in the African American 
community. This belief in the inherent unfairness of the system is also increasingly apparent 
among Americans of European descent, manifest most recently in the activation of Donald 
Trump’s voter base in the 2016 elections. Coincidentally, new modes of election campaigning 
and political mobilisation based on fake news and social-media bubbles, along with suspicions 
of foreign collusion and influence, are topics of everyday discussion in the US.  
Although the American economy recovered relatively quickly from the 2007/8 financial crisis, 
the perception prevails that globalisation has not created equal opportunities throughout the 
country. Income inequalities are increasingly viewed as an ever-strengthening barrier against 
social mobility – the realisation of the “American dream” has become increasingly difficult. 
This sense of economic injustice is reflected in the growth of opposition to free trade. Various 
multilateral agreements aimed at further liberalising international trade – including legacy 
items such as the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and novel trade pacts 
such as the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) and the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Part-
nership (TTIP) – have met with resolute criticism from both sides of the political spectrum. In 
fact, the view that the emergence of transnational supply chains has robbed the United States 
of domestic job opportunities has become more prominent. This is the case even though the 
unemployment rate is relatively low and economic growth has been respectable in compari-
son to Europe, for example.     
The 2016 presidential elections reflected these underlying trends. The central theme of can-
didate Trump’s campaign was anti-globalisation, and Democratic primary candidate Bernie 
Sanders was similarly critical of the new free trade pacts. In the run-up to the vote, both Trump 
and his opponent Hilary Clinton promised improved job opportunities based on supply-side 
economics. Infrastructure modernisation and defence spending were the two dominant 
themes on candidate Trump’s agenda. It is likely, given the current Republican-controlled 
government, that defence spending will increase even if America’s military presence around 
the world is not significantly altered. In general, it is also likely that the heated debate over 
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America’s global engagement will continue when factions with differing worldviews seek to 
advance their agendas in Washington. Paradoxically, the desire for robust American engage-
ment is growing amongst America’s allies and partners, whereas US willingness to bind itself 
to global institutions, foster free trade and commit militarily to global hot spots may become 
increasingly based on conditionality and narrower perceptions of the national interest.   
Alterations in America’s global role and the foreign-policy interests that underpin it have a 
bearing upon the future of the transatlantic bond and, by implication, on Finland’s security 
environment. On the most general level, US foreign policy since the Second World War has 
been founded on three key pillars:  
1. the US remains the central global actor;  
2. US power relies on hard and soft components, namely superior military force and 
economic strength underwritten by legitimate international institutions, astute diplo-
macy and cultural influence; and 
3. the US retains an unwavering commitment to its allies and partners (Haltzel 2016). 
Donald Trump has pointedly criticised American allies for free riding on US security guaran-
tees. In his view, US allies have not shown sufficient resolve in maintaining their defence 
capabilities, and US commitments should be contingent on a narrower definition of America’s 
national interests. Such demands per se are by no means novel. Complaints about Europe’s 
unwillingness to carry its share of the transatlantic military burden have been voiced at least 
since the days of the Eisenhower presidency. The Obama administration was no different in 
this regard, and the former president even alluded to America’s European allies as free riders 
(Goldberg 2016). 
Nevertheless, Trump’s comments imply that the United States might have an appetite for 
more shallow engagement. In a world that the administration characterises not as a “global 
community”, but as “an arena where nations […] engage and compete” (McMaster and Cohn 
2017), President Trump’s America seems to view allies primarily as force multipliers. This 
sentiment may indicate a shift towards a more realist foreign-policy orientation. At the very 
least, the Trump administration appears less inclined than its predecessors to stress the cen-
trality of liberal-democratic values in America’s engagement with the world. Instead, the Pres-
ident’s foreign policy is likely to retain its isolationist and nationalist rhetorical bent – tried and 
tested on the campaign trail. At the same time, US commitment to multilateralism may be 
undermined by a more transactionalist approach, the idea being to compartmentalise the in-
ternational arena into bilateral relationships – at least in certain sectors.  
The new administration looks to be altering the mix of America’s global strategic engagement 
by prioritising “hard power” means, the military in particular, over “soft power” instruments 
such as public diplomacy, cultural exchanges and foreign aid. Upon unveiling the budget pro-
posal for the fiscal year (FY) 2018, Trump’s budget director Mick Mulvaney laid emphasis on 
the hard-power component. The budget plan would send a message to allies that they were 
dealing with a “strong-power administration”. The most clear-cut signal in this respect are the 
cuts and streamlining measures the administration has proposed with regard to various pro-
grammes and posts at the State Department and the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). 
The Trump team has singled out climate-change-related initiatives and foreign aid, for in-
stance, as items that rank low on the administration’s agenda. These cuts would be under-
taken concurrently with an increase in military spending. Although the budget proposal’s im-
pact on the State Department is likely to be watered down in Congress, the message is clear: 
the Trump administration will focus on restoring America’s international prestige by building 
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up its material power base, not by investing more in programmes intended to increase Amer-
ica’s international legitimacy.    
If one is looking for the lowest common denominator of the US geostrategic vision, the idea 
of securing access to the high seas and international commerce is the key (Aaltola et al. 
2014a). This view, associated with Admiral G. Mahan, contrasts with the mainstream of con-
tinental European geopolitics, which emphasises the need to control territory and the strategic 
resource deposits therein. Although the difference between the geopolitical visions is not ab-
solute, the US emphasis on the maritime domain is nevertheless a pragmatic tendency that 
has prevailed for decades. Freeing up markets and securing sea lanes of communication are 
among the policies to which the present administration – irrespective of its disruptiveness – 
is committed. Inside the broad geostrategic vision are multiple doctrines and styles to which 
different administrations have adhered.   
Although the magnitude of America’s foreign and security policy shift will ultimately be contin-
gent on unfolding internal and international dynamics, and even possible “black swan” events, 
the climate of uncertainty after Trump’s election has already created uneasiness in Europe. 
In May, German Chancellor Angela Merkel went as far as to call on Europeans to “take our 
fate into our own hands” (quoted in Dempsey 2017). Upheavals on the old continent accen-
tuate such immediate apprehensions. There is a pressing sense of uncertainty over Britain’s 
exit from the European Union, while intra-European solidarity has eroded in the aftermath of 
the Eurozone crisis, and as a result of differences in opinion on how to deal with migration 
from the Union’s southern neighbourhood. The geopolitical realities on the old continent have 
also become more tenuous because of Russia’s aggressive foreign-policy behaviour (espe-
cially in Ukraine and Syria), and the use of hybrid influencing. Currently, relations between 
Russia and the West are arguably at their post-Cold War lowest point. The European security 
environment is therefore rife with newfound insecurities. To make matters worse, European 
defence capabilities have deteriorated across the board in the post-Cold War era as a result 
of chronic underinvestment in national defence throughout the continent. There has been in-
creasing realisation in recent years that the trend should be reversed sooner rather than later. 
In fact, America’s European allies made it clear that they remain committed to the two per 
cent of GDP defence spending pledge made at NATO’s Wales Summit in 2014.  
President Trump’s administration took hold of the reins of US foreign policy in a situation in 
which America is dealing with increasingly complex technological, cultural, economic and se-
curity dynamics. Two structural trends are of particular significance. First, the power balance 
between states is becoming increasingly dynamic. The United States remains militarily as-
cendant for the time being, and it still wields considerable soft power. However, in the eco-
nomic realm the power balance has been shifting for decades with the rise of the emerging 
economies in Asia and, more recently, China in particular.  
The rise of China, together with the role it will ultimately assume in the evolving international 
order, is among the most significant determining factors when it comes to the development of 
global politics in the 21st century. The effects of China’s evolving role will not be limited to its 
immediate neighbourhood: they will be felt globally. The evolution of the US-China relation-
ship, the most important bilateral dyad in the international system, will have a great bearing 
upon the future of the balance of power and the liberal international order, which has served 
the West well since its inception in the aftermath of World War II. China has grown more 
assertive in its near abroad in recent years, and the United States will need to react to these 
forays sooner or later – a process that began with the Obama administration’s talk of a “Pacific 
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century” and the “rebalance to Asia” (Obama 2015, 24-25; Clinton 2011). Disruptions in rela-
tions between Washington and Beijing – brought about through protectionist trade policies 
fuelled by economic nationalism, for instance – would be reflected in the economic prospects 
of small open economies such as Finland.  
Russia, in turn, has sought to reassert its status as a great power by engaging in destabilising 
actions in Europe and the Middle East (although Moscow considers its actions stabilising). 
Contrary to early speculation about a grand bargain in the aftermath of Donald Trump’s elec-
tion victory, the US-Russia relationship reached its lowest point for over twenty-five years in 
the spring of 2017. The window of opportunity for such a bargain appears to have closed. The 
Trump administration is engulfed in a string of investigations – in Congress and by a Special 
Counsel appointed by the Department of Justice – on Russian influence on the 2016 presi-
dential election and the alleged links between the Trump campaign and Russia. Any attempt 
at a Russia reset in this political climate would be extremely risky for the President. A further 
bone of contention concerns the US air strikes in Syria after a chemical-weapons attack widely 
attributed to dictator Bashar al-Assad, a Russian ally. The role of Iran is another contentious 
point. The Trump administration’s tough talk directed at Tehran stands in stark contrast to 
Russia’s increasingly friendly relations with America’s long-time adversary.  
Nevertheless, as an overall tendency the possible reprioritising of bilateral great-power rela-
tionships over multilateral solutions by the United States may also have consequences affect-
ing the stability and predictability of small countries’ security environments.  
The second key trend in 21st-century international life is the diffusion of power to non-state 
actors. These actors include civil society organisations, cities, regions, and dispersed inter-
national networks, which exist beyond and below the state level. It has become apparent that 
the increasing complexity of the interdependent world may also breed new vulnerabilities, as 
potential sources of disruption grow. In the case of the Trump administration’s first year, the 
more insidious manifestations of power diffusion have attracted considerable attention. In par-
ticular, international terrorism and vulnerabilities created by cyber connectivity have domi-
nated the debate. The Trump team has pledged to step up the battle against terrorism, and 
for the president this has become a struggle between the forces of “good and evil”, and has 
acquired a dimension of civilizational struggle. In the case of cyber vulnerabilities, the ability 
of great-power competitors to leverage the cyber domain for political gain has cast doubt on 
the credibility and resilience of American democracy. 
1.2 Research objectives and questions 
Recent events in the United States and Europe, and in world politics more generally, have 
created a clear demand for a study that analyses the potential changes and continuities of 
America’s global engagement. This is particularly relevant for Finland, a small export-oriented 
country that relies on the predictability provided by the stable rules-based international order 
pioneered and supported by the United States.  
The aim in this report is to enhance understanding of the contemporary manifestations and 
future development of America’s role in the world. Accordingly, the investigation covers both 
the broader trends and the more immediate dynamics of America’s global engagement. Do-
mestic political and cultural developments are analysed, as well as strategic debates that 
have a bearing on the potential changes and continuities in American policymaking. The re-
port also zooms in on the formulation and execution of US foreign, defence and economic 
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policies in the unfolding Trump era. The intention is to shed light on the evolution of US global 
engagement and national interests in terms of the future of international order, evolving great-
power relations and the strategic setting of Northern Europe. Finally, this analysis should also 
contribute to the understanding of Finland’s broad security environment, facilitate decision-
making related to foreign and security policy, and stimulate debate about it in the future.  
The key research questions that guide the analysis presented in the report are: 
1. How do domestic trends and foreign-policy dynamics affect the evolution of America’s 
global engagement and national interests? 
2. How does the US currently formulate and execute its foreign, defence and economic 
policies? 
3. How does America’s evolving global engagement bear upon great-power politics, 
transatlantic relations and Finland’s broader security environment? 
1.3 Research methodology and material 
The analysis presented in this report was conducted within the broad framework of qualitative 
research. The methodology adopted is known as triangulation, which is a mode of qualitative 
research that combines different research material, means of analysis and points of view. The 
rationale for adopting this methodology is the expected enhanced validity of the research re-
sults, given that the analysis does not rely solely on a single data set or the interpretation of 
one analyst.       
In the present context, the analysis is based on three forms of triangulation: 
1. Research-material triangulation to obtain various relevant pieces of information (gov-
ernment documents, expert interviews, statistical data, research literature, expert 
analyses); 
2. Methodological triangulation to generate knowledge based on various means of anal-
ysis (conducting interviews, qualitative content analysis of documents); 
3. Researcher triangulation to bring together various scholars to analyse the same 
broad themes. 
The main research material used for the report consists of policy documents produced by 
actors in the US. These include, for example, White House policy declarations, strategy doc-
uments produced by government departments and agencies such as the Department of State 
and Department of Defense, as well as Congressional testimonies and bills. This data is com-
plemented with relevant research literature, expert commentary and news reporting, which 
provide background information on and interpretations of the evolution of America’s global 
engagement. 
The analysis is further enhanced by interviews and discussions with relevant Finnish, Ameri-
can and European experts on the subject matter. In particular, the broad theme of US global 
engagement was analysed from various perspectives at the main event of FIIA’s Center on 
US Politics and Power (CUSPP), the 4th Annual Helsinki Summer Session Reimagining 
Transatlantic Relations in the Trump Era, August 29–31, 2017. The CUSPP Helsinki Summer 
Session is an interdisciplinary event that brings together researchers and experts from Europe 
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and the United States to discuss the future of the transatlantic relationship.1 During the con-
ference, the research team also conducted expert interviews on relevant changes and conti-
nuities in US foreign, security and economic policies during the first seven months of Donald 
Trump’s presidency. In addition, FIIA organised the US research day on May 15, 2017, Un-
derstanding Trump: The domestic roots of US foreign policy, during which American and Finn-
ish experts also discussed some of the key themes addressed in the current report.2 
1.4 Research timetable and team 
The research project was conducted at the Finnish Institute of International Affairs between 
January 1 and December 31, 2017. The project was divided into three phases:  
1. Phase 1 (January 1 – April 30, 2017): identification and collection of primary research 
material and relevant research literature (updated throughout the duration of the pro-
ject).  
2. Phase 2 (May 1 – November 30, 2017): compilation of the analyses and the organi-
sation of expert events and interviews; commentary from the project’s steering group. 
3. Phase 3 (December 2017): completion of the editorial processing of the report for 
publication.  
The programme director of FIIA’s Global Security Research Program, Dr Mika Aaltola led the 
project. The editors of this final report of the research project include Mika Aaltola, senior 
research fellows Charly Salonius-Pasternak and Dr Juha Käpylä, and research fellow Ville 
Sinkkonen. In addition to the editors of the report, the research team included the following 
current and former FIIA researchers: senior visiting research fellows Leo Michel and Professor 
Mark N. Katz (George Mason University); CUSPP project director, senior research fellow Dr 
Bart Gaens; senior research fellow Dr Harri Mikkola; former FIIA senior research fellow Dr 
Anna Kronlund (University of Turku); and former FIIA research fellow Dr Johanna Jacobsson 
(IE University). Details of specific contributions are to be found after the Table of Contents 
above. 
FIIA research assistants Anna Wikholm and Anu Ruokamo coordinated the research project, 
and FIIA project managers Marie-Louise Hindsberg, Sannamari Bagge and Kukka-Maria Kov-
sky took care of the related seminar and conference arrangements. FIIA’s director of admin-
istration Helena Lehtovirta and financial manager Lauri Kaanela dealt with administrative mat-
ters. Joan Nordlund MA edited the language of the report, and Inka Reijonen produced the 
graphical illustrations. 
In addition to this final report, the project outcomes to date include three additional FIIA pub-
lications (2 FIIA Working Papers and 1 FIIA Briefing Paper). 
 
 
                                                     
1 For additional information, see the event description on FIIA’s homepage, available at: https://www.fiia.fi/en/event/4th-annual-helsinki-summer-session-
decline-of-liberal-rule-based-world-order.  
2 For additional information, see the event description on FIIA’s homepage, available at: https://www.fiia.fi/tapahtuma/understanding-trump-the-domestic-
roots-of-us-foreign-policy.   
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1.5 The structure of the report 
The report is subdivided into five substantive parts.  
Part I deals with the domestic politico-cultural trends as well as the institutional and party-
political dynamics that affect – directly and indirectly – America’s global engagement.  
Chapter 2 analyses the broader politico-cultural trends in American society and how they are 
reflected in the leadership mode of Donald Trump and his administration. Instead of relying 
on the age-old tradition of American pragmatic pluralism, Trump highlights moral differences 
and the importance of traditional conservative values, European heritage, and the idea of the 
West as a Christian civilisation. According to this view, the United States should no longer be 
seen as a multicultural melting pot. Trump draws his legitimacy from an appeal to the exist-
ence of a shared, but now lost, communal and moral element in America, which is framed in 
conservative, populist and reactionary terms. In particular, the current political polarisation in 
the United States could be said to spring from two long-term trends in American domestic 
political culture: the proliferation of narratives of decline and the revival of religiosity. These 
trends play a role in shaping the leadership mode of the Trump administration, both domesti-
cally and in relation to America’s evolving global role. 
Chapter 3 investigates the current situation in America’s political institutions and party politics, 
with a view to analysing their implications for US foreign policy. In an attempt to shed light on 
the President’s ability to lead US foreign policy, the chapter explores the enduring constraints 
of the American political system, the more fluid dynamics of intra-party divisions and the in-
tervening potential of public opinion. It is argued that all these factors act as enablers of and 
constraints on the foreign-policy agenda of the Trump administration.  
Part II of the report focuses on the current trajectories of US foreign and defence policy. 
Chapter 4 elaborates on the “Trump doctrine” and its relationship with America’s enduring 
foreign-policy traditions. The aim is to explore the international implications of the “America 
First” and “Make America Great Again” slogans, and the extent to which the Trumpian ap-
proach departs from US foreign-policy thought and practice in the longer term. Tapping into 
different traditions of foreign policy, the analysis offers some preliminary insights that shed 
light on how the current administration envisions US global engagement. 
Chapter 5 analyses the emerging US defence policy in the Trump era. In spite of persistent 
turmoil in the domestic political sphere, the vast US defence establishment is engaged in 
various military activities, including operations in the broader Middle East, the strengthening 
of the US presence in Europe, and countering possible future crises in North Korea and po-
tentially even Iran. The administration is currently in the process of compiling its conceptual 
framework for these efforts in the form of various strategic reviews – a task that should be 
complete by early 2018. This chapter investigates the strategic changes and continuities that 
are likely to emerge from these reviews, and assesses their effects on US defence capabilities 
and transatlantic partnerships.  
Part III of the report deals with issues related to multilateral governance. 
Chapter 6 analyses the uncertain future of the liberal international order. This body of norms, 
rules and institutions that evolved after the Second World War under American leadership is 
facing a number of internal and external challenges. These include the rise of anti-globalist 
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sentiments, shifts in the global distribution of power and the growing importance of non-state 
actors. Such long-term trends are further complicated by more timely factors, of which the 
uncertainty over US global leadership during the current administration is a key example. 
From a longer-term perspective, potential trajectories for the liberal international order are 
considered in the light of the current political situation in the US and globally. 
Chapter 7 zooms in on the current administration’s international economic policy, with a par-
ticular focus on foreign trade relations. For Donald Trump, the 2016 presidential campaign 
was a showcase for economic nationalism, the core institutions and tenets of international 
trade bearing the brunt of his rhetorical offensive. Aside from America’s quick exit from the 
Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) and the launch of the NAFTA renegotiation process, at pre-
sent it appears that the new president’s critique of trade practices might be more rhetorical 
than substantive. However, there are worrying signs in relation to the country’s evolving ap-
proach to the core institutions of global trade, the WTO in particular. US attempts to assert its 
economic muscle vis-à-vis China could also bring negative externalities to bear upon other 
trade partners.   
Part IV of the report covers emerging great-power politics. 
Chapter 8 investigates the relationship between the United States and Russia. Donald 
Trump’s victory in the 2016 presidential elections raised the possibility of an improvement in 
Russian-American relations, which had deteriorated during the previous eight years despite 
the Obama administration’s attempt to “reset” them. However, persistent differences between 
these two great powers have led to recurring cycles of frustrated expectations, of which the 
current impasse is only the most recent example. Although the US and Russia share certain 
common interests, it is likely that they will be outweighed by differences on various policy 
issues such as Syria, Ukraine, North Korea and China, as well as the unfolding Russia inves-
tigations. Consequently, the poor state of US-Russian relations will likely endure during, and 
possibly also beyond, the Trump/Putin era.  
Chapter 9 explores the US role in the transforming security environment in Asia. There were 
widely held perceptions at the start of the current presidential administration that US foreign 
policy would shift dramatically – from “Asia first” to “America First”. Nevertheless, Donald 
Trump’s early foreign-policy approach to this vital region exhibits significant continuity with 
Barack Obama’s “rebalance to Asia” policy. In particular, it appears that America will maintain 
its strong military presence in the region and hold onto its security commitments. However, it 
may well expect more from its allies and partners in return. These core continuities are vital 
not only for maintaining a balance against a rising China, but also for managing the various 
strategic challenges in the Asia-Pacific region, including those in the South China Sea, the 
Korean peninsula and the Taiwan Strait.      
Part V of the report focuses on America’s evolving engagement in Europe in general, the 
circumpolar North, and the Nordic-Baltic region. 
Chapter 10 traces current trends in the transatlantic relationship, arguably the most mature 
example of a security community in the world. Yet, the first year of the current US administra-
tion has been characterised by increasingly strained relations between the US and Europe, 
and commentaries on the erosion of the transatlantic bond have proliferated. However, the 
relationship has never been problem-free, characterised instead by fluctuating tensions. Nev-
ertheless, it has endured because of robust security and economic links, as well as common 
institutions and a (by and large) shared value base. Currently, in spite of fears raised by 
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Trump’s inflammatory rhetoric, the security and economic pillars of the community show con-
siderable resilience. With regard to the value base and commitment to institutions, however, 
differences between the continents have been brought to the fore.  
Chapter 11 investigates US engagement in the transforming circumpolar north. Reflecting the 
broader Zeitgeist, there has been uncertainty about the future of US policy in the Arctic. De-
spite initial concerns, the US under the current administration appears to recognise enduring 
strategic interests in the Arctic, and continues to engage in practical co-operation in the re-
gion. That said, there remains the worry that President Trump will advocate certain policies 
that might be contradictory to the long-term goals and aspirations of international co-operation 
in the region. These concerns include the President’s critical approach to climate change, his 
emphasis on bilateral transactionalism as opposed to multilateral co-operation, and the recal-
ibration of the relationship with Russia in the absence of a noticeable change in its behaviour. 
Chapter 12 explores US security engagement in the Baltic Sea region. It first places the Baltic 
Sea in the global geostrategic context and then considers how the US has responded to the 
changing balance between the normative/economic and geostrategic pressures that animate 
its involvement in this region. The US response is examined on three levels of interaction: the 
institutional, the practical and the personal. On all three levels there are indications of a sig-
nificantly more active United States, which through its myriad actions has managed both to 
reassure its allies in the region, and to draw in Sweden and Finland as closer partners in 
regional security, thereby enhancing webs of cooperation. 
The Conclusion presents reflections on the preceding analysis, and ends with some general 
rules of thumb for Finland in what could be described as an emergent transatlantic “waiting 
game”. 
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PART I: DOMESTIC DRIVERS OF CHANGE AND 
CONTINUITY 
2. The political culture: competing visions for 21st-century 
America 
 The Trump administration has drawn upon polarising politico-cultural resources – the 
conservative narrative of decline and the revival of religiosity – to frame the tenets of 
its “America First” policy agenda both domestically and globally.  
 The conservative narrative of decline focuses on reviving the US national character 
by emphasising patriotic zeal, civilizational identity grounded on its Anglo-American 
heritage, and a specifically Judeo-Christian conception of American civil religion. 
 Conservative Christian themes have become more prominent in American public life. 
Their proponents view the espousal of (overly) liberal values as a regressive devel-
opment for America and Western civilisation in general, and have sought to “restore” 
Christian values and practices in the body politic. 
 Drawing on these resources, the worldview of president Trump (and some of his ad-
visors) breaks with secularist and liberal traditions, and instead emphasises the need 
to protect the Christian and European creed of the American way of life. The admin-
istration is thus likely to espouse a “custodian of principle” approach in its foreign 
engagement.  
2.1 Introduction 
Donald J. Trump’s incumbency was forged in an extraordinarily polarising presidential cam-
paign.3 As a candidate, Trump turned practical issues into signs of moral difference rather 
than embracing the American tradition of pragmatic pluralism, which entails turning potentially 
divisive moral problems into manageable practical issues. As president, instead of engaging 
in professorial speeches in the vein of his predecessor Barack Obama, Trump has utilised 
devices outside of the traditional mediascape – Twitter in particular – to persuade people of 
the presumed existence of a shared, but now lost, communal and moral element in America, 
framed in conservative, populist and reactionary rhetoric. Time and again, he has shown a 
propensity to use hyperbole and antagonistic language to attack political opponents.  
Trump's use of such politico-cultural resources is at times incoherent, and even self-contra-
dictory. However, it is also dynamic and can trigger the foundational myths by which a political 
community remembers and reproduces itself, along with the rites and devotions of this 
grounding process. Trump’s interpretation of this American “civil religion” or “creed” draws on 
Christian values, its European heritage, and the idea of the US-led West as a Christian civili-
sation. It is an alternative to the globalist understanding of the US as a multicultural melting 
pot.  
The American tradition of pragmatic pluralism is therefore under assault in the present political 
climate of polarisation. People with diverse backgrounds and ideologies are finding it harder 
                                                     
3 This chapter draws upon Aaltola, Mika and Ville Sinkkonen. 2017. “Political culture and the domestic aspects of American leadership: Towards a new 
version of the Clash of Civilizations.” FIIA Working Paper 95, June 8, 2017. https://www.fiia.fi/en/publication/political-culture-and-the-domestic-aspects-of-
american-leadership.    
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to engage in issue-based dialogue to solve common problems. The aim in this chapter is to 
make sense of this impasse in the light of two long-term trends in the US domestic political 
culture: the proliferation of narratives of decline and the revival of religiosity. These trends 
play a role in shaping the leadership mode of the Trump administration both domestically and 
in relation to America’s evolving global role. 
2.2 American narratives of doom and gloom 
All foreign-policy leaders are products of their sociocultural surroundings (Hopf 2002, 37). 
Domestic ideological contestation is therefore an essential factor to be considered in the de-
velopment of the global role of the United States and its evolving relationship with the world. 
In particular, identity-political dynamics influence the central tenets of American foreign-policy 
consensus: whether or not the US should have a global leadership role, remain globally en-
gaged, and maintain its responsibilities and commitments. 
According to opinion polls, an increasing number of Americans believe that the US is on the 
wrong track, or on a declining path.4 Of course, such an alarmist interpretation is by no means 
new. In fact, Joseph Nye (2015) traces the tradition of American declinism back to the days 
of the Massachusetts Bay colony in the 17th century, and cycles of declinism have ebbed and 
flowed ever since, including in the 20th century (Joffe 2009). At present, there seem to be two 
prevalent and competing formulations of American decline: the liberal and the conservative.  
The liberal narrative laments America’s incapability of perfecting itself as a lawfully and justly 
regulated realm with minorities able to voice their opinions. According to this account, the US 
should strive harder to be a nation of rules and laws. Liberals see the US as a self-perfecting 
and self-governing community, the key rationale of which should be the struggle to expand 
justice. The liberal vision also calls for normative consistency in US foreign policy.5 President 
Barack Obama’s often-repeated phrase “the arc of history bends towards justice” is a good 
illustration of how just rules should be seen as a starting point for both domestic government 
and global engagement (Washington Post 2013).  
Conservative declinism, on the other hand, laments the erosion of the traditional value base 
of American society as a result of globalisation, immigration and the loss of religiosity along 
with the overarching liberalisation of individual conduct. The conservative narrative thus fo-
cuses on reviving America’s national character in emphasising patriotic zeal, civilizational 
identity grounded on its Anglo-American heritage, and a particular Judeo-Christian conception 
of American civil religion. In the sphere of foreign engagement, the conservative vision fore-
sees danger in the lack of dynamic and direct action to defend America’s place in the world, 
even if this comes at the expense of policy consistency.  
These two views of declinism are competing, contradictory and increasingly mutually exclu-
sive. Within both, any deviations from the respective ideals are regarded as signs of decay 
and political regression.  
Donald Trump, by and large, subscribes to the conservative declinist narrative, and it consti-
tutes a key building block of his threat perceptions. He has highlighted the need to put “Amer-
ica First” in its dealings with the rest of the world (White House 2017a), and has drawn paral-
lels between excessive liberal or globalist ambitions and America’s domestic and international 
                                                     
4 According to a Wall Street Journal and NBC News poll from July 17, 2016, for instance, 73 per cent “say things have gone off-course” (Zitner 2016).  
5 For arguments reflecting the tenets of the liberal declinist view, see for example Ikenberry (2012, 326-331) and Kupchan (2012, 159-166). 
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predicaments (White House 2017b; Stephens 2017). This theme of overextension contains 
different, but interrelated, variants in the Trumpian trope. Economic overstretch evokes prob-
lematic outflows of capital, a global imbalance of trade surpluses, “unfair” free-trade pacts and 
stifling climate-change regulations, all of which are potentially disadvantageous to the US 
(White House 2017c; White House 2017d; Ross 2017). There is also a sense of danger that 
the United States is living beyond its means by stretching its military resources too thinly: 
consider, for instance, Trump's comments about the need for fairer burden-sharing in NATO 
(White House 2017e; White House 2017f).  
Trump has also made strong references to a cultural form of overstretch, meaning the degree 
of over-extendedness with reference to civic resources such as declining morality and work 
ethics. The conservative narrative of American overextension tends to link foreign influences 
with the nation’s political regression. According to this declinist vision, there is a possibility 
that outsiders will culturally undermine core American values if the US tries to integrate too 
many people or accommodate the national interests of too many allies (see Kaplan 1994; 
Huntington 2004, 30-45). The perceived danger is that foreign practices or elements will dilute 
core American civic beliefs. Trump's comments about “bad Mexicans”, the need to build a 
border wall and his toying with labelling China a currency manipulator could be viewed in this 
light (Tennery 2016; White House 2017g; Lawder 2017).  
In this manner, America’s global role comes to be understood as a function of a “healthy” 
domestic civil religion. Trump’s rhetoric stressing internal problems and societal ills – a vast 
drug problem, a high rate of violent crime, the lack of a national direction and mission and a 
decline in family values – is therefore relevant from the perspective of US global engagement. 
In the language of decline and fall, these are problems stemming from perceived civil irreligi-
osity (White House 2017b; White House 2017h). Trump’s “America First” doctrine maintains 
that the only way to fix these underlying problems is to avoid global overextension. Interna-
tional commitments are thus seen as a function of, or in the worst case detrimental to, do-
mestic health. From this standpoint, the new president appears to embody a transitionary 
figure who will rid US foreign policy of the misinformed strategy of “deep engagement” fa-
voured by Obama-era liberals and Bush-era neoconservatives, and place it on a footing in-
creasingly favoured by the country’s populace (see Schweller 2017). 
2.3 A civilizational focus 
The narratives of American decline have international implications and tangible conse-
quences for America’s preferred modes of engagement and perception of threats. In key 
speeches both domestically and internationally, Trump has highlighted the concept of “civili-
sation” as opposed to much more traditional terms such as human rights, democracy and 
freedom (White House 2017f; 2017i). Trump’s vision is one of prosperous and secure civilised 
regions surrounded by enemies, which will ultimately seek access to American territory 
thereby challenging its culture and endangering its prosperity. The civilised world is the last 
stronghold against these “barbaric” elements of chaos (Kaplan 1994). Trump often uses lan-
guage that suggests signs of contagious hazards – corruption, political violence, drugs et 
cetera – that threaten to spread to the US from the outside (White House 2017b; 2017h). On 
the Trumpian world map, international borders and lines of communication from air and sea 
to cyberspace represent possible vectors for the spread of dangerous “cultural pollution”. For 
Trump, liberal ideas and institutions represent the wrong types of “cure” for America’s present 
ills. Primarily, America’s resources need to be used for the defence of the homeland and the 
“civilised world” as Trump defines it (White House 2017a; 2017b; 2017i).  
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Trump's vision for America’s global engagement and domestic regeneration bears similarities 
with Samuel Huntington’s “clash of civilizations” framework (Rachman 2017; Walt 2017a). In 
Huntington’s (1993; 2002) view, the international politics of the post-Cold War world would 
not be dominated by economic conflict or a battle between competing grand ideologies. In-
stead, cultural identity would become increasingly salient, and future conflicts in international 
politics would take place on the “fault lines” between cultural entities called civilisations.6 For 
Huntington, the most precarious of civilizational divides was between the non-Muslim and the 
Muslim worlds (Huntington 2002, 255).   
Some of the advisors President Trump nominated at the beginning of his term, including now-
ousted chief strategist Stephen Bannon, senior policy advisor Stephen Miller and National 
Security Council spokesman Michael Anton, subscribe to this civilizational worldview and 
frame “radical Islamic terrorism” as an existential threat to the United States (Anton 2017; 
Smith 2017). Trump’s inauguration speech, reportedly written in part by Bannon, evoked the 
notion of a civilised world locked in conflict with “radical Islamic terrorism, which we [America 
with Trump at the helm] will eradicate completely from the face of the earth” (White House, 
2017b). In this vein, the task of the new administration is to act as a vanguard in the inter-
civilizational battle between the Judeo-Christian West and the “others”. These others include 
“Islamist extremists” and Iran (White House 2017j), but the category has proven sufficiently 
fluid also to include other “rogue” regimes such as Cuba, North Korea and even Venezuela 
(White House 2017k).  
The Trump administration began putting its civilizational sentiments into practice in the form 
of an executive order issued on January 27, 2017, banning travel from seven Muslim-majority 
countries for a period of 90 days (White House 2017l). The order faced legal challenges and 
was duly frozen by a US district judge in the state of Washington, a verdict upheld by the US 
Court of Appeal for the Ninth Circuit (Ford 2017). A revised order in March sought to rectify 
some of the most troubling aspects of the original, exempting permanent US residents and 
visa-holders, and dropping the reference to the preferential treatment of religious minorities 
(Thrush 2017). The Supreme Court allowed parts of this revised ban to go into effect in June 
(Shear and Liptak 2017). However, the Court cancelled oral arguments on the temporary ban, 
as the administration rolled out a new version that sets different degrees of restriction on travel 
and immigration into the United States for citizens of Libya, Syria, Yemen, Somalia, Chad, 
North Korea, Iran and Venezuela (White House 2017m; Shear et al. 2017). The Supreme 
Court allowed this new ban to take effect on December 4, 2017, despite on-going legal chal-
lenges (Liptak 2017). 
The clash-of-civilisations worldview of the Trump administration is not limited to the battle 
against terrorism and rogue states, however. In fact, there is a strong domestic-politics aspect 
in the Huntingtonian thesis, according to which immigration is a source of potential decay in 
the political community. Of particular concern for Huntington (2004, 141) were immigrants 
“from other civilizations who reject assimilation and continue to adhere to and propagate the 
values, customs, and cultures of their home societies”, a danger intensified by modern forms 
of communication. As immigrants retain their links to their countries and communities of origin, 
people from different civilisations come to represent a potential source of decay in America’s 
collective identity (Huntington 1997, 28-49; 2002, 306). In the worst case, such an erosion of 
the American creed could ultimately lead the US to rescind its leadership role as the vanguard 
                                                     
6 In his later book, Huntington distinguished between eight such civilisations: Sinic, Japanese, Hindu, Islamic, Orthodox, Western, Latin American and, with 
a caveat, African (Huntington 2002, 45-47).  
  
 
14 
 
of Western civilisation. In the inter-civilizational battle, this scenario would precipitate an inev-
itable decline in the United States as well as in Western civilisation in general (Aysha 2003).  
Trump’s election campaign approximated these Huntingtonian views, especially in its inflam-
matory immigration rhetoric. Although the President’s tone has admittedly softened since his 
infamous comments depicting Mexican immigrants as sexual assaulters (TIME 2015), he has 
retained the substantive edge of his attack on immigration in key speeches by framing it as 
an internal security threat (White House 2017b; New York Times 2017a). He has, for example, 
issued two executive orders to strengthen border controls and issue penalties to “sanctuary 
cities” unwilling to aid the federal government in the deportation of illegal aliens (White House 
2017n; White House 2017o). Candidate Trump also pledged to erect a wall along the Mexican 
border, a promise that he still insists on honouring as President, although he has been forced 
to put his plans on hold in the face of congressional unwillingness to fund the project (White 
House 2017h; Hulse 2017a; Becker and Cornwell 2017). Trump has also targeted the De-
ferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) programme launched by the Obama administra-
tion, which has protected the children of undocumented immigrants from deportation. After 
Trump’s decision to end the programme, Congress was given six months to come up with an 
agreement on the fate of some 800,000 “Dreamers” enrolled in it (Shear and Hirschfeld Da-
vies 2017). 
Yet, Trump’s offensive is taking place as estimates show a winding down of illegal immigration 
to the United States, especially via the Southern border. In fact, according to Pew Research 
Center, since 2009 the number of Mexican immigrants leaving the US has exceeded the num-
ber of new entrants (Passel and Cohn 2016; Gonzalez-Barbera and Krogstad 2017). 
2.4 Modes of religious leadership 
According to James Davison Hunter (1991, 44), there are two important groups claiming moral 
legitimacy in contemporary America. The first comprises the conservatives, or the orthodox, 
united in their “commitment […] to an external, definable, and transcendent authority”. These 
custodians of the American creed are priming themselves to lead their people through dra-
matic times, and draw their rhetoric from religious fundamentals and authorities. The second 
group could be characterised as liberals or progressives, whose legitimacy derives from plu-
ralist and secularist ideas of modernity. These two groups provide the stock figures of the 
contemporary American politico-religious scene. 
The secularist spirit has been under challenge in American political life in recent decades. 
The roots of these recent developments can be traced to changes that have taken place in 
American Christianity, especially to the rise of charismatic evangelicalism in mainstream 
American society. 
Two competing versions of Christian revivalism developed in the 1960s and 1970s as a back-
lash against political disorder and the impression that American society was in disarray. The 
division became manifest in issues such as legalised abortion and family values, but also 
reflected the perceived weakening of America’s global position. The conservative wing saw 
these progressive themes as antagonistic developments that weakened the American Judeo-
Christian creed, whereas the liberals highlighted the need for a progressive interpretation of 
freedoms and rights. 
Conservative Christian narratives claim that something went wrong in the otherwise pure and 
righteous US with the spread of liberal, cosmopolitan and globalist ideas (Dochuk, Kidd and 
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Peterson 2014. 3-8). Controversies over expansion of civil rights, the Vietnam War, contra-
ception and abortion, together with the HIV/AIDS outbreak, contributed further to the percep-
tion that the American Christian way of life was under attack. Christian revivalism was meant 
to counteract the centrifugal forces of value pluralism, socialism, the mass immigration of non-
Christians and globalisation. In the eyes of the Christian right these dangers legitimised the 
return of openly Christian themes and values to public life. Hence, in the conservative narra-
tive, liberal values came to be regarded as a regressive development in Western civilisation. 
The liberal definition of America was resisted both at home and abroad, such as in the sending 
of missionaries abroad to preach against the decadence of Western-style liberalism. 
The religious movement in America also sought to “restore” and “re-establish” Christian val-
ues and practices in public life, and started to demand that politicians be openly Christian 
(Casanova 1994, 158). During the 1980s, mainstream politicians began using increasingly 
religious language to express themselves, and in politics this type of religious rhetoric fuelled 
nostalgia for an American golden age that had been lost because of the liberal expansion of 
rights. This nostalgic yearning for a real but lost America effectively became a sounding board 
for political populism. 
At the same time, state secularity has remained a very powerful principle in the US, and the 
multicultural character of the nation has relied on the separation between state and church. 
In a similar vein, the liberal secularisation hypothesis has been driven by the desire to turn 
religion into a private matter (Hadden 1987). The roots of liberal-humanistic civil religion go 
back to the Enlightenment. It is based on a secular conception of humanity and virtues such 
as freedom, equality, human goodness, friendship and compassion for distant others. The 
secular movement opposed established forms of religion, but was not directed against religion 
per se. This critique of blind faith in the authority of religious institutions and figures could 
accommodate rational members of secular humanity holding religious beliefs, as long as 
these beliefs were not irrational or in contradistinction to more secular forms of knowledge. 
The revival of religious themes in public life means that Christianity has broken away from the 
private realm and has returned to play an important role in day-to-day politics. Although sec-
ularisation is still a trend, it is counteracted by the increasing political influence of themes 
espoused by the Christian Right. In fact, the US currently seems to be an outlier when it 
comes to the significance of religion in society at large within the group of economically more 
developed countries (see Figure 1). This countervailing drift also strengthens the Christian 
elements in American civil religion. The content of contemporary civil religion is increasingly 
Christian and less dependent on the values and myths of modern secularity. For example, it 
has become customary to include an act of prayer, which until only recently was considered 
a private matter, in the public speeches of American presidents. This has brought a sense of 
introspection and mystical experience to public speeches (Schmidt 2002, 602).   
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Figure 1: The role of religion in society versus the country’s wealth
Source: Pew Research Center (2016b) 
Against this background, orthodox custodian-of-principle political figures draw on Judeo-
Christian themes – such as the Bible, the Holy Land, divine mission, prayer and God. They 
promote a programme that resists liberal secularism and multiculturalism, and highlights cer-
tain American experiences such as its exceptional way of life, divine providence or mission, 
and the Founding Fathers. Reflecting the themes of the Evangelical movement and the reli-
gious right, custodians of principle often refer to the programmatic notion that Christian ideals 
should guide the public life of the nation. In this context, themes such as pro-life and the 
freedom to carry guns have functioned as rallying calls, and these political ideals have led to 
the mobilisation of strong movements, most recently the Tea Party and the Trump campaign. 
In addition, custodians of principle make frequent Manichean references to a cosmic battle 
between good and evil. Their relationship with people and states deemed to be outside of or 
– worse – antagonistic to American-led civilisation is openly hostile. 
President Trump's custodian-of-principle rhetoric frames Western civilisation and its power in 
terms of religious values. “America first” conveys the nationalistic message of the US as the 
land of God’s chosen people. For instance, when he announced the April 2017 cruise missile 
strike against Assad’s forces in Syria, Trump appealed to the civilised world and, in a profound 
break from established tradition, blessed not only America but also “the entire world”. The 
rhetoric that Trump used to justify the missile strike also reflects this mode of cultural leader-
ship: “Tonight I call on all civilized nations to join us in seeking to end the slaughter and blood-
shed in Syria […] We ask for God's wisdom as we face the challenge of our very troubled 
world” (quoted in Beckwith 2017). A similar evocation of evil is also apparent in Trump’s call 
to Arab leaders in Riyadh to step up in the battle against terrorism: “[P]iety to evil will bring 
you no dignity. If you choose the path of terror, your life will be empty, your life will be brief, 
and YOUR SOUL WILL BE CONDEMNED” (White House 2017j; capitals in original). 
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It is thus clear that the worldview of president Trump (and some of his advisors) breaks with 
secularist and liberal traditions. It holds secular values to be idealistic and bleary-eyed, and 
purports to protect the Christian and European creed of the American way of life. Judging by 
the use of underlying cultural resources by the Trump administration, its foreign policy is likely 
to continue adopting the custodian-of-principle approach. 
2.5 The polarisation of identity politics 
The ideological and civil-religious characteristics of the Trump administration emanate from 
fundamental changes in the general composition of the American political culture. Trump's 
election victory, and his winning coalition, could be considered a reaction against the under-
lying and – according to some observers – unsurpassable demographic trends, which favour 
a more secularist and multiculturalist interpretation of America. In this sense, Trump’s triumph 
represents the victory of identity politics over structural trends.   
This is the case despite statistics indicating a general decline in religiosity in the United States. 
In a prominent poll, the proportion of agnostics and those unwilling to identify their faith stood 
at 22.8 per cent in 2014, an increase of 6.7 per cent since 2007 (Pew Research Center 2015). 
However, the proportion of white born-again/evangelical Christians in the electorate has re-
mained at roughly 20 per cent for the last two decades (Pew Research Center 2016a). It has 
also been estimated that white born-again/evangelical Christians make up 35 per cent of Re-
publican Party supporters (Pew Research Center 2016a). When other groups with broadly 
similar views – namely Catholics and Mormons – are factored in, approximately 57 per cent 
of the Republican support base is made up of what is often termed the “Christian Right”, 
constituting a formidable coalition of veritably reliable voters (Marsden 2014, 121). 
Whereas the role of evangelicals and the Christian Right has expanded in the Republican 
Party, support for Democrats within these religious groups has declined steadily over the last 
two decades – before the 2016 election, eight per cent of the Democratic support base com-
prised white evangelicals, compared to 16 per cent in 1996 (Pew Research Center 2016a). 
The secular component of the Democratic base has grown accordingly, from ten per cent in 
the mid-1990s to 29 per cent in 2016 (Pew Research Center 2016a). Interestingly, the secular 
shift at the population level has not been reflected in the makeup of the legislature: Congress 
appears to be profoundly religious, with over 90 per cent of members identifying, at least by 
declaration, as Christian (Pew Research Center 2017a).7  
Related to this dynamic of apparent secularisation is the changing composition of the US 
population. According to an argument originally coined by John Judis and Ruy Teixeira (2004) 
in the early 2000s, the demographic changes unfolding in the United States will, in the long 
run, lead to the advent of a “Democratic majority”. In fact, an independent review panel com-
missioned by the Republican National Committee (RNC) to plot a way forward after the 2012 
elections between Barack Obama and Mitt Romney recommended making concerted efforts 
to secure support and new voters from ethnic and racial minorities, as well as from young and 
female demographic groups, to prevail in future elections (Barbour et al. 2012, 12).  
Over 26 per cent of those who voted in the 2012 presidential election were non-white, alt-
hough this figure still falls considerably short of their 37-per-cent share of the American pop-
ulation at the time (Taylor 2016, 32). According to exit polls, Obama won overwhelmingly in 
the black, Hispanic and Asian voter groups, with 93, 71 and 73 per-cent support, respectively. 
                                                     
7 55.9 per cent of representatives identify as Protestant and 31.4 as Catholic (Pew Research Center 2017a).  
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The Republican candidate Romney, in turn, received 59 per cent of the white vote (New York 
Times 2012). Romney beat Obama by over two million votes in the over-30s demographic 
(Taylor 2016, 32), whereas Obama had the broad support of the under-30s, with 60 per cent 
of the vote (Pew Research Center, 2012a). Romney also racked up 79 per cent of the evan-
gelical Protestant vote, and won the white Protestant vote overwhelmingly, with 69 per cent 
to Obama’s 30 per cent (Pew Research Center 2012b).  
A recent study conducted by the United States Census Bureau estimates that the proportion 
of non-Hispanic whites will decline from 62.2 per cent of the population in 2014 to 43.6 per 
cent in 2060 (Colby and Ortman 2015, 9). If the present projections for birth, mortality and 
immigration rates underpinning such estimates prove correct, at around mid-century non-His-
panic whites will no longer comprise the largest ethnic group in the United States (Colby and 
Ortman 2015, 9; see also Figure 2). 
Figure 2: Demographic trends in America 
Source: Pew Research Center (2016c) 
The problem with demographic changes, however, is that they are slow and structural in na-
ture. In the fallout of the 2014 Democrat defeat in the midterm elections, John Judis (2015) 
recanted on his earlier claims regarding the emergence of a Democratic majority, and argued 
that support for the Democrats was declining ominously, not only within the white working 
classes but also among the white middle class. The lesson of the 2016 election is that de-
mography is hardly destiny, and political factors may intervene and render contingent what 
once seemed inevitable (see Holland 2017a; Foran 2017; Erickson et al. 2017).  
To a large extent, the crux of Trump’s winning strategy was his recognition of the “missing 
white voter”, who could be stirred by a clear but simplified anti-globalist, anti-establishment 
and culturally divisive message (Trubowitz 2016; Holyk 2016). This was a far cry from the 
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opening up of the GOP to the diverse group of minority voters, as suggested in the 2012 RNC 
report. According to exit polls, the Republican candidate attracted 58 per cent of the white 
vote, and particularly excelled amongst white voters without a college degree with 67 per cent 
of the vote (Huang et al. 2016).8 This allowed Trump to take control of the “Rust Belt” swing 
states, which ensured his victory. Hillary Clinton, although beating Trump decisively in the 
popular vote tally (Wasserman 2017), failed to garner Obama-like support from black, His-
panic and Asian voters.9 
However, lost amidst the furore over Trump’s successful mobilisation of the white non-college-
educated vote is the role of the Republicans’ religious coalition. Despite considerable uproar 
over Trump’s inflammatory rhetoric and revelations of sexism, exit polls show that the evan-
gelicals supported the new incumbent overwhelmingly – 81 per cent voted for Trump and only 
16 per cent for Clinton (Huang et al. 2016). In fact, as analyst Sean Trende (2016) points out: 
“Trump received more votes from white evangelicals than Clinton received from African-Amer-
icans and Hispanics combined [a considerable chunk of the ‘Obama coalition’]. This single 
group [the white evangelicals] very nearly cancels the Democrats’ advantage among non-
whites completely.” 
Figure 3: Voting patterns in the 2016 presidential election 
 
Source: Huang et al. (2016) 
                                                     
8 This marked a 14-per-cent shift in favour of the Republican Party compared to the 2012 elections (Huang et al. 2016). 
9 Clinton had 88, 65 and 65 per cent of support in the black, Hispanic and Asian demographics, respectively (Ehsan 2016, 1-3; Huang et al. 2016). 
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Voters subscribing to the orthodox brand of American civil religion were clearly influential in 
dismantling the demography-based Democratic advantage in the 2016 election. The trustwor-
thy religious coalition, along with the mobilisation of the white working class, ultimately spurred 
Trump on to victory. The religious right, therefore, constitutes a dependable base of followers, 
upon which the alarmist strand of conservative declinism propounded by the Trump admin-
istration can anchor itself in the on-going contest over America’s identity-political landscape. 
This will continue as long as voters belonging to the Christian Right can trust Republican 
administrations to take their concerns into account, especially in pushing through conserva-
tive judicial appointments such as that of the latest Supreme Court Justice Neil Gorsuch. In 
fact, Trump has a momentous opportunity to shift the American courts in a more conservative 
direction, given the ageing bench on the Supreme Court and also in the appeals courts (Sav-
age 2017).  
Unsurprisingly, the Trump incumbency has brought with it visible manifestations of a funda-
mental rupture in America’s body politic. Protests of historic proportions took place across the 
United States in the aftermath of Trump’s inauguration (Broomfield 2017). Instead of opting 
for measures to unite the country, the administration has stoked the flames further by feeding 
the insecurities of its supporters. In August, there were violent clashes between right-wing 
nationalists and counter protesters in Charlottesville, Virginia over the removal of a Confed-
erate statue. Instead of condemning the white-supremacist elements, President Trump took 
an ambivalent stand, fuelling further speculation of racist inclinations (White House 2017p). 
Trump’s attack on the National Football League (NFL) for allowing its players to protest 
against police violence directed at black people by “taking a knee” during the national anthem 
has done little to dispel such fears (Selk 2017). In fact, the first nine months of Trump’s pres-
idency have elapsed in the midst of an on-going feud with liberal-leaning media outlets, which 
have gone out of their way to criticise the administration’s sketchy policy record (Nussbaum 
and McCaskill 2017). This strategy panders to the perception of a “liberal media bias”, which 
remains widely shared amongst Republican supporters (Gates 2016; Saad 2017). 
The profound political division is borne out in opinion-poll data collected during the first months 
of Trump’s presidency. A Pew survey conducted in February 2017 reported that Donald 
Trump’s approval rating was a mere six per cent amongst interviewees who regard them-
selves as Democrat or Democrat-leaning (Pew Research Center 2017b). This is an unprece-
dented lack of support for a new president among supporters of the opposition party.10 A 
survey released in June gave the same figure for Democrats, whereas Republican and Re-
publican-leaning respondents rated Trump highly, with 81 per cent voicing their approval. 
Negative views of Donald Trump’s incumbency also reflect the ethnic and racial divisions in 
the country: 88 per cent of black and 72 per cent of Hispanic respondents disapproved of the 
President’s job performance. In contrast, half of white respondents approved of Trump’s early 
endeavours in the White House (Pew Research Center 2017c).  
When it comes to reactions to President Trump’s policies, particularly those tracking the ad-
ministration’s civilizational agenda, polarisation remains profound. On the most general level, 
according to a Chicago Council on Global Affairs survey, anti-globalist views were prominent 
amongst Trump supporters before the 2016 election: only 49 per cent regarded globalisation 
as “mostly good” for the economy (Smeltz et al. 2016, 20-21). The corresponding figures were 
59 per cent for Republican supporters in general, and 74 per cent for Democrats (Smeltz et 
                                                     
10 The corresponding figures for President Obama amongst Republicans in February 2009 was 37 per cent, and even George W. Bush – who came to 
power in the wake of a Supreme Court battle over the fate of the presidency – enjoyed an approval rating of 30 per cent amongst Democrat supporters 
(Pew Research Center 2017b). 
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al. 2016, 20-21). According to the 2017 survey, 80 per cent of Trump supporters view immi-
grants and refugees entering the country as a “critical threat to the vital interests of the United 
States”, whereas the figures are 61 per cent for Republican supporters and 20 per cent for 
Democrats (Smeltz et al. 2017a, 25). 
There is, again, an ethnic and racial component to this division. Initial support for Trump’s 
first-week executive order placing restrictions on entry into the United States from seven Mus-
lim-majority countries was 49 per cent among white respondents, whereas the corresponding 
figures among black and Hispanic interviewees were 11 and 17 per cent (Pew Research 
Center 2017d). Notably, the response was also divided along religious lines: 76 per cent of 
white evangelical Protestants supported the ban, falling to 50 per cent among white mainline 
Protestants and 24 per cent among the religiously unaffiliated (Pew Research Center 2017d). 
The building of the wall along the Mexican border attracted widespread criticism amongst the 
general populace, with 62 per cent of respondents voicing their disapproval of the construction 
project. However, 74 per cent of Republicans and 80 per cent of conservative GOP supporters 
voiced their support for the policy (Suls 2017). 
Trump supporters – and GOP supporters in general – thus hold broadly supportive views on 
the core themes of the Trump campaign. Although the above illustrations merely scratch the 
surface, they not only reflect the deep polarisation of America’s political landscape along 
party, ethnic and racial lines, but also confirm the weddedness in Trump’s constituencies to 
the conservative strand of civil religion and the conservative declinist thesis propounded by 
the new presidency. The conservative strand of civil religion prevalent within the Republican 
Party would appear to favour the custodian-of-principle leadership mode. This development 
has the potential to fuel the polarisation, given that the Democratic Party is drawing increas-
ingly on America’s progressive cultural resources for leadership. 
2.6 Conclusion 
To conclude, it is worth emphasising that the sense of American decline, the revival of religion 
in US politics, and the country’s changing demographics are intimately intertwined with 
broader debates over America’s national and, by implication, foreign-policy identity. In stark 
contrast to the inclusive and multicultural vision of the Obama age, the American national 
identity propounded in the conservative vision of declinism and the orthodox brand of Ameri-
can civil religion is exclusive in nature. Its relationship with incompatible foreign elements 
could turn hostile. The inclusion of the “other”, those holding beliefs and value systems of 
non-Judeo Christian (and, to a lesser extent, non-Anglo Protestant) origin, would be sufficient 
to challenge the very foundations of Americanness.  
Although the electorate as a whole has become increasingly heterogeneous, many congres-
sional districts, for instance, are ethnically homogenous (Wong 2017, 28-29) – often by design 
through the practice of “gerrymandering”.11 Moreover, the electorate is still largely white and 
Christian. Trump's winning coalition could theoretically be mobilised for future elections, and 
the battle lines between the liberal and conservative narratives of internal and external threats 
may continue to characterise American politics for years.   
Immigration policy illustrates the potential for a continuation of the Trump coalition. Views on 
the reform of immigration legislation tend to track the partisan divide (Ehrenfreund 2016). 
Studies also show that anti-immigration attitudes tend to be more pronounced in areas in 
                                                     
11 Gerrymandering refers to the deliberate manipulation of electoral-district boundaries to favour a particular political party or group.  
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which few immigrants reside, and legislators hailing from such districts remain “unlikely to 
embrace the new demographic normal until electoral incentives demand it” (Wong 2017, 29-
30). It may be that these parts of America continue to be resistant to more secularist and 
liberal cultural identifiers. Such resistance could feasibly be utilised in future presidential elec-
tions as well.  
The domestic politico-cultural drivers of America have an effect beyond its shores. On the one 
hand, the impact may be diffuse and difficult to pin down. Ideas travel across oceans almost 
instantaneously in today’s complex and interconnected world. The politico-cultural divisions 
in the United States could thus have an impact on the development of similar debates in 
Europe. However, this cultural diffusion is not linear, and depends on manifold factors within 
the societies to which the ideas are transmitted. The rise of civilizational rhetoric and the 
hardening views on immigration in the United States could therefore engender both affinity 
for and aversion to such ideas – and the US in general – within European societies. 
On the other hand, the impact could also be channelled into the international arena through 
policy action, particularly in the manner in which US global engagement and identification are 
justified. A contemporary example is the utilisation by the George W. Bush administration of 
civilizational political leadership as a rationale for unilateral interventions. However, a distinc-
tion should be made between weak and strong justificatory arguments for interventionist en-
deavours (Purdy 2003). The weaker argument, often employed by more pragmatically inclined 
presidents, stems from the premise that clear differences exist between regimes in terms of 
their ability to practice responsible governance. Furthermore, this argument holds that re-
gimes should be held accountable for their shortcomings, and, in extreme conditions, their 
sovereignty may become conditional. The existence of regime ineptitude thus legitimises di-
rect or indirect control over foreign territory to help people, or to address non-state challenges 
such as terrorism.  
The stronger argument, on the other hand, rests on the assumption that there are differences 
in the cultural characteristics of a people, which affect its ability to maintain legitimate rule. 
This argument associates interventions with the civilising mission. Because of this existential 
nature, harder forms of interventionism tend to be employed by custodian-of-principle types 
of leader. Trump has used such hard-line justification in his reactions to ISIS, Syria’s use of 
chemical weapons, and the North Korean nuclear programme, for example. The strong argu-
ment takes for granted that some “rogue” states or localities do not have the same ability and 
readiness in terms of self-government, the underlying assumption being that some are more 
backward than others. Such “rogueness” invites a more exclusionary or even openly antago-
nistic attitude from the US. The implication is that if regimes perceived as deviant challenge 
US national interests when President Trump is at the helm, American reactions will probably 
be intense and direct. This would be a departure from the “pragmatic realism” and “strategic 
patience” of the Obama years. 
The boundaries of the Trumpian civilisation may yet be extended, but the principles of inclu-
sion still have cultural and religious signifiers. Russia, as a Christian nation, could potentially 
be included if it acknowledges American interests and engages in civilizational battles – 
against ISIS, for example. Although China does not share underlying cultural elements with 
the West, it could also be recognised as a civilizational actor if it pays heed to American 
economic, trade and geopolitical interests, and plays a role in defusing more existential dan-
gers such as in North Korea. As for America’s European allies, shared cultural affinities are 
clearly present, regardless of ideological differences and disagreement over burden sharing. 
The likely outcome is that reliable partners will be approached in cooperative forays, as long 
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as they contribute to the civilizational defence against threats such as ISIS and al-Qaeda. 
This would not only create prospects for sector-specific collaboration, but could also be useful 
in keeping America globally engaged – issues that America’s European partners and allies 
should bear in mind when formulating their policy approaches. 
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3. Institutional and party-political dynamics in the United 
States 
 Political power is divided between the executive and the legislative branches in the 
US political system. However, the unified government in the hands of the Republican 
Party opens up opportunities to advance a substantial conservative agenda at home 
and abroad.  
 In practice, success will depend on the ability of the Trump administration and Con-
gress to co-operate despite attempts by the minority to thwart its legislative agenda 
and the considerable divisions within the Republican Party over ideology and policy 
questions. 
 Policy differences have already emerged with regard to budgetary issues, such as 
funding the State Department and balancing “soft” and hard” elements of US power. 
Furthermore, there is contention over pressing items on the foreign-policy agenda, 
including the Iran nuclear deal, North Korea and Russia.  
 For the time being, America’s foreign policy remains conditioned by intra-party ten-
sions as well as problems within the Trump administration, in particular the on-going 
Russia investigations.  
3.1 Introduction 
The 2016 elections resulted in the surprising outcome of a unified government.12 Donald 
Trump was elected the 45th President of the United States, and the Republicans maintained 
majority-party status in both the Senate and the House of Representatives despite losing 
seats.13 In theory, this state of affairs should open up ample opportunities for the GOP to 
pursue its political agenda. However, in practice, success will depend on functional rapport 
between a White House led by a politically untested president and a Congress controlled by 
a fractious party, the electoral success of which did little to mend existing ruptures in its ranks. 
The present chapter therefore addresses the current situation in America’s political institutions 
and the inherent potential tensions, with a view to deciphering the implications for US foreign 
policy. In particular, it explores the systemic constraints of the American political system on 
the President’s foreign-policy leadership, the role of intra-party divisions in enabling and con-
straining the presidential administration’s foreign-policy agenda and the intervening potential 
of public opinion.  
3.2 The US political system: the interplay between presidential and congres-
sional power 
The US Constitution sets out the powers of the President and Congress. These powers are 
not static, however. They remain dependent to some extent on political realities, including the 
political capital of various actors, the contexts in which power is wielded, the issues that are 
dealt with, and the ways in which these issues are understood and defined by different actors. 
Broadly speaking, the powers of Congress are eminent in terms of legislating, levying taxes, 
                                                     
12 This chapter draws upon Kronlund, Anna. 2017. “Republican government in the United States: Its implications for US foreign policy.” FIIA Working 
Paper 99, September 20, 2017. https://www.fiia.fi/en/publication/republican-government-in-the-united-states.   
13 The respective numbers in the 115th Congress for Republicans and Democrats as of March 2017 are: in the Senate 52 to 46 (plus 2 independents 
caucusing with the Democrats), and in the House 239 to 197 (Manning 2017). The GOP lost 6 seats in the House and 2 seats in the Senate in the 2016 
elections (Peters 2017).  
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and appropriating funds, whereas the powers of the President, who heads the executive 
branch, are most prominent in matters related to foreign policy.  
The branches of US government are neither completely separate nor wholly autonomous. 
The president may, for example, unilaterally veto congressional legislation, which Congress 
could then overrule with a two-thirds majority. The House of Representatives and the Senate 
also have their own enumerated powers that can affect presidential decision-making. The 
Senate, for instance, gives, advice and provides consent when it comes to international trea-
ties (as distinct from executive agreements).14 It also confirms presidential nominations, which 
include Supreme Court justices, cabinet members, key department appointments and ambas-
sadors. Congress can also assume a key role in foreign-policy matters through its “power of 
the purse” – the ability to fund or defund certain foreign-policy initiatives the president pursues. 
The president thus needs co-operation from Congress for legislative actions, nominations and 
policy execution. 
Despite these systemic constraints, the president is empowered to advance his or her agenda 
through political leadership. A key tool in this regard is executive action, which can be taken 
without Congressional consent. The basis of this power lies in Article 2 of the Constitution, 
which states that executive authority is vested in the president of the United States. Generally 
speaking, there are three different types of executive action available to the president: exec-
utive orders, presidential memoranda and presidential proclamations.  
Executive orders are used to instruct the federal government and its agencies on the ways in 
which US policy or existing laws should be executed. They cannot be used to change existing 
legislation (which is the role of Congress), and they do not have “the force of law”, even if they 
have the status of law when they rely on the authority of existing statutes or the Constitution. 
This means they are also reversible, and future presidents may overrule predecessors’ or-
ders. Whereas executive orders usually deal with issues that warrant public awareness or 
heightened scrutiny, presidential memoranda concern the more routine actions of government 
agencies. Presidential proclamations, in turn, are typically handed down to enable the regu-
lation of private individuals: they could be considered strong recommendations (Garvey and 
Chu 2014; BBC 2017).  
The President enjoys considerable flexibility when it comes to executive actions. Within his 
first 100 days, Donald Trump issued more executive orders (31) than any president since 
Harry S. Truman (Cohen and Payson-Denney 2017). With regard to foreign policy in particu-
lar, President Trump’s executive actions include: 
- executive orders on building a wall along the US-Mexico border, banning immigration 
from seven Muslim-majority countries, rescinding certain regulations made by the 
previous government on climate change, and addressing trade-agreement violations 
and abuses; 
- presidential memoranda on defeating ISIS, rebuilding the military, approving the Da-
kota Access and Keystone XL oil pipelines, and withdrawing the US from the Trans-
Pacific Partnership (TPP) free-trade agreement; 
- a presidential proclamation enhancing the vetting capabilities of US border authorities 
(effectively modifying the two previous “travel bans”, see Chapter 2).15 
                                                     
14 The bulk of international agreements entered into by the US take the form of executive agreements, which do not require consent by the senate (Garcia 
2015, 4). 
15 For a list of Trump’s executive actions, see White House (2017q). 
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In addition, President Trump announced US withdrawal from the Paris climate accord to which 
the US was committed through an executive agreement by President Obama.16  
The ability of presidents to achieve their intended aims by means of executive actions should 
not be overstated, despite the leeway they provide. If an executive order requires funding to 
have an impact, for example, the president may well need the blessing of Congress, which 
as mentioned above, holds the “power of the purse”. This was famously the case with Presi-
dent Obama’s failure to close the contentious prison facility at Guantanamo Bay. Although he 
issued an executive order to close the base, Congress thwarted the plan by refusing to fund 
the closure of the prison, the transfer of detainees to the US and the construction of facilities 
for holding detainees on American soil (Reilly 2016).   
The president may also wield executive authority by pursuing rules and regulations in various 
US agencies to set policy. The new government cannot simply overturn regulations that have 
entered into force just by issuing an order, as it can in the case of executive orders: there is 
a formal process that must be adhered to. When it comes to pursuing deregulation, the pres-
ident has three options: he or she could challenge regulations through the legal system (judi-
cial review), ask Congress to revoke some of the potential regulations, or use the standard 
regulatory process to influence existing regulations – a slow and painstaking process (Shapiro 
2015; Garvey 2017). 
Although the president may advance parts of his or her agenda without Congress, he or she 
also needs it to amend existing legislation, enact new legislation, and authorise and appropri-
ate funding. Committee hearings in Congress (whether on legislation, strategy, nominations 
or budgetary issues) are a significant setting in which legislators are able to exert an influence 
on issues, including those related to the armed services or foreign relations. 
When it comes to foreign policy, the president is expected to take the lead. Although Congress 
is not well suited to managing daily crises given the frequently long and/or complex delibera-
tion, it may still make constructive contributions. In addition to appropriating funding, it pro-
vides advice and consent with regard to treaties. Recently, for instance, the Senate played a 
role with regard to the NATO membership of Montenegro. The quick vote on the Protocol to 
the North Atlantic Treaty of 1949 on the Accession of Montenegro was initially delayed in the 
Senate because of opposition from two Republican senators, but it was ultimately passed by 
a vote of 97 to two on the Senate floor (see US Senate 2017a). Congress also has compe-
tence in specified actions related to defence and security cooperation. One example of this is 
the Arms Export Control Act, which allows it to overrule a possible presidential veto on legis-
lation that aims to prohibit or modify arms sales (Grimmet 2010).  
Congressional influence on foreign policy could also entail the promotion of US interests 
through legislative efforts (most notably sanctions), funding the State Department, or engag-
ing in “person-to-person” diplomacy (Bruder 2016). In the end, the role of the legislative body 
hinges on the issues or initiatives it decides to promote or object to. The ratification of the UN 
Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) is a good example of the latter. Due to recalci-
trance in the Senate, the US has not ratified the treaty, even though it would advance various 
US strategic interests – especially in the South China Sea and the Arctic.17 For several years, 
Congress similarly prevented the US from backing the reallocation of IMF voting quotas to 
                                                     
16 The decision does not affect US participation in the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change, which is an international treaty approved by the US 
Senate. 
17 Among other things, it would provide the international legal basis for extending US continental shelves (e.g. in the Arctic) as well as for defending the 
freedom of navigation. Freedom of navigation, in turn, is a strategically important legal principle that guarantees the free flow of global trade as well as the 
ability of the US to project military force around the globe. It is also an issue that is likely to gain in prominence in critical regions, most notably in the South 
China Sea and the Arctic, where the US has enduring strategic interests. 
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China (Nye 2017). Most recently, Congress made an exceptional foreign-policy move by ap-
proving a bill that makes it harder for the White House to modify sanctions on Russia (see 
below). 
Moreover, the control of government by the same party should allow the White House to push 
its preferred executive nominations through the Senate. Ideally, this should enable the ad-
ministration to get its foreign-policy apparatus up and running relatively quickly. The Trump 
administration, however, has been criticised for its extremely slow nomination process (see 
Figure 4). There are various reasons for this state of affairs: obstruction by the Democrats 
(Hulse 2017b), the difficulty of finding qualified candidates, the disarray in the administration, 
and the aspiration to slim down departments by leaving positions unfilled. At the State De-
partment, for instance, there are many positions with no nominees announced at the assis-
tant-secretary and undersecretary levels, not to mention ambassadorial appointments.18 De-
spite the escalation of tensions in the Korean peninsula, for example, the Trump administra-
tion had not nominated an ambassador to Seoul as of November 30, 2017 (Partnership for 
Public Service 2017). 
Figure 4: Presidential appointments sent to the Senate by November 30, 2017 
Source: Partnership for Public Service (2017) 
Finally, although Congress holds the power to declare war as per the Constitution, the presi-
dent, as Commander in Chief, is perceived to retain wide constitutional powers to take any 
action he or she deems fit to defend the homeland. In the battle against terrorism – a key 
foreign-policy priority for the new administration – President Trump (like his predecessor) con-
tinues to rely on the wide authorisation for the use of military force issued by Congress in the 
                                                     
18 In fact, despite being frequently dubbed as one of the “adults” on Trump’s team (see below), Secretary of State Rex Tillerson has curiously heeded the 
call of anti-establishment voices, such as that of Stephen Bannon, to “deconstruct the administrative state” by supporting budget cuts and not filling vacan-
cies at the State Department (Mann 2017). 
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aftermath of the 9/11 terrorist attacks. Given that the situation on the ground has evolved 
significantly since 2001, there has been speculation that the 115th Congress may even pro-
ceed to enact a new authorisation for the use of force against ISIS. Congress could have the 
incentive to act now: although the Supreme Court has not tackled the issue of the War Powers 
Resolution to date, it could do so if the use of armed force is expanded in the future 
(Rudalevige 2017). However, there are divisions on this issue on Capitol Hill.19  
3.3 Inter-party and intra-party political dynamics 
There are various sources of division in the US political system that may hinder or block the 
president’s ability to govern effectively. Historically, a key modus operandi in American gov-
ernance has been pragmatic bipartisan co-operation – the practice of “reaching across the 
aisle” – between the Democrats and the Republicans. 
At the beginning of the 111th Congress in 2009, when President Obama took office, the Dem-
ocrats had a considerable majority in the Senate (57 Democratic and two independent Sena-
tors) and the House (255 Democratic representatives). As a result, Congress was able to 
pass a number of President Obama’s legislative priorities – 11 in total – in the first 100 days. 
The 2010 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (“Obamacare”), perhaps the most nota-
ble achievement of Obama’s presidency, was passed during the second year of his presi-
dency, without bipartisan support. Given the divided government in the later Obama years, 
the Republicans were better positioned to adopt various tactics to obstruct the President’s 
agenda.20  
Nevertheless, even the minority party can exercise forms of influence in Congress. In the 
Senate, for example, this means being able to slow down or prevent a decision on proposed 
legislation (“filibuster”), to withdraw consent, or to invoke a cloture rule that requires 60 votes 
for proposed legislation to proceed.21 The minority can also get the majority party on record 
with their votes, publicly highlighting potential divisions. Furthermore, senators from the mi-
nority party may propose legislation. For example, in response to President Trump’s executive 
order regarding border security and immigration – the so-called “travel ban” – a number of 
Democratic senators introduced a bill in March 2017 “to nullify the effect of the recent Execu-
tive order regarding border security and immigration enforcement” (US Senate 2017b).22 Alt-
hough legislative efforts of this kind are typically unsuccessful, members of the minority may 
also suggest amendments to majority-sponsored bills, which the majority is then forced to 
strike down. This could be costly in terms of public relations, and could affect future re-election 
chances (Jenkins et al. 2016). In the current context, it gives Democrats the opportunity to 
create discord amongst the Republicans in Congress, and between Capitol Hill and the White 
House. Republicans can then blame Democrats for obstructing President Trump’s agenda, 
although research shows that majorities are more likely to be held responsible for inaction 
than minorities are for frustrating legislative progress (Binder 2017). 
The US electoral system further hardens party-political divisions. Both Congress and the pres-
ident have their own constituencies, as the two branches of government are elected sepa-
rately. Although members of Congress and the president share the broader party platform, 
                                                     
19 The Republican majority House and its Committee on appropriation did approve an amendment that would repeal the 2001 authorisation for use of 
military force for the first time. However, in the final version of the bill (H.R. 3219) the proposal made by Democratic Representative Barbara Lee was 
watered down (Wire 2017). 
20 The GOP gained control of the House in the 2010 mid-term elections, and of the Senate in the 2014 mid-term elections. 
21 A filibuster can be stopped by signing and presenting a cloture motion (with a minimum of 16 senators’ signatures) and then voting to invoke cloture after 
two days (successfully with 60 votes) (Davis 2017). 
22 The Federal Court decision overruling the first of President Trump’s “travel ban” executive orders illustrates not only the limits of presidential powers but 
also the resilience of the “checks and balances” built into the American political system. For further discussion, see Chapter 2.  
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their policy preferences may differ on various topics. It is not uncommon, particularly in the 
House of Representatives, whose members have to face elections every two years, for the 
views of constituents in a specific congressional district to be reflected in the member’s ac-
tions on polarising issues such as immigration (Prokop 2017). This is less common in the 
Senate, where the terms span six years, the electorate is bigger (state-wide) and only a third 
of the seats are up for re-election at any one time.  
Nevertheless, a Republican majority in Congress should ideally weaken congressional limits 
on the president’s powers, including those related to foreign policy. The situation is more 
complex in the current political climate, however, and political divisions may not necessarily 
follow rigid party lines. Although in control of both Houses, the Republican Party remains 
divided, and intra-party-political struggles in Congress have already assumed newfound sali-
ence.23  
In simple terms, the tension within the GOP is two-dimensional: conservative versus moder-
ate, and anti-establishment versus establishment. In this context, the strongest conservative 
positions are represented by the House Freedom Caucus, which advocates ideologically rigid 
conservative views (e.g. on abortion, and limited government and fiscal responsibility), 
whereas the more moderate Republican position in the House is embodied in the more prag-
matic and compromise-minded Tuesday Group. The anti-establishment–establishment divi-
sion can be understood in terms of either endorsing or challenging existing political power 
structures, institutional authority and long-held policy prescriptions. Anti-establishment dy-
namics take many concrete forms, but the most relevant in the current context relate to US 
foreign and trade policy. A number of establishment senators, including John McCain, Bob 
Corker and Lindsay Graham, have been critical of the Trump administration’s pursuance of 
what have often appeared to be anti-establishment policies – such as the aspiration to “get 
along” with Russia, questioning the viability of NATO, and the promotion of economic nation-
alism rather than trade liberalisation. 
3.4 Wrangling over the budget 
Funding the government is a key issue that is likely to cause policy divisions between the 
White House and Congress. The Trump administration released its budget proposal “A New 
Foundation for American Greatness” for FY 2018 in May 2017.24 One key element with for-
eign-policy implications is the funding of the US Armed Forces. Although US military spending 
as a whole increased significantly during the 2000s, spending on both war and defence more 
broadly has dropped somewhat in recent years after peaking in 2010 (Perlo-Freeman et al. 
2015; Chapter 5).25 During the presidential race, then-candidate Trump made a campaign 
pledge to rebuild and modernise the US military (Trump 2016).  In honour of this pledge and 
to prepare the armed forces for the future, he proposed to increase the defence budget for 
FY 2018 by $52 billion, from $587 to $639 billion (see White House 2017r).26  
                                                     
23 Bills should be easier to pass in the House because of a considerable (although not always unanimous) Republican majority. The situation is trickier in 
the Senate due to a narrower Republican majority. As illustrated by the Republican Party’s failure to repeal and replace Obamacare, only a few defections 
may prevent the passage of a bill. 
24 The US Government fiscal year runs from October 1 to September 30 of the following year. Hence, FY 2017 included spending from October 1, 2016 
until September 30, 2017, and FY 2018 began on October 1, 2017. 
25 The rise in US military spending is partly attributable to “overseas contingency operations” (OCO) in Afghanistan, Iraq and elsewhere. The costs of OCOs 
are largely separate from the base budget of the Department of Defence (Cordesman 2016; Chapter 5).  
26 The Senate passed The National Defense Authorization Act of 2018 by a vote of 89 to 8 (Lardner 2017). Republicans opposing the bill were senators 
Bob Corker, Mike Lee and Rand Paul. For voting results see US Senate (2017c). The House has also approved a Department of Defense Appropriation bill 
for FY 2018 to provide funding for national security (US House of Representatives 2017b). The measure includes funding for the border wall and an increase 
in military spending.  
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The budget proposal contained other elements with foreign-policy and global implications. For 
example, the President sought to make various US agencies engaged in foreign affairs leaner, 
more efficient and more effective. To this end, he proposed to decrease funding to the De-
partment of State and the US Agency for International Development (USAID) by 32 per cent 
(Manson and Sevastopulo 2017; Ebbs and Riviera 2017; White House 2017r). If implemented, 
these cuts would likely hamper US diplomatic efforts and increase the role of the Armed 
Forces in US foreign and security policy. The suggested budget cuts along with the organisa-
tional restructuring have already led to a brain drain and general demoralisation at Foggy 
Bottom (Gramer et al. 2017; Stephenson 2017). The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) 
was also set to experience a dramatic cut of 31 per cent in its budget, with implications related 
to combatting global climate change. However, drastic cuts even in highly polarised areas 
such as climate change are not automatically a foregone conclusion in Congress.  
Furthermore, Trump’s budget includes a proposal to reduce direct funding to international 
organisations. In particular, the aim is to reduce the US share of funding to key institutions of 
the liberal international order, the United Nations in particular (White House 2017r, 13). Con-
gress has, in the past, attached reform proposals or conditionalities to UN funding, and this 
option is on the table once again.27 Reflecting such sentiments, the State and Foreign opera-
tions bill for FY 2018 – reported by the House Appropriations Committee in July 2017 – also 
calls for decreases in international security assistance, as well as cuts in payments to the UN 
and other international organisations, and USAID (US House of Representatives 2017a). In 
October, the Trump administration also announced America’s withdrawal from The United 
Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), citing America’s unpaid 
contributions, the need for reform and the organisation’s anti-Israel bias (US Department of 
State 2017a). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
27 For instance, in January 2017 Republican Representative Mike Rogers introduced a bill aiming “to end the membership of the United States in the United 
Nations” (Govtrack 2017). 
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Figure 5: Proposed cuts to key agencies in the Trump FY2018 budget pro-
posal 
 
Source: Soffen and Lu (2017) 
 
It is worth pointing out that although the President’s proposals reflect the priorities of the ad-
ministration, Congress will eventually decide on the funding framework.28 In this respect, crit-
ical voices have already emerged, as the order of priorities in the budget has reignited do-
mestic debate about the correct balance between the “hard” and “soft” elements of US power. 
In his remarks on President Trump’s FY 2018 budget proposal, Senate Majority Leader Mitch 
McConnell reminded the public that it would be treated only as a “recommendation” (Davidson 
et al. 2017). Furthermore, a group of 43 Senators (including six Republicans) criticised the 
proposed budget cuts to the State Department and foreign aid to offset increases in defence 
spending (Tritten 2017). This sentiment is echoed by a host of senior military officials, busi-
ness leaders and foreign-policy experts (Lamothe 2017).  
On the general level, some of Trump’s agenda items require substantial federal funding that 
could cause problems among conservatives who typically endorse limited government and 
                                                     
28 As of early December 2017, the Senate and the House have agreed on budget resolutions that set targets for spending and tax revenues, as well as 
their respective tax-overhaul bills, which would cut the corporate tax rate by approximately 20 per cent, adding $1.4 trillion over 10 years to the national 
debt (Morgan and Becker 2017). 
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fiscal responsibility. In terms of military spending, opposing interests between “deficit hawks” 
and “defence hawks” within the GOP could still cause confrontation on Capitol Hill (see Chap-
ter 5). Other contentious items that necessitate substantial public spending include infrastruc-
ture investment and the construction of a wall along the US-Mexican border. Congress is also 
facing the question of the debt ceiling: can the government go beyond the legislative limit on 
how much it can borrow or should it balance the budget to remain within the borrowing limit? 
In September, President Trump and the Democrats somewhat surprisingly found common 
ground on some fiscal-policy issues including a short-term plan to secure government funding 
until December 8, 2017, and to raise the borrowing limit (DeBonis et al. 2017). A further bill 
was passed on December 7, 2017 to avert a government shutdown for another two weeks 
(Bresnahan et al. 2017). On December 21, 2017, Congress again moved the deadline until 
January 19, 2017. 
3.5 Contentious foreign-policy issues 
Beyond questions of funding, a few central foreign-policy issues are likely to feature promi-
nently in the relationship between the White House and Capitol Hill. First, the fate of the nu-
clear deal with Iran (Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, JCPOA) has been hanging in the 
balance ever since Trump assumed the presidency. Under the deal, Iran has agreed to sig-
nificantly reduce its nuclear centrifuges and uranium stockpile, and in exchange for compli-
ance, economic sanctions have been reduced (BBC 2016). Every 90 days the Trump admin-
istration is required to certify to Congress that Iran remains in compliance with the agreement 
(Baker 2017). As the October 15, 2017 deadline for certification loomed, the President 
ratcheted up his critical rhetoric concerning the agreement, which is broadly regarded as stra-
tegically beneficial for the US and is one of President Obama’s key foreign-policy achieve-
ments. Ultimately President Trump did not certify that Iran remained in compliance with the 
deal, and instead decided to pass the buck to Congress, which will now have to decide on the 
future of US commitment to the agreement. This could entail seeking modification or reinstat-
ing sanctions, for example. Given that even President Trump’s top military advisors, including 
Secretary of Defence James Mattis, are in favour of keeping the agreement in place, it is likely 
that the Republican-dominated Congress will at most seek to toughen its provisions. This 
could entail, inter alia, removing the phasing out of uranium-enrichment restrictions, providing 
the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) with greater authority to carry out inspections 
and restricting Tehran’s ballistic-missile programme. This might give President Trump the 
chance to agree on accepting the modified, tougher version of the treaty – assuming, some-
what optimistically, that all the other international parties to the agreement would concur (Fo-
roohar 2017; Landler and Sanger 2017a; b). 
A second issue that could create contention between the President and Congress is the US 
response to North Korea’s nuclear posturing. On the one hand, Trump’s inflammatory remarks 
in response to escalation by the Kim Jong-un regime have invited bipartisan criticism. Not 
only is Trump’s rhetoric likely to further deteriorate the situation, it is also uncertain whether 
he can back it up with resolute and credible action given the immense risks involved in any 
significant military engagement in the region (Herb 2017a). On the other hand, many mem-
bers of Congress have clearly expressed their desire to remain involved in the decision-mak-
ing process, and have warned that pre-emptive military action would probably require Con-
gressional authorisation. A key issue here is the understanding of the threat that North Korea 
poses. The President, as the Commander in Chief, is typically assumed to have wide authority 
to take military action to protect the US from a threat to its national security. Although Con-
gress has few options to prevent this, it might try to do so by introducing legislation to block 
the use of force or to bar any funding for military action against North Korea (Herb 2017b).  
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Last, but certainly not least, Russia is a serious source of tension between President Trump 
and Congress. There are two interrelated reasons for this. First, there is a policy disagreement 
over the best formula for dealing with Russia. Second, there are on-going committee investi-
gations in the House and Senate into Russia’s involvement in the 2016 presidential-election 
process, including the hacking and release of damaging materials on the Clinton campaign 
(Uhrmacher and Soffen 2017; Chapter 8). The committee investigations in Congress remain 
polarised and politicised, perhaps with the exception of the Senate Intelligence Committee. 
These divisions will probably have an impact in terms of findings and reporting (see e.g. Car-
ney 2017; Kelley 2017; Kutner 2017).  
The question of “election hacking” has, curiously, been missing from President Trump’s policy 
agenda, despite initial calls to improve cyber security (see White House 2017s). To further 
understand Russia’s activities and protect the reliability of future elections, members of Con-
gress have called for cooperation from the administration and its agencies over the issue. 
Congress took a bold legislative step in July in restricting the freedom of the Trump admin-
istration to unilaterally lift sanctions on Russia (also North Korea and Iran) – a bill grudgingly 
signed by the President (Weaver and Foy 2017).   
In May, former head of the FBI, Robert Mueller, was appointed “to serve as Special Counsel 
to oversee the previously-confirmed FBI investigation of Russian government efforts to influ-
ence the 2016 presidential election and related matters”, including the Trump campaign’s 
potential collusion with Russia and events leading to Trump’s firing of FBI director James 
Comey (US Department of Justice 2017). The results of this inquiry are likely to be critical 
with regard to the development of the relationship between President Trump and the current 
Republican-dominated Congress. Should the inquiry find intentional and malicious collusion 
or a severe case of obstruction of justice it is possible – although unlikely – that the Republican 
party will withdraw its support for the President, or even move to remove him from office 
through impeachment or by evoking the 25th amendment of the Constitution (see Chapter 
8).29 The upcoming mid-term election in November 2018 could also alter the composition of 
Congress and affect the prospects of impeachment, especially if the Democrats take control 
of the House of Representatives (which initiates the procedure). 
3.6 The intervening dynamics of public opinion  
Foreign-policy issues are not typically of major concern to the American public. This was the 
case in the 2016 presidential elections, in which voting behaviour was largely predicated upon 
domestic issues. Furthermore, polls conducted prior to the election indicated that Hillary Clin-
ton was trusted more on foreign-policy questions (see e.g. Blanton 2016; Byrnes 2016). On a 
broader level, the President’s support of protectionism and nationalism over globalism, free 
trade and alliances is likely to result in a world that the US public does not support unequivo-
cally (see Smeltz et al. 2017b). In fact, Trump’s belief in and policy of putting “America First” 
do not even enjoy unanimous support within his own administration (Mann 2017), and face 
opposition from the foreign-policy establishment in the US as well as from several Republican 
members of the Senate (with competence in foreign-policy matters) (Brands 2017; McCarthy, 
D. 2017). 
                                                     
29 There are two pathways for removing a president from office. The first is the impeachment procedure. The House of Representatives has the sole power 
of impeachment as per the Constitution. The House can charge the President with “Treason, Bribery, or other high Crimes and Misdemeanors”.  A resolution 
to impeach (or its separate articles) requires a simple majority of votes in the House, after which the matter is presented to the Senate to initiate the trial. 
Conviction by the Senate requires a two-thirds majority (see Halstead 2005). Only two US presidents have ever been impeached by the House: Andrew 
Johnson in 1868 and Bill Clinton in 1998. In both cases, senators voting to remove the president from office were in the majority, but did not constitute a 
two-thirds majority. The second path to removal is through section four of the 25 th amendment, which allows the vice-president and the majority of the 
cabinet, or a body appointed by Congress (e.g. a group of medical experts) to determine that the president is “unable to discharge the powers and duties 
of his office”. Should the president object, a two-thirds majority in the House and Senate is necessary to remove him or her (Osnos 2017).  
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Despite the fact that foreign policy is not the most significant issue for Americans, public opin-
ion still plays a role in conditioning US foreign-policy choices – and public perceptions seem 
to be extremely important for the current president. For example, dissatisfaction with the mil-
itary adventurism of the George W. Bush presidency allowed Barack Obama to campaign 
successfully with a message of hope and domestic rejuvenation that included a pledge to 
withdraw from a long and costly war in Iraq – a promise he ultimately kept (Aaltola et al. 
2014a). In this regard, public perceptions are relevant when it comes to the ebb and flow of 
US foreign policy between interventionist and more isolationist phases (Sestanovich 2014; 
Chapter 4).  
It has been argued in recent years that popular opinion in the US is characterised by “war 
weariness”, and has been drifting towards more limited participation in world affairs, especially 
on matters such as democracy promotion and human-rights advocacy (see Drezner 2008). 
Nevertheless, according to a Pew Research Center poll from October 2017, an equal per-
centage of Americans (47 per cent) support active involvement in global affairs and paying 
more attention to problems at home, respectively (Pew Research Center 2017e). According 
to a similar study conducted by The Chicago Council on Global Affairs, 63 per cent of re-
spondents favour an active role for the US in global affairs (Smeltz et al. 2017a).30  
Public opinion also plays a role in the struggle for influence between the White House and 
Capitol Hill. Congress enjoys relatively low confidence among the American public. According 
to average figures published by Real Clear Politics (2017), Congressional job-approval ratings 
in recent years have fluctuated between 10 and 20 per cent. Public support is thus commonly 
considered to constitute “leverage” for the president vis-à-vis Congress (Cassino 2017). How-
ever, the current president enjoys historically low popularity among the general public – his 
average approval rating hovers at around 38 per cent (FiveThirtyEight 2017; Pew Research 
Center 2017c). In situations in which the president’s “standing in the public sphere” is not 
high, incumbents also tend to face problems in cooperating with their own party members 
(Chafetz 2017). The events leading up to Richard Nixon’s resignation are an extreme example 
of this dynamic, and in this regard the healthcare legislation debacle between the Trump 
White House and Congress might prove a harbinger of things to come. 
One further complicating factor regarding the Trump presidency concerns the rallies he con-
tinues to hold for his core supporters, in stark contrast to past practice. On April 29, 2017, for 
example, to mark the first 100 days of his presidency Trump opted to skip the White House 
correspondents’ dinner and to hold such a rally in Harrisburg, Pennsylvania, with an estimated 
7,000 people in attendance (Fisher 2017). In this way, the President connects and communi-
cates directly with his support base, and can emphasise the issues he considers to be of 
paramount importance. It could become a longer-term problem for the Republican Party, how-
ever, to the extent that Trump manages to control the base and radicalise the party – in effect 
eroding the foundations of more moderate Republicanism. 
3.7 Conclusion 
As the above discussion purported to illustrate, if they are to capitalise on their majority status 
and advance their agenda, Republicans need to be on the same page. In this sense, commu-
nication between the White House and Capitol Hill is critical. However, the Trump administra-
tion’s forays have indicated otherwise. To further complicate matters, President Trump has 
                                                     
30 However, it is also worth noting that the way in which polling questions are framed can affect how people respond to them, and thus they paint a limited 
picture of how supportive or sceptical Americans are of global engagement. 
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no previous political experience and apparently little interest in policy details, which also in-
hibits his ability to deal with Congress. It will be interesting to see whether Vice President Mike 
Pence, with his long track record, will take a more active role in building up relations with 
Congress in the same way that Joe Biden did during the Obama presidency. Personal rela-
tions could thus mitigate the effects of intraparty tensions or, in a worse scenario, serve to 
underline them further.  
Such dynamics are inevitably affected by the volatility of the Trump administration. The Pres-
ident is infamous for his controversial and often insulting social-media communication – some 
of which has even been targeted at leading Republican politicians such as John McCain 
(Chairman of the Senate Committee on Armed Services) and Bob Corker (Chairman of the 
Senate Foreign Relations Committee). Cabinet and White House rosters have also under-
gone significant changes. Key departures among anti-establishment figures include those of 
National Security Advisor Michael Flynn, chief strategist Stephen Bannon and policy advisor 
Sebastian Gorka. Offsetting the dismissals of Chief of Staff Reince Priebus and Press Secre-
tary Sean Spicer, both representatives of the Republican mainstream, have been other mod-
erate appointments, including those of generals John Kelly and H.R. McMaster, who have 
assumed the positions of Chief of Staff and National Security Advisor, respectively. As a re-
sult, analysts foresee this “axis of adults” – including Secretary of Defence James Mattis and 
Secretary of State Rex Tillerson – assuming a more pivotal role in forging the Trump admin-
istration’s foreign policy (see Boot 2017). 
Nevertheless, US foreign policy is ultimately led by the president. Congress has more influ-
ence on domestic politics due to its power to legislate. From the perspective of getting legis-
lative measures passed, the administration commonly benefits from majority-party status in 
both chambers of Congress. The effect is seldom as visible in matters of foreign policy be-
cause the president has more room for manoeuvre to begin with. The period of unified gov-
ernment could also have an effect on the oversight role of Congress, de facto limiting its 
willingness to act as a check on the president. This does not rule out differences of opinion 
among Republicans, however. So far, divisive foreign-policy issues have included the soft 
versus hard power trade-off in the FY 2018 budget, administration policy vis-à-vis North Korea 
and Iran, and especially the US relationship with Russia – an area that has already provided 
some surprising common ground for bipartisanship on Capitol Hill. It remains to be seen 
whether circumstances and pressure from within the reformed administration, the Republican 
Party, and the media will push Trump’s foreign policy in the direction of “mainstream” Repub-
licanism, or whether the agendas of Trump and his party will diverge further. One potential 
scenario is that the tensions between the parties that characterised the Obama years will be 
complemented with intra-party tensions during the current presidency – something that should 
also be taken note of in Europe. 
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PART II: FOREIGN AND DEFENCE POLICY 
4. US foreign policy: the “Trump doctrine” 
 Despite posturing himself as an outsider, President Trump – like any other policy 
maker – remains immersed in the broader, historically-evolved set of ideas that ena-
ble and constrain American thinking on foreign policy. 
 US foreign policy thought in the post-Cold War era has followed three prominent tra-
ditions: liberal internationalism, neoconservatism and realism. Neoisolationism has 
recently emerged as a fourth alternative. 
 Although not fully endorsing any alternative, President Trump in his foreign-policy 
thinking draws upon – or at the very least takes postures against – each of these 
traditions. 
 The so-called “Trump doctrine” emphasises unilateralism, civilizational affinities, and 
the build-up and use of hard power. Furthermore, it undermines aspects of multilat-
eral co-operation in favour of transactionalism, in other words bilateral deals built on 
ad hoc sector-based bargains. 
4.1 Introduction 
To make sense of US foreign policy one might look at the contradictions and debates that 
followed the 2016 presidential election. These deliberations illustrate the underlying trends as 
the new administration and its critics alike draw from a specific subset of foreign-policy tradi-
tions. The expectation is that the divergences and debates will result in a balance that gener-
ally aligns with the continuity of US foreign-policy thought. However, the similarities between 
past, present and future will also reflect elements of “change in continuity”.   
American foreign-policy experts and academics were already extremely critical of Donald 
Trump’s approach during his raucous presidential campaign, which they considered unortho-
dox, disruptionist and even dangerous. These fears have yet to be dispelled completely. The 
beginning of Trump’s tenure in the White House has been marked by contradictory statements 
disseminated by the President and different administration figures on key foreign-policy issues 
such as US commitment to NATO, America’s approach to resolving the North Korea crisis 
and the future of the Iran nuclear deal.  
To understand the extent of change and the trappings of continuity in Trump’s approach, 
however, it is necessary to move beyond the cacophony of statements emanating from the 
administration and the criticism circulating in the media and academia. This chapter analyses 
how the Trump administration’s foreign policy relates to US foreign-policy traditions. The aim 
is to map out what the “America First” and “Make America Great Again” slogans have entailed 
so far, and how drastic a departure the Trumpian approach is, in reality, when it comes to the 
broader perspective of US foreign-policy thought and practice. This will shed light on the 
question of whether, and if so how, the Trump administration may seek to refashion the dec-
ades-old orthodoxies on US global engagement in the coming years. 
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4.2 Policymakers and foreign-policy debates 
Donald Trump has made much of the fact that he is not beholden to anyone and does not 
further the agenda of the Washington establishment. Instead, he is the hope of forgotten 
America, on a mission to regain America’s surrendered prestige. Despite posturing himself 
as an outsider, neither Donald Trump nor his administration officials – many of them former 
business executives and generals – exist independently of the history-bound ideational con-
structs that function as a wellspring for foreign-policy thinking and decision-making. Even in 
the era of a potentially disruptive presidency, the debates on America’s place in the world 
structure the worldviews of policymakers in key positions. As Ted Hopf (2002, 37) once ar-
gued: “[e]very foreign policy maker is as much a member of the social cognitive structure that 
characterizes her society as any average citizen”. 
Hence, debates that take place in the public sphere (and also in academia) over a state’s 
place in the world play a role in constructing points of departure for political action. Scholars 
have long appreciated the influence of such discussions. As fabled economist John Maynard 
Keynes (1939, Ch. 24, V) put it: 
“The ideas of economists and political philosophers […] are more powerful 
than is commonly understood. […] Practical men, who believe themselves to 
be quite exempt from any intellectual influences, are usually the slaves of some 
defunct economist. Madmen in authority, who hear voices in the air are distil-
ling their frenzy from some academic scribbler of a few years back.”  
It is thus relatively safe to assume that even President Trump – in spite of his pledge to break 
with tradition – is irredeemably enmeshed in the history-bounded competition between differ-
ent views of America’s place in the world. Traditions of foreign-policy thought thus have an 
impact upon policymakers, and the influence is tangible regardless of whether these actors 
acknowledge this to be the case. 
4.3 Alternative traditions of US strategic thought 
Debates on America’s place in and engagement with the world are habitually framed in terms 
of competing grand-strategic alternatives. Simply put, “[a] state’s ‘grand strategy’ is its leaders’ 
theory and story about how to provide for its security, welfare and identity” (Nye 2011, 212). 
It also informs states and their leaders on “how they mobilise which elements of their power 
in pursuit of which causes in global politics” (Kitchen 2010, 121).  
All leaders engage in the formulation of grand strategies when conducting foreign policy. They 
do this by deciding which ends to pursue and which means to harness for such exploits. They 
“have a sense, whether implicitly or explicitly, of their country’s national interests, the threats 
that exist to those interests, and the resources that can be brought to bear against those 
threats” (Dueck 2005, 198). This implies that grand strategies are not necessarily enshrined 
in foreign-policy documents or reiterated in key speeches: they may also be embedded in 
policy practices (Brands 2012, 6-7).  
One way of categorising the ebb and flow of the grand-strategic debate on US engagement 
with the world is through the three prominent traditions of post-Cold War American thinking 
on foreign policy: liberal internationalism, neoconservatism and realism. Neoisolationism can 
be considered a fourth approach, which until recently had been relegated to the fringes of US 
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foreign-policy debates (Quinn 2016). These schools of thought represent “ideal type” posi-
tions, which presidents tend to utilise in combination to arrive at different grand-strategic op-
tions. 
The first of these schools, liberal internationalism, has been ascendant in US foreign-policy 
circles throughout the post-Cold War era. Adherents of the approach view the promotion of 
liberal trade practices and core American (and more broadly Western) values, especially de-
mocracy and human rights, as central to America’s national interests. US involvement in mul-
tilateral institutions is seen as crucial to entrench these values in international society 
(Ikenberry 2009, 14-20). When it comes to exerting force, liberal internationalists do not shy 
away from using military power to defend these values. However, such measures should be 
undertaken for legitimate reasons with the support of the broader international community. 
The so-called humanitarian interventions undertaken during the Clinton presidency are thus 
often attributed to the ascendancy of liberal internationalism in Washington (Dueck 2005).  
Liberal internationalists also place strong emphasis on the economic dimension of foreign 
policy and the tools of soft power that tend to be associated with public diplomacy (Nye 2011; 
Ikenberry 2015). Many liberal internationalists thus subscribe to a strategy of “deep engage-
ment”, maintaining America’s responsibilities to international institutions and its military com-
mitments around the world (Ikenberry 2014). According to proponents of the strategy, nurtur-
ing the liberal international order is necessary for co-opting the rising powers – China as well 
as India some years ahead – as “responsible stakeholders” in resolving common global chal-
lenges. In addition, the US needs the institutions of the liberal order to perform essential func-
tions, including the maintenance of financial stability, the negotiation of best practices for 
global commons such as sea, air and cyberspace, and securing interstate peace (Nye 2017; 
see also Chapter 6).  
Proponents of the second school of thought, the neoconservatives, agree with the liberal in-
ternationalists on the importance of promoting America’s liberal-democratic values – espe-
cially the so-called “negative freedoms”31 – abroad. In fact, neoconservatism is often associ-
ated with moralistic “missionary zeal”. Therefore, unlike liberal internationalists, “neocons” are 
willing to follow their agenda unilaterally if necessary, without encumbering multilateral alli-
ances and, in extremis, circumventing international legal constraints on the use of military 
force. In practice, however, this has meant the use of flexible US-led “coalitions of the willing”. 
Neoconservatives also emphasise the importance of maintaining America’s unchallengeable 
military power position in the international system as a clear foreign-policy priority (Krautham-
mer 2002). This connotes a willingness to expend vast resources on bolstering military power. 
Soft power tools, although potentially useful instruments, are treated as auxiliary means of 
achieving foreign-policy goals (Singh 2014, 30-31). The muscular and unilateralist foreign 
policy of the George W. Bush presidency, especially during his first term in the aftermath of 
9/11, is often termed the golden age of the neoconservative foreign-policy vision (see Reus-
Smit 2004).  
Realism, the third school, represents a broad and diverse tradition of foreign-policy thought. 
Despite the heterogeneity, most realists would acknowledge that the international system is 
inhabited by states bent on survival and locked in persistent competition for power. This pre-
occupation with international “anarchy” and power in its material form leads realists to argue 
that states will (and should) act in a self-interested manner within the international system, 
                                                     
31 Negative freedom here refers to the freedom of persons or groups to conduct themselves as they see fit without interference from others. For the seminal 
discussion, see Berlin (1969). 
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seeking relative gains and placing little emphasis on values (Mearsheimer 2001, 17-18; Wohl-
forth 2008, 133-135). At best, the proliferation of democracy or human rights is a welcome 
side effect of pursuing national interests. At worst, the pursuit of such eloquent goals could 
divert attention away from the true task of a nation’s leadership: ensuring national survival. 
Moreover, given the inevitable uncertainty among states about each other’s intentions, the 
best way to ensure survival is to accumulate power (Mearsheimer 2001, 31-33).  
Prominent realist thinkers have recently challenged the strategy of “deep engagement” as-
cribed to liberal internationalists. Instead, they call for a strategy of “offshore balancing” to 
scale back America’s overseas engagements and focus only on making sure key regions 
(Europe, Northeast Asia and the Persian Gulf) do not fall under the rule of a hostile regional 
hegemon. This would cater to a narrower definition of American national interests. Such an 
approach, they claim, would avoid the dangers of overstretch that a policy bent on the pro-
motion of liberal-democratic values might create, but still retain America’s place at the top of 
the global power hierarchy (Mearsheimer and Walt 2016).32 
Neoisolationists take the argument to disengage further. As a term, isolationism echoes neg-
ative connotations from the 1930s, but the whole school should not be equated with national-
istically minded figures on the right of the political spectrum, despite similar talking points. 
Nevertheless, like their isolationist forebears of the interwar period, neoisolationists call for 
the abandonment of America’s role as global leader and the putting of its own house in order. 
From this standpoint, America’s pursuit and maintenance of superpower status and entan-
gling global engagement – massive military spending in particular – has, in fact, made it less 
secure and economically less well off. Such sentiments were long relegated to the fringes of 
US foreign-policy debates, but have resurfaced in Trump’s “America First” agenda. Propo-
nents of the approach claim that America’s deep engagement with the world is a folly main-
tained by foreign-policy experts and the elite, which holds little appeal among the broader 
public (Preble 2017). 
4.4 Deciphering the “Trumpian” approach to foreign policy  
A fervent debate has surfaced in the US and globally on the “true” nature of Trump’s approach 
to the world. These discussions have made some headway in pinning down how the President 
and his team view America’s global role in the future. The following exploratory profile of 
Trump’s foreign policy is based on a review of the main strands of this debate and how they 
tie in to statements and practices emanating from the President and his administration, and 
reflect the US foreign-policy traditions presented above. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
32 Realism is a broad school of thought. Some realists even agree with liberal internationalists in regarding “deep engagement” with the world as the safest 
bet for safeguarding US interests (Brooks et al. 2012). 
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Figure 6: The ”Trump doctrine” and US foreign-policy traditions 
 
4.4.1 Trump’s challenge to liberal internationalism 
 
President Trump has drawn considerable fire from liberal internationalists in his critique of the 
Western-led liberal international order and the Washington foreign-policy establishment 
(Ikenberry 2017; Nye 2017). In fact, although presidential elections are rarely decided on for-
eign-policy issues, the result of the 2016 election may ultimately turn out to be highly relevant 
in terms of the future of America’s commitment to deep engagement and the building blocks 
of the liberal rule-based order (Patrick 2016; Kitchen 2016).  
As candidate and incumbent, Donald Trump has articulated a narrower definition of America’s 
national interests, especially when it comes to commitment to the international norms and 
institutions of the US-led rule-based liberal international order. As the new National Security 
Strategy (NSS) published on December 18, 2017 states: “all institutions are not equal […] 
[t]he United States will prioritize its efforts in those organizations that serve American inter-
ests” (White House 2017z). Reflecting this “America First” pledge, the administration has, for 
instance:  
- delayed the endorsement of Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty;  
- disavowed the Iran nuclear deal (JCPOA); 
- pulled the US out of the Paris Agreement on Climate Change;  
- withdrawn from the nascent Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP); 
- put out a budget proposal that would slash US funding to the United Nations;  
- walked away from UNESCO and threatened to leave the UN Human Rights Council. 
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The administration has also been perceived as putting the promotion of liberal-democratic 
values on the backburner. Although the US has traditionally done business with and even 
propped up authoritarian leaders, human-rights rhetoric has been uncharacteristically absent 
in public statements issued by the new administration. President Trump put the virtues of 
sovereignty and patriotism – instead of democracy, human rights and freedom – centre stage 
in his speech at the United Nations (White House 2017k). Secretary of State Rex Tillerson 
similarly made a point of laying out how America’s interests might be harmed by keeping such 
concerns at the forefront (US Department of State 2017b).  
Admittedly, there have been some exceptions to the Trump administration’s departure from 
liberal internationalist convictions. In late December 2017, the administration moved to sanc-
tion 52 persons and entities for human-rights abuses and corruption under the Global Mag-
nitsky Act of 2012.33 A more widely publicised exception was the bombing of a Syrian airfield 
in the aftermath of an alleged chemical-weapons attack by Bashar al-Assad’s regime. The 
missile strike was explicitly justified with reference to the prohibition of the use of chemical 
weapons in international law (Beckwith 2017). Anne-Marie Slaughter (2017), former Director 
of Policy Planning at Hillary Clinton’s State Department, regarded Trump’s missile strikes on 
Syria as “a refreshing moment of moral clarity”. However, the decision to uphold the ban on 
the use of chemical weapons and the targeting of individual human-rights abusers seem to 
contradict the Trump administration’s broader approach towards the normative foundations 
of international order and the human dignity of non-Americans.  
Judging by the first nine months of his term, therefore, Trump is positioning himself against 
the central theses of liberal internationalism. According to one prominent critic, the admin-
istration’s conduct challenges the five “core convictions” that have upheld America’s commit-
ment to the liberal international order: internationalism, free trade, global leadership, multicul-
turalism and faith in the virtues of democratic governance (Ikenberry 2017; see also Chapters 
2 and 6). 
4.4.2 Trump’s conflicted relationship with neoconservatism 
 
Interestingly, a president espousing a neoconservative agenda could have promoted many of 
the policy stances and actions adopted by the Trump team. A swift comparison of Trump’s 
above described forays with George W. Bush’s foreign policy record suffices to prove the 
point. Bush, for instance, “unsigned” the Statute of the International Criminal Court, aban-
doned the Kyoto climate protocol, sanctioned an extraordinary rendition programme and en-
hanced interrogation techniques, and paid little heed to the lack of a United Nations Security 
Council resolution authorising the invasion of Iraq (Hastings Dunn 2009).  
Despite such parallels, there is little love lost between Trump and some prominent neocon-
servative pundits, who are animated by their convictions regarding the muscular defence of 
American interests, as well as the promotion of its values and of US-style democracy in the 
world at large (Franko 2016; Kagan 2016). It is not only the omission of value-based rhetoric 
that sets the Trump administration apart from “neocon” foreign-policy thinking. Trump and his 
team eschew a key component of American “exceptionalism”: the belief in America’s destiny 
to actively remake the world in its own image. According to the neoconservatives, Trump’s 
“America First” approach is the “antithesis of American exceptionalism” because “[i]t makes 
America no different from all the other countries that define themselves by a particularist 
blood-and-soil nationalism” (Krauthammer 2017a). However, in keeping with some liberal in-
                                                     
33 The Global Magnitsky Act allows the president to target individuals and entities with property seizure and revocation of visas. 
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ternationalists, neoconservatives applauded the missile strikes on Syria for muscularly reas-
serting American leadership after “eight years of sleepwalking” in the Obama era (Krautham-
mer 2017b; see also Lobe 2017). 
Of course, the fact that Trump evades the defence of liberal democratic ideals does not mean 
that his foreign policy is devoid of an ideational basis. Despite the departure from the White 
House of members of his core group of nationalistically-minded advisors such as Stephen 
Bannon and Sebastian Gorka, Trump continues to echo the Huntingtonian clash-of-civilisa-
tions framework described above, according to which “cultural commonalities and differences 
shape the interests, antagonisms and associations of states” (Huntington 2002, 29; see also 
Chapter 2; Walt 2017b; Rachman 2017). Trump’s preoccupation with ISIS and repeated use 
of the loaded phrase “radical Islamic terrorism” in his key policy speeches implies that, for the 
President and some of his advisors, this threat is existential in nature, and must be exorcised 
from the American and global societal body. This is a pronouncedly Manichean view of inter-
national politics, framing the international as an arena in which the “good” forces of Christianity 
and the “evil” cohorts of radical Islam are in perennial conflict (Kennedy 2013). According to 
critics, a similar impulse was a mainstay of the discourse that informed George W. Bush’s 
War on Terror and the branding of Iran, North Korea and Iraq as the “axis of evil” (Müller 
2014). In his UN speech, Trump similarly identified “a small group of rogue regimes” – North 
Korea, Iran and Syria, but also Cuba and Venezuela – as the “scourge of our planet today” 
(White House 2017k). 
4.4.3 Realist undertones in Trumpian thought 
 
Trump has explicitly stated that, for him, the measure of a great country is a great military. 
This approach is also evident in the military emphasis of the administration’s budget proposal 
(see Chapters 3 and 5). In March, Director of the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) 
Mick Mulvaney termed it “a hard-power budget” blueprint for “a strong-power administration” 
(White House 2017t). The President has also shown his preparedness to utilise military power 
(Syria), and has given the military considerable latitude in the battle against terrorism (Af-
ghanistan). However, he seems unlikely to use the US military machine, to uphold the nascent 
norm of responsibility to protect or promote democratic governance, for instance.  
This focus on hard power, combined with his pronounced unwillingness to engage in democ-
racy promotion, tilts Trump’s foreign policy towards the realist tradition (Brooks 2016; Drezner 
2016). As evinced in his UN speech, Trump and his team view the international arena in state-
centric terms, acknowledge the primacy of great-power relations, focus on competition for 
power understood in terms of the possession of material capabilities, and adhere to a zero-
sum understanding of the nature of international competition (Schweller 2017). As National 
Security Advisor H.R. McMaster and Director of the National Economic Council Gary Cohn 
put it in their Wall Street Journal op-ed: “the world is not a ‘global community’ but an arena 
where nations […] engage and compete […]. Rather than deny this elemental nature of inter-
national affairs, we embrace it” (McMaster and Cohn 2017). This outlook is captured in the 
Trump team’s new NSS under the moniker “principled realism” (White House 2017z).  
It is hardly surprising that some self-identified realists have supported Trump’s “America First” 
foreign-policy platform, viewing it as a welcome departure from decades of misinformed deep 
engagement based on liberal internationalism and the “unipolar illusions” of neoconservatives 
(Mearsheimer 2016; Layne 2016; Schweller 2017).  Although Trump may not see the issue 
on quite these terms, for such realists his “America First” and “Make America Great Again” 
slogans reflect a long-overdue realisation that the US can only maintain its position at the top 
of the international power hierarchy by demanding that allies do more and the US itself resists 
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the temptation to engage in costly and difficult nation building in faraway places. Some realists 
are even amenable to Trump’s initial toying with a Russia reset: if China is the only legitimate 
long-term threat to US primacy, then finding common cause with Moscow would not be such 
a bad idea. From this standpoint, the Trump team is a disappointment (Walt 2017c). By raising 
suspicions of questionable dealings with Russia through its own policy incompetence, the 
administration has botched hopes of an improvement in relations (see Chapter 8). 
4.4.4 Trump’s transactionalism as selective neoisolationism 
 
It has become commonplace to conflate President Trump’s approach to the international 
arena with isolationism. It is true that Trump toys with neoisolationist talking points, especially 
in the realm of trade. However, he departs from this tradition with his manifest willingness to 
build up and exercise military power. In the realm of economic policy, he seeks engagement 
on terms that are favourable to the United States: the objective is to secure “fair” as opposed 
to “free” trade deals that do not “take advantage of the US”. 
An apt descriptor of Donald Trump’s modus operandi for conducting day-to-day international 
relations is transactionalism: foreign policy boiled down to the art of deal making. Good deals 
are defined in narrow terms, according to Trump’s designation of what is in America’s (eco-
nomic) interests. In the transactionalist mindset, these interests are invariably represented in 
terms of relative as opposed to absolute economic gains – in other words the aim is for Amer-
ica to get more out of the deals than its counterpart(s), not that all parties should benefit from 
agreements (Stephens 2017; Kahl and Brands 2017). Thus understood, transactionalism 
breaks international politics into bilateral silos, akin to a string of one-off commodity ex-
changes, which means that short-term benefits are deemed more important than potential 
long-term returns. Therefore, Trumpian transactionalism is at most a selective espousal of 
neoisolationism, and his affinity with the approach remains issue-specific (see Rothkopf 
2017). 
On the one hand, the President’s distrust of multilateral institutions and organisations of global 
governance have led him down the isolationist path, most notably in the case of the TPP (see 
Chapter 7). On the other hand, he has shown a willingness to walk back on some of his views, 
such as opting for a strategy on Afghanistan advocated by his generals, passing the buck on 
the Iran deal to Congress instead of pulling the US out of the agreement outright, and ulti-
mately endorsing Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty. In the spirit of transactionalism, there-
fore, it is likely that isolationist impulses will be harnessed selectively, restricted to relation-
ships and deals the President personally deems particularly detrimental to relative US inter-
ests as he defines them. 
4.5 Conclusion 
It is clear that the Trump administration’s foreign-policy approach is a shifting yet selective 
mix of different traditions of American foreign-policy thought. The President adopts compo-
nents of neoconservatism from the George W. Bush era (eschewing cumbersome multilater-
alism and relying on clash-of-civilisations rhetoric), realism (emphasising military power and 
a zero-sum view of global competition) and neoisolationism (rhetorically undermining multi-
lateral rules and institutions of global trade and rejecting them on a case-by-case basis).  
Trumpian foreign policy is thus characterised by apparent incompatibilities and inconsisten-
cies – perhaps even more so than the policies of his immediate predecessors. Critics have 
taken this to indicate that there is no broad, grand-strategic thread, merely issue-specific 
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short-termism (Friedman Lissner and Zenko 2017). It should be admitted that the President 
(less so his foreign-policy team) is at most an intellectual scavenger. Nevertheless, his forag-
ing takes place in the forest of American foreign-policy and grand-strategic thought. In this 
sense, President Trump is a product of American foreign-policy traditions just as his prede-
cessors were, regardless of the desire among critics to dismiss him as simply a nationalist or 
an isolationist aberration. 
A key question faces observers of Trump’s evolving foreign-policy strategy. Which inclination 
will dominate, and what contexts provide the space for each approach to come to the fore? 
This is also of long-term significance, given that the next president, whoever it might be, will 
evaluate and react to the success of his selection of underlying trends. However, there is an 
important distinction to be made between Trump, on the one hand, and his foreign-policy 
advisors and cabinet secretaries in charge of the State and Defence Departments on the 
other. In the aftermath of the missile strike on Syria, the unveiling of the administration’s Af-
ghanistan strategy and the President’s decision to push for renegotiation of the Iran deal, the 
influence of the “adults in the room” – Mattis, Kelly, McMaster and Tillerson – has been cited 
as a potential check on the President’s most unorthodox foreign-policy impulses (Mann 2017; 
Boot 2017). Some have gone as far as to claim that the administration is approaching a more 
traditional Republican foreign policy (Abrams 2017), which in Trump’s case would entail ton-
ing down his more controversial isolationist impulses.  
The problem with the mainstreaming argument is that President Trump’s latitude on foreign-
policy matters is vast (see Chapter 3). In the case of the Iran deal, for instance, arguments 
that stress an averted storm do not take account of the fact that Mattis – often seen as the 
most influential of the adults – as well as McMaster and Tillerson apparently advocated certi-
fication, as did all the other state parties to the deal. The Paris Climate Agreement is another 
example of when Trump reportedly turned a deaf ear to the advice of more centrist characters 
in the administration, including his daughter Ivanka, son-in-law Jared Kushner and economic 
advisor Gary Cohn: instead he opted for a policy stance advocated by the nationalist wing of 
his team (Easley and Parnes 2017). A similar dynamic characterised Trump’s decision to 
recognise Jerusalem as Israel’s capital and to relocate (eventually) the US embassy from Tel 
Aviv, reportedly against the advice of his Secretaries of State and Defence (Landler 2017a; 
Holland 2017b). Trump’s impressionability thus appears contingent upon how strongly he 
feels about a policy issue on the one hand, and domestic political exigencies on the other.    
In sum, for America’s partners and allies there are both comforting and unsettling facts. First, 
despite the air of uncertainty, the Trump era is likely to provide allies and partners with oppor-
tunities for sector-based cooperation by virtue of the President’s transactionalist impulses. 
Second, it appears that he is capable of selective social learning, and at the present time the 
adults in his administration seem to have some influence over the policy agenda, as illustrated 
by America’s re-articulation of its security commitments in Europe and Asia. Third, although 
the US president is powerful, he cannot merely wish away the structural constraints imposed 
by other actors – state or non-state – or the normative frameworks that constitute international 
society overnight. The flipside of the coin is that the president of the United States can prob-
ably do more than any other individual in the world to undermine and reshape these con-
straints. Trump’s volatility is a wild card that allies, partners and adversaries must keep in 
mind when dealing with the United States during the next three (or possibly seven) years. 
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5. Crosscurrents in US defence policy 
 Despite the exceptional rhetoric of the President and related concerns over political 
turmoil inside the Trump administration, US defence policy reflects several broad ar-
eas of continuity from previous administrations.  
 In line with the National Security Strategy released by the White House in December 
2017, the Pentagon’s top priorities will be to counter challenges from the revisionist 
powers of China and Russia, the rogue states of Iran and North Korea, and transna-
tional threat organisations, particularly terrorist groups.  
 The large increases in military capabilities proposed by the Trump administration are 
likely to fall short of early expectations, largely due to budgetary realities. Neverthe-
less, depending on the on-going policy review, developments in nuclear-weapon and 
missile-defence policies are possible, with potential implications for the already tense 
relations with Russia. 
 US bilateral and multilateral defence ties with Europe and Asia will remain relatively 
stable, despite some friction over spending levels and industrial cooperation on de-
fence. A more serious quarrel with its allies might result if the Trump administration 
were perceived as partly responsible for a major military clash in Korea or the collapse 
of the 2015 nuclear agreement with Iran. 
5.1 Introduction 
Since his inauguration in January 2017, President Donald Trump has limited his statements 
on defence matters to a few broad themes: rebuilding the US military with a hefty increase in 
spending; strengthening, in particular, its nuclear forces and missile defences; and destroying 
ISIS. He has relished his role, under the Constitution, as Commander-in-chief, exhorting mil-
itary audiences with hyperbolic language. For instance, he has taunted adversaries and raised 
the prospect of military action by threatening to “totally destroy” North Korea, while publicly 
deriding efforts by his Secretary of State Tillerson to find a diplomatic path to relieve tensions. 
To date, however, the President has seemed to prefer the selective use of force, as shown in 
the US cruise-missile attack last April on a Syrian air base used for chemical-weapons strikes, 
and the modest reinforcement of US forces in Afghanistan. 
The US system contains checks and balances, and the President’s approach is likely to be 
moderated and directed towards relative continuity. Despite evidence of turmoil in the White 
House, the vast US defence establishment has “soldiered on”. This entails simultaneously 
managing military operations in Iraq, Syria and Afghanistan; reinforcing US positions and ca-
pabilities in Europe in response to Russia; and improving the readiness to deal with these and 
other potential flash points, including North Korea and potentially Iran. The conceptual frame-
work for these efforts should emerge in early 2018 in the Pentagon’s National Defense Strat-
egy (NDS), to be followed soon after by its Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) and Missile De-
fense Review (MDR).  
The aim in this chapter is to identify the strategic changes and continuities that are likely to 
emerge from the high-level reviews, and to assess their effects on US defence capabilities 
and the potential future pathways for the transatlantic relationship.   
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5.2 The emerging defence strategy: the threat environment and policy re-
sponses 
In the hierarchy of national security documents mandated by Congress, the National Security 
Strategy (NSS) report is the core document outlining the tenets of the US grand strategy. 
Prepared by the National Security Council and approved by the President, the NSS, according 
to its Congressional mandate, should provide guidance for the entire US Government on mat-
ters including US worldwide interests, objectives, and commitments deemed vital to national 
security; proposed political, diplomatic, military, economic, intelligence and other elements of 
national power to promote those interests and objectives; and the overall resources and ca-
pabilities required to execute the various parts of the overall strategy.34   
In many respects, the new National Security Strategy (White House 2017z) reflects the ongo-
ing tension between two somewhat amorphous camps. On the one hand, there are the Pres-
ident and a circle of hardline, ideologically-driven advisors within the administration or with 
close, informal links to the White House. On the other hand, there are conservative but prag-
matic officials whose government and/or military experience has framed their thinking more 
along the lines of the defence and foreign policy “establishment” often derided by the Presi-
dent and his loyalists.  
For the former camp, the NSS represents an unapologetic shift to an explicit “America First” 
approach across the spectrum of domestic and international security issues. Hence, the doc-
ument promises, inter alia, stronger border controls (including a “border wall”), “enhanced 
vetting” of prospective immigrants and refugees, expanded cyber and ballistic missile de-
fences, greater protection for American defence industries, “strengthening (US) sovereignty” 
in multilateral organisations, and retaining US “military overmatch” to deter and defeat adver-
saries – or, in the President’s words quoted by the NSS, to “always win”. 
For the latter camp, the NSS offers more traditional and/or centrist reference points. It prom-
ises, for example, to “preserve peace through strength” (resurrecting President Ronald 
Reagan’s theme during the Cold War); counter Chinese and Russian efforts to “shape a world 
antithetical to US values and interests,” while keeping open the possibility of cooperation in 
areas of mutual interest; integrate all elements of America’s national power – political, eco-
nomic and military; and “deepen collaboration with our European allies and partners to con-
front forces threatening to undermine our common values, security interests, and shared vi-
sion”. 
Not surprisingly, the President’s critics were quick to point out many inconsistencies between 
the NSS description of US objectives and priorities and the actual policies and actions under-
taken by his administration (Cohen 2017).  For example, shortly following release of the NSS, 
the Republican-controlled Congress passed tax legislation (enthusiastically embraced by the 
President) that, according to independent estimates, would be likely to add more than $1 
trillion to the US national debt over the coming decade (Patel and Parlapiano 2017; Joint 
Committee on Taxation 2017).  According to the NSS, however, the current $20 trillion debt 
“presents a grave threat to America’s long-term prosperity and, by extension, its national se-
curity” (White House 2017z). Even Republican-leaning commentators pointed to disconnects 
between the NSS praise for the “indispensable” role of American diplomacy while the admin-
istration has proposed a 30 percent cut in funding for the Department of State (Schake 2017; 
                                                     
34 The Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 mandated the submission of the NSS. The principal drafters are staff members 
of the National Security Council (NSC), working under the direction of the President’s National Security Advisor, a position now held by Army Lieutenant 
General H.R. McMaster. 
  
 
47 
 
Inboden 2018). Similarly, the NSS acknowledges the growing cyber threats to American po-
litical, economic and security interests, and – in a separate chapter – Russian “interference in 
the domestic political affairs of countries around the world,” but carefully omits any explicit 
linkage between the two.   
According to its congressional mandate, the forthcoming NDS should describe the projected 
threat environment and the defence department’s strategy for countering those threats; prior-
ity missions and planning scenarios to execute them; the size, posture and non-nuclear ca-
pabilities of the military forces; and the necessary investment framework to execute the strat-
egy over a five-year period. The Pentagon will submit the strategy to the appropriate congres-
sional committees in a classified form, with an unclassified summary released to the public. 
The classified nature of the report might facilitate Secretary of Defense James Mattis’ stated 
intention to challenge the status quo and to make hard choices among readiness, investment, 
force structure and operational commitments. 
In recent months, Mattis and Marine General Joseph Dunford, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs 
of Staff, have previewed their thinking on the threat environment in regions vital to US secu-
rity.35   
In Europe, they see a “resurgent and more aggressive” Russia, which is investing in capabil-
ities designed to limit the US ability to project power into Europe, and thereby meet its com-
mitments to NATO. These Russian capabilities range from anti-access/area denial (A2AD) 
tools – including long-range strike platforms, extended air defences, and electronic warfare – 
to the modernisation and deployment of non-strategic nuclear weapons. Russia’s reported 
deployment, in December 2016, of a new nuclear-capable ground-launched cruise missile in 
violation of the 1987 Intermediate Nuclear Forces Treaty, together with various military activ-
ities in the northern European region and in Syria have heightened Pentagon concerns about 
Moscow’s intentions and appetite for risk-taking.   
In Asia, North Korea has moved to the top of the Pentagon’s list of near-term threats for 
several reasons: its tests of prototype intercontinental-range ballistic missiles in July 2017; 
the detonation two months later of its largest nuclear device to date; and reports (attributed to 
US intelligence) that it might be closer than previously assessed to mounting a nuclear war-
head on ballistic missiles capable of reaching Hawaii, Alaska and the US territory of Guam. 
The Pentagon leadership is also concerned about an assertive China, which is challenging 
international norms on the freedom of navigation (especially in the South China Sea) and 
intimidating nations on its periphery. China’s extensive programmes to modernise and expand 
its strategic arsenal and conventional (including A2AD) capabilities are seen as an integral 
part of Beijing’s strategy to limit US power projection and its ability to meet alliance commit-
ments in the Pacific. Indeed, as Dunford told a Senate panel in September: “China probably 
poses the greatest threat to our nation by about 2025” (quoted in Hincks 2017).  
Across the Middle East, North Africa and Southwest Asia (especially, Afghanistan and Paki-
stan), Mattis and Dunford highlight “extremists” or “violent extremist organizations” such as 
ISIS and al Qaeda as a serious, long-term threat to US partners in those regions, European 
allies, and potentially the American homeland. At the same time, they avoid using descriptors 
such as “radical Islamic extremists” favoured by the White House. They cite Iran’s support for 
proxies in Syria, Iraq and Yemen, as well as its improving ballistic-missile, cyber and cruise-
missile capabilities as a growing threat to regional security and American interests. Although 
                                                     
35 The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is the principal military adviser to the President, the Secretary of Defense, and the NSC. 
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they reportedly opposed Trump’s initial plans to withdraw from the 2015 multilateral agree-
ment on the Iranian nuclear programme, they later acquiesced in his decision to seek its re-
negotiation (see Chapter 3). 
Mattis and Dunford also point to global trends that pose an increasing risk to US forces. Ac-
cording to their analysis, although the US military maintained either uncontested or dominant 
superiority in every operating domain – air, land, maritime, space and cyber – for decades, it 
now finds itself challenged in all of them. In addition, many of the rapid technological changes 
that the US military will depend upon in the future – including advanced computing, big data 
analytics, artificial intelligence and robotics – emanate from the commercial sector. This 
means that, in many instances, state and non-state adversaries might have increased access 
to technologies that they can employ to degrade US advantages. 
Even if Mattis and Dunford adopt a somewhat more strident and urgent tone than projected 
by the Obama administration, their description of the evolving threat environment does not 
differ radically in substance. Hence, in terms of its overarching objectives, the forthcoming 
NDS is likely to resemble the Pentagon’s last major strategic report, the 2014 Quadrennial 
Defense Review (US Department of Defense 2014). That document emphasises the need to 
deter and defeat any attack on the US homeland; to continue with a strong US commitment 
to shaping world events so as to deter and prevent conflict, while assuring allies and partners 
of that commitment; and to maintain armed forces with the capability to deter acts of aggres-
sion and defeat adversaries in one or more operational theatres. If this analysis proves cor-
rect, one might anticipate a degree of continuity in the NDS’s approach to policy. 
For example, despite the President’s scolding of NATO allies on defence spending and his 
six-month wait before explicitly reaffirming his commitment to the collective defence provision 
(Article 5) of the NATO Treaty, Mattis and Dunford have consistently made the case for main-
taining strong transatlantic defence bonds and a “rock solid” US commitment to NATO and 
Article 5. The new NSS specifically confirms this view.  The NDS, therefore, could be expected 
to endorse efforts – initiated by the Obama administration following Russia’s 2014 invasion of 
Ukraine – to strengthen NATO’s deterrence and defence capabilities: these include the en-
hanced US forward presence in Poland, the Baltic states and Romania, and the further pre-
positioning of equipment to support the rapid deployment of additional forces, if necessary, 
from the United States. Although Mattis and Dunford do not use the “third offset” terminology 
of the last administration, they do support further US and NATO efforts to counter Russia’s 
A2AD capabilities.36 As Mattis stated: “While willing to engage diplomatically, we are going to 
have to confront Russia when it comes to areas where they attack us, whether it be with cyber, 
or they try to change borders using armed force” (quoted in CBS News 2017).   
Similarly, without reference to “rebalance” – the Obama administration’s descriptor for paying 
greater attention to the Asia-Pacific region – Mattis appears to differ very little from his imme-
diate predecessors in his overall approach. Thus, while welcoming China’s economic devel-
opment, he warns against its militarisation of islands in the South China Sea, and any unilat-
eral changes to the status quo. He has also pledged to strengthen longstanding US bilateral 
alliances (with Australia, Japan, South Korea, Thailand and the Philippines), and to forge 
newer defence-cooperation partnerships (with India and Vietnam, for example). As a result, 
the new NDS is likely to follow through on the Obama administration’s plan to assign 60 per 
cent of US Navy ships, 55 per cent of Army forces, two-thirds of Marine forces and (in the 
near future) 60 per cent of US overseas tactical aviation assets to the Asia-Pacific region. 
                                                     
36 For an excellent discussion of the “third offset strategy,” see Hicks et al. (2017). 
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Regarding North Korea, Mattis and Dunford warn that US patience has its limits, and a military 
conflict would have disastrous consequences for the Kim Jong-un regime. Nevertheless, they 
acknowledge that US allies (especially South Korea and Japan) and US forces in the region 
are vulnerable to North Korean conventional, chemical and, potentially, nuclear weapons. 
Hence, they have avoided Trump’s most provocative rhetoric, emphasising that the best ap-
proach is through diplomatic and economic pressure, while strengthening missile-defence co-
operation with South Korea and Japan.   
If a military conflict with North Korea were to appear imminent, additional US forces and sup-
port assets would be deployed to the region. This, in turn, would force difficult decisions by 
the Pentagon on whether, and if so how to draw such reinforcements from US-based units 
and/or regional combatant commands, such as the European Command and the Central 
Command. The unclassified version of the NDS would not include detailed analyses of po-
tential conflict scenarios and associated risks. However, it might point to the volatile situation 
on the Korean peninsula as a reason why a future US defence strategy, force structure and 
global posture should be tailored to the possible need to fight and win two major regional wars 
simultaneously.37        
In some respects, the Pentagon’s preferred strategy for dealing with ISIS resembles the 
Obama administration’s approach (often ridiculed by then candidate Trump) to “degrade and 
destroy” the terrorist organisation and its affiliates through a US-led anti-ISIS coalition com-
prising some European allies and partners, with participation and support from largely Sunni 
Arab states in the region. The NDS almost certainly will not suggest the reintroduction of 
thousands of US combat forces into the Middle East. However, Mattis has promised an “ac-
celerated and reinforced” effort and a shift from “attrition” to “annihilation” tactics. Based on 
its budget submissions for the fiscal year 2018, the Pentagon envisages a slight increase in 
funding to train and equip Iraqi government, Kurdish Peshmerga, and Syrian opposition 
forces. Several thousand US military advisors will probably remain forward deployed with (or 
near to) the combat forces they support in Iraq, with additional US military personnel – ap-
proximately 2,000 according to recent Pentagon statements – in Syria. Notwithstanding the 
aforementioned cruise-missile strike last April, US military efforts in Syria are likely to remain 
heavily weighted to combatting ISIS rather than the Syrian regime.   
In this context, the Pentagon apparently remains sceptical regarding the possibility of exten-
sive military cooperation with Russia in Syria. After all, Moscow and Washington are backing 
different sides in the conflict, and the US military and its coalition partners are very critical of 
Russian military tactics that produce high civilian casualties. Still, the NDS will probably sup-
port efforts, where possible, to avoid a direct US-Russian confrontation through military-to-
military lines of communication. Elsewhere in the region, the NDS is likely to stress the im-
portance of enhanced defence cooperation (including through military sales) with Israel and 
those Arab states that are presumed to be reliable partners in fighting terrorism and containing 
Iran. 
Regarding South Asia, the NDS will not unveil any significant change from the President’s 
August 2017 statement, which promised a “conditions-based” approach to the size and timing 
of the US troop presence in Afghanistan; increased pressure on Pakistan to stop the “har-
bouring of militants and terrorists”; and the further development of a US “strategic partnership” 
                                                     
37 Critics of the 2014 Quadrennial Defense Review argued that its force-sizing construct meant that US forces could not simultaneously fight and defeat 
aggressors in two major regional conflicts. The QDR language reads: “If deterrence fails at any given time, US forces will be capable of defeating a regional 
adversary in a large-scale multi-phased campaign, and denying the objectives of – or imposing unacceptable costs on – a second aggressor in another 
region” (US Department of Defense 2014). 
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with India (White House 2017u). Some 4,000 US soldiers reportedly will join the 11,000 cur-
rently deployed in Afghanistan. Most will provide increased training and mentoring to Afghan 
forces, putting some Americans in closer proximity to direct combat with the Taliban. 
5.3 Nuclear forces and missile defence 
In testimony to congressional panels and other public statements, Mattis listed the mainte-
nance of a safe, secure and reliable nuclear deterrent at the top of the Pentagon’s priorities 
to build a “more lethal force”. In language similar to that of his predecessors, he argued that 
nuclear weapons were fundamental to US national security in providing a deterrent against 
aggression (either nuclear or non-nuclear) aimed at the United States and/or its allies; under-
pinning the US ability to deploy conventional forces worldwide; and, by extending deterrence 
to allies, dissuading them from developing their own nuclear weapons. Before assuming his 
cabinet post, he questioned whether the United States needed to retain a land-based inter-
continental ballistic missile force as part of its strategic triad, along with submarine-launched 
ballistic missiles and long-range air-launched cruise missiles delivered by strategic bombers. 
More recently, he has acknowledged his intent to retain and modernise all three legs of the 
triad, thereby maintaining a continuity of approach with the four previous post-Cold War ad-
ministrations. 
Nevertheless, prominent current and former senior defence officials have pointed to changes 
in the strategic environment that the forthcoming NPR will need to take into account. For 
example, given the nature of Russia’s security policy since early 2014, the characterisation of 
relations set out in the Obama administration’s 2010 NPR – “Russia and the United States 
are no longer adversaries, and prospects for military confrontation have declined dramatically” 
– is no longer accurate (US Department of Defense 2010). Moreover, Russia proved unwilling 
to engage in the US proposal to negotiate an additional one-third cut in strategic arsenals 
linked with transparency measures and eventual reductions in non-strategic nuclear weap-
ons, or to address US concerns regarding Russia’s violation of the INF treaty.   
Elsewhere, North Korea has pressed ahead with its nuclear build-up, prompting calls from 
some South Korean parliamentarians for the deployment of US non-strategic nuclear weap-
ons on their territory to strengthen their deterrent effect. China has deflected US proposals 
for “strategic stability” talks, which would include discussion on transparency measures re-
lated to nuclear doctrines and postures. In addition, if the decision Trump made in October 
regarding the JCPOA eventually leads to the collapse of the agreement, Iran would most likely 
resume its pre-2015 activities, possibly bringing it to within a few months of fabricating a nu-
clear weapon. 
To date, defence officials have given little public indication of how their NPR analyses and 
recommendations are shaping up. However, there are signs that significant policy shifts are 
under consideration.   
For instance, it is suggested in a non-government think-tank report published in May 2017, 
some of whose authors are now involved in the NPR process, that the “expectation of a more 
benign nuclear threat environment embedded in previous nuclear (posture) reviews […] 
should not serve as a planning assumption for the new NPR” (Payne and Foster 2017, 3; see 
also Michel 2017a). It further proposes several new approaches that, if adopted, would prove 
controversial. These include explicitly setting the deterrence of aggression and the assurance 
of allies as the priority goals of US nuclear policy, thereby pushing non-proliferation lower 
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down the agenda; rejecting any “minimalist” approach to determining the size of the US arse-
nal and leaving the door open to a possible expansion; incorporating allies in eastern Europe 
into NATO arrangements for the deployment of “dual capable aircraft” (DCA); and extending 
US DCA deployments to bases in Japan and South Korea.38   
Although the report does not rule out further arms-control agreements with Russia, its authors 
would set a very high bar for entering into new negotiations. For example, they would make 
future talks conditional on Russia’s return to compliance with the INF Treaty, the resolution of 
US questions regarding Russia’s compliance with the 2010 “New START” treaty on strategic 
arms reductions, and the fulfilling of political commitments to reduce non-strategic nuclear 
arsenals and delivery systems made by Presidents Mikhail Gorbachev and Boris Yeltsin in 
the early 1990s. 
The capabilities and posture of US missile defences are similarly under review, but with little 
official comment on any progress. Again, there are elements of continuity. Trump-administra-
tion officials, like their predecessors, have highlighted the growing threat to US allies, regional 
partners and, potentially, the US homeland from the ballistic-missile programmes of North 
Korea and Iran. They emphasise the fact that North Korea has tested, albeit with mixed re-
sults, a variety of missile types from land, road-mobile and submarine-based platforms, while 
Iran reportedly holds the largest inventory of ballistic missiles in the Middle East, with the 
ability to strike targets throughout the region and into south-eastern Europe. For the most 
part, they also stress the need to improve US capabilities (such as the ground-based inter-
ceptors) to defend the US homeland against the evolving but limited North Korean ballistic-
missile threat. To date, US cooperation with Japan and South Korea to defend their territory 
against ballistic-missile attack has also focused on the North Korean threat, whereas cooper-
ation with NATO allies has focused on the Iranian threat (see Harvey 2017). 
However, in what appears to be a subtle change from the Obama administration, US defence 
officials are now more likely to draw attention to Russian and Chinese ballistic-missile and 
advanced cruise-missile developments that could put US as well as regional targets at risk. It 
is unclear if this presages a shift in US strategy, which might be unveiled in the MDR, towards 
building defences against those Russian and Chinese offensive capabilities. If such a shift 
were to occur, it would doubtless increase tensions between Washington on the one hand, 
and Moscow and Beijing on the other. Indeed, the latter have frequently claimed that US 
missile defence cooperation with its European and Asian allies is essentially a mask conceal-
ing their efforts to degrade the Russian and Chinese deterrents.     
5.4 Fiscal constraints and the prioritisation of capabilities 
The United States has been the world’s leading military power for years, its defence expendi-
ture outstripping that of other great powers by a wide margin (see Figure 7). Trump promised 
soon after his inauguration to put in place “one of the largest increases in national defense 
spending in American history” (quoted in Greenberg 2017). This apparently reflected his po-
litical messaging calculations – specifically, his desire to underscore differences with the pre-
vious administration – rather than a considered analysis of US capability requirements. Still, 
even some prominent experts who served in the Obama administration have welcomed the 
prospect of additional resources for the Pentagon. The emerging debate will be over how 
much and for what purposes. 
                                                     
38 DCA are combat aircraft capable of delivering conventional and nuclear weapons.   
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Figure 7: World military spending in 2016 
 
Source: McCarthy, L. (2017) 
 
The stakes in this debate are enormous, given that defence spending represents approxi-
mately one-sixth of all federal spending, or about three per cent of GDP (Congressional 
Budget Office 2017). In May 2017, Congress approved a total of $586 billion in spending for 
the fiscal year (FY) 2017, which represents a $6 billion increase over the 2016 figure approved 
by the Obama administration. As part of a deal between the President and Democratic con-
gressional leaders in September 2017 to avoid a government shutdown, defence spending 
for at least the first quarter of FY 2018 was capped at the FY 2017 level, leaving major new 
Pentagon programmes proposed by the administration without funding. In November 2017, 
Congress passed a defence authorisation bill totalling $700 billion for FY 2018, a significant 
increase over the Trump administration’s request of $639 billion. As part of a short-term 
budget compromise to prevent a partial federal-government shutdown on the eve of Christ-
mas, the Pentagon received an extra $4.7 billion (above the FY 2017 cap) for missile-defence 
and ship-repair programmes. However, the real battle over how much money the Pentagon 
actually receives will be decided when Congress debates the FY 2018 defence appropriation 
bill beginning in early January 2018. 
Hence, the stage is set for what promises to be a protracted and contentious fight in Congress. 
Republican “deficit hawks,” who are committed to reducing overall federal-government spend-
ing, are uncomfortable with proposals by fellow Republicans (known as “security hawks”) to 
appropriate up to $650 billion or more for defence – or $70 billion more than statutory budget 
caps enacted in 2011. On the Democratic side of the aisle, liberal Democrats who oppose 
any increase in defence spending will be at odds with moderates in their party willing to accept 
a smaller increase than the Republican “security hawks” want. However, the lion’s share of 
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Democratic members are likely to vote against additional defence spending if it is not matched 
by increases in spending on domestic programmes such as health care and infrastructure. 
Trump (and most of the congressional Republicans) staunchly oppose the former, and the 
chances of a bipartisan compromise on infrastructure legislation appear to be fading, in part 
due to the President’s insistence on including funding for building a wall along the US-Mexican 
border. The longer Congress is unable to resolve these differences, the greater the chances 
will be of a government shut down in early 2018 and a concomitant freeze on substantially 
increased defence spending.  
Although less publicly, the debates on how to allocate defence spending, which will take place 
within the Trump administration and between the administration and Congress, will probably 
be just as spirited. Given the size of the defence budget and the complexity of modern defence 
systems, it is very difficult to introduce radical changes in direction and to obtain quick results. 
Moreover, defence strategists must constantly seek a balance among the oft-competing pri-
orities inherent in preparing for current or imminent operations, investing to meet anticipated 
future needs, and getting the associated force structure right.  Meanwhile, members of Con-
gress keep a close eye on the effects of defence spending on their constituencies. Hence a 
substantial number of members in both parties, for example, appear to oppose the Pentagon’s 
desire to close or consolidate unnecessary basing structures in the United States and redirect 
the savings – about $2 billion annually, according to the Pentagon – to higher-priority readi-
ness or investment needs. 
Much of the FY 2017 and proposed FY 2018 spending increases will be devoted to improving 
war-fighting readiness in the near term – such as in the areas of training, equipment, mainte-
nance and munitions. They will also help to fund a modest augmentation (by several thousand 
personnel) in active-duty military ranks, which currently total about 1.3 million soldiers, sailors, 
airmen and marines. If approved along the lines proposed by the administration, the FY 2018 
budget will also include enhancements to US power-projection capabilities in the air and mar-
itime domains. Missile-defence programmes would receive a modest increase in funding, 
mostly for implementing existing plans (such as the deployment of missile defences in Po-
land), maintaining the 44 ground-based interceptors currently deployed in Alaska and Califor-
nia, and upgrading various sensor capabilities. 
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Figure 8: US defence spending during the 2000s 
 
Source: US Department of Defence (2017) 
 
Over the longer term, however, the Trump administration will face serious challenges to its 
promise to “rebuild” the armed forces. In addition to renewing strategic delivery systems, for 
example, the NPR is likely to endorse the modernising of the DCA; making safety and relia-
bility improvements to certain types of nuclear warheads; enhancing command, control and 
communications systems involved in detecting attacks and relaying orders regarding the de-
ployment and/or possible use of weapons; and sustaining the extensive nuclear-weapons 
laboratories, production and dismantlement facilities. According to government estimates, the 
price tag of these programmes over the next decade will range from $340-$400 billion, or 
about six per cent (versus three per cent currently) of the total defence budget in this period. 
Although manageable, the large increase for nuclear programmes would put more stress on 
resources for conventional weaponry, investment and force structure. 
Trump’s appetite for other major defence investments may also be unaffordable. In March 
2017, he promised to expand the Navy’s fleet from 275 to 350 ships, which would represent 
the largest proposed growth since the early 1980s. As the CBO pointed out in January 2017, 
however, the Navy’s mid-2016 plan to number 308 ships by 2021 came with an estimated 
price tag of around $20 billion annually for new ship construction – more than one-third more 
than the inflation-adjusted average spent on shipbuilding in recent decades. A notional fleet 
of 350 ships would cost around $25 billion annually for new ships – around 60 per cent above 
the historical average, according to the CBO. Meanwhile, the Air Force is seeking to boost 
funding for its top three priorities: the further production and deployment of F-35 combat air-
craft; the development of a new B-21 strategic bomber; and the acquisition of new KC-46 
aerial tankers.  
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Moreover, the purchase of platforms and weapon systems is only part of the story. The Pen-
tagon will seek to maintain a reasonable margin of US technological superiority through inno-
vation projects such as unmanned aerial and submarine vehicles, directed-energy weapons, 
and new space- and seabed-based sensors. Successful innovation initiatives will require that 
technology and resources be matched with the “best and the brightest” individuals drawn to 
military and civilian government service – an effort that is not helped by the President’s deri-
sive references to the federal workforce. 
In some instances, US defence innovation benefits from a willingness to work closely with 
allies and partners with special skills. However, the Trump administration’s “Buy American” 
mantra, if widely applied to defence research, development and acquisition programmes, 
would impede such international cooperation. Although imperfect, the previous administra-
tion’s efforts to improve defence-industry relations with selected allies and partners yielded 
technological, cost and political dividends for both sides. The stated policy objective of the 
President’s July 2017 Executive Order – that the United States “must maintain a manufactur-
ing and defence industrial base and supply chains” capable of providing “goods critical to 
national security” – might seem unobjectionable (White House 2017v). However, broad defi-
nitions of materials and capabilities deemed necessary for national security purposes, com-
bined with the administration’s emphasis on returning manufacturing jobs to the United States, 
could set the stage for further constraints on the possibility for non-US entities to compete for 
Pentagon contracts. 
5.5 Transatlantic trends and uncertainties 
Europe’s deep and complex defence relationships with the United States have never been 
problem-free. In recent decades, even American presidents who enjoyed broad popularity 
across the Old Continent were, on occasion, targets of stiff criticism from European officials 
and non-government security analysts. Some faulted Bill Clinton, for example, for his early 
reluctance to engage American power to stop the Bosnian war. Others blamed Obama’s de-
cision not to launch military strikes against Syria (after warning that its use of chemical weap-
ons would cross a “red line”) as a “failure of leadership”. Still, the frequency and degree of 
loose rhetoric emanating from the current resident of the White House, combined with occa-
sional policy decisions showing disregard for the views and interests of allies, leaves many 
Europeans understandably worried. As one unnamed diplomat in Washington recently con-
fided to The Washington Post: “[t]he idea that he [President Trump] would inform himself, and 
things would change, is no longer operative” (quoted in DeYoung and Jaffe 2017). 
To better anticipate how crosscurrents of US policies and/or actions might affect transatlantic 
defence relationship, it would be useful to examine its three dimensions: first, the bilateral and 
multilateral ties primarily related to US engagement in Europe; second, the effects on Europe 
of the US defence strategy vis-à-vis Russia; and finally, how European defence structures 
and interests might be shaped by US actions in other regions, especially in the Asia-Pacific 
and the broader Middle East. 
Of these, the first dimension appears the most stable. With the President now on record – 
albeit belatedly – as committed to upholding the NATO Treaty’s collective defence provision, 
the United States and its allies have turned their attention to the practical tasks at hand. For 
NATO, these include continuing the implementation and longer-term sustainment of deter-
rence and defence measures in the Baltic States, Poland and Romania; improving coopera-
tion on capacity-building and interoperability; and deepening a range of activities (from con-
sultations to exercises) with Enhanced Operational Partners, notably Finland and Sweden, 
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and the EU. On the bilateral track, which complements US work within the Alliance, Mattis 
reaffirmed the longstanding patterns of US cooperation with individual allies, as well as the 
more recent defence-cooperation agreements (covering military training, information sharing 
and research) with Finland and Sweden. 
Some areas of friction are likely to persist or expand, however. The Trump administration in 
general, and the President in particular, are unlikely to relax their insistence that allies in-
crease defence spending (and do so at a faster pace) to reach the NATO-agreed target of 
two per cent of GDP. European allies, for their part, will closely examine the results of the 
NPR and MDR, especially any suggestions to expand NATO’s nuclear-sharing arrangements 
to include DCA capabilities for Eastern European allies and/or to introduce capabilities to 
NATO missile-defence systems directed against Russian ballistic and cruise missiles. Mean-
while, Washington and some of its closest allies find themselves at odds on how to deal with 
Turkey, a NATO member that appears increasingly determined to go its own way on issues 
ranging from involvement in Syria to its recent purchase of a Russian air-defence system.  In 
addition, the United States and its European allies and partners might find themselves in-
creasingly at odds over industrial and technology-sharing issues, given the growing protec-
tionist sentiments on both sides of the Atlantic.  
On the second dimension, there is a strong possibility that a downward trend in the US-Russia 
relationship will have secondary effects on European security interests. For example, the US 
decision in late December to approve the first-ever sale of lethal defensive weapons to 
Ukraine is certain to rile Russia: President Putin suggested in September that such an action 
might prompt Russia to increase its military assistance to Ukrainian separatists. Moscow 
might also retaliate by suspending its participation in the “Minsk process”. Without defending 
the Russians, Germany and France, who remain committed to the Minsk process, may well 
consider the US action counterproductive. A number of EU member states might even view 
the US action as provocative, and argue for a relaxation or the abandonment of economic 
and financial sanctions on Russia.    
Russia will also closely examine the NPR and the MDR, and its reaction is likely to be highly 
critical of both. President Vladimir Putin reportedly raised the possibility, in a January 2017 
phone call with Trump, of extending the 2010 New START agreement beyond its 2021 expi-
ration date. Hence, he would probably respond harshly to any suggestion in the NPR to link 
an extension to Russian compliance with other arms-control treaties.39 A collapse of New 
START would not directly affect the independent UK and French nuclear systems – neither 
country participates in the strategic arms talks – but the absence of any arms-control process 
could strengthen the appeal of the “nuclear ban” movement across Europe. Similarly, having 
claimed for years that US missile defences aim to degrade the Russian deterrent (rather than 
defend against a potential North Korean or Iranian threat), Russian leaders would seize on 
any indication of such a shift in US strategy to step up efforts to contain or reverse US missile 
defences deployed in Europe.   
With regard to the third dimension, the US defence posture and operations outside Europe 
may also have far-reaching ramifications for European interests. For example, the current 
tense standoff involving the Korean Peninsula could unravel in a number of ways. A major 
military clash would produce catastrophic loss of life and injuries on both sides of the Demili-
tarized Zone, including thousands of foreign nationals in the south. The second- and third-
order consequences of a failure of deterrence in Korea are hard to predict – particularly if the 
                                                     
39 During his presidential campaign, Trump dismissed the 2010 New START nuclear arms reduction treaty with Russia as a “one-sided deal”. 
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conflict escalated to the use of nuclear weapons – but they would probably be dramatic. They 
might include, for example: a serious deterioration in US-China and US-Russia relations; the 
reappraisal of US bilateral defence ties to South Korea and Japan (in the event that those 
countries blamed US actions, at least in part, for precipitating the war); and a significant trans-
fer of US military capabilities from Europe to meet more urgent war-fighting and stabilisation 
needs in northeast Asia. 
In South Asia, failure by the United States and its NATO allies and partners to stabilise and, 
eventually, improve the security situation in Afghanistan would be a serious setback for the 
Alliance.  At a minimum, it would provoke a debilitating round of recriminations between the 
United States and Europe over “who lost Afghanistan”, making it exceedingly difficult to work 
together on risky out-of-area operations for many years to come. At worst, it would allow ter-
rorist networks once again to use Afghanistan as a base from which to launch attacks against 
European and US interests in the region and, potentially, their homelands. 
Across the broader Middle East, US decisions affect European security interests in multiple 
areas. For example, French, British and German negotiators worked hard with their American 
counterparts to reach a nuclear deal with Iran based on shared strategic concerns over that 
country’s progress towards acquiring a nuclear weapon. If Europeans came to view the Trump 
administration as responsible for the deal’s collapse, their future cooperation with the United 
States on counter-proliferation would be jeopardised. Moreover, European direct or indirect 
assistance in any US military intervention against Iran would be highly unlikely. Similarly, alt-
hough many Europeans share US concerns about the threats posed by violent extremism 
across the region, they would find it increasingly difficult to participate in US-led military coa-
litions if Washington appeared to be focused on “killing terrorists” and disinterested in diplo-
matic solutions. Widespread opposition in Europe to the Trump administration’s decision to 
move the US embassy to Jerusalem might be a harbinger of a deeper transatlantic split over 
Middle East policy affecting the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. 
5.6 Conclusion 
Despite the potential for policy differences and adverse externalities assessed above, worst-
case scenarios in any of the three dimensions of the transatlantic defence relationship are not 
preordained.  The current occupant of the White House is likely to remain unpredictable, prone 
to favouring a transactional approach over the constraints of multilateral alliances, and more 
enthralled with hard power (at least brandishing it, if not its actual use) than with soft power 
tools, including patient diplomacy. To date, he has not been tested in a major, imminent crisis 
– although a military conflict with North Korea could erupt with little warning.    
First, the good news: despite occasional deep divisions, from the 1956 Suez crisis to the 
invasion of Iraq in 2003, the underlying fabric of transatlantic defence relations has grown 
stronger and more resilient. Indeed, over the past decade or so, the dominant trend among 
US defence strategists and military commanders – especially in light of lessons learned from 
Afghanistan and Iraq – has been to formulate and implement policies with allies and partners 
in mind. As Secretary of Defence Mattis put it in a recent speech: “Nations with allies thrive, 
and those without allies decline. It’s that simple […]. We must be willing to do more than to 
listen to our allies. We must be willing to be persuaded by them […]. Not all the good ideas 
come from the nation with the most aircraft carriers” (Mattis 2017a).   
Additional good news: for their part, European allies and partners still command substantial 
defence and military resources, and have the potential – individually and collectively – to do 
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more, if the political will is there. There is a growing understanding, among NATO allies as 
well as partners such as Finland and Sweden, that Russia’s more assertive – even aggressive 
(as in Ukraine) – behaviour challenges the European security order in a way that cannot be 
ignored. A strong US link to Europe will remain important for stability on the “old continent”. 
By following through on their commitments – nationally, and within NATO and the EU – Eu-
ropeans will help to contain the impulse for unilateral decisions and actions that remains in 
parts of the US national-security complex. 
However, there is also more worrying news. In many respects, Trump seems out of step with 
key national-security figures in his own administration, as well as with mainstream opinion 
within the broader defence and foreign-policy establishment across both political parties. 
Moreover, this Commander in Chief is likely to remain in office for at least three more years. 
The Constitution entrusts him with broad discretion in the conduct of foreign and defence 
affairs, and the checks-and-balances that can hamstring a president’s domestic agenda are 
generally weaker – and slower to take effect – when it comes to defence affairs writ large, 
and crisis management in particular.  
The renowned British wartime leader Sir Winston Churchill famously quipped: “You can al-
ways count on the Americans to do the right thing, after they have exhausted all other possi-
bilities”. The Trump administration’s defence policy will test whether Sir Winston’s back-
handed compliment still applies. 
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PART III: MULTILATERAL GOVERNANCE 
6. The uncertain future of the liberal international order 
 The Trump administration’s “America First” policy agenda may denote a newfound 
unwillingness on the part of the US to maintain its traditional role as the leading pro-
ponent of the post-World War II liberal international order.  
 Donald Trump’s rise to the presidency is, in part, a symptom of the longer-term inter-
nal and external challenges faced by the current order, which include the “return of 
geopolitics”, the negative externalities of economic globalisation and the rise of na-
tionalist populist movements in the West. 
 The first year of the Trump presidency has seen America challenge parts of the insti-
tutional, normative and economic foundations of the liberal international order. In the 
security sphere America’s espousal of its commitments looks to remain firmer, alt-
hough it will continue to press for more equal burden-sharing from allies and partners. 
 America’s willingness to maintain sustained support for all key components of the 
present order remains essential. A reassertion of American commitment could lead 
to the continuation or renegotiation of the current order. An American retreat, on the 
other hand, would increase the likelihood of great power or civilizational competition, 
the birth of opposing power blocks or a rising China filling the leadership vacuum.  
6.1 Introduction 
Days before Donald Trump’s inauguration in January 2017, the Financial Times painted a 
gloomy picture of the potential metamorphosis of “Pax Americana […] into a return to the 
Hobbesian world of great power conflict” (Stephens 2017). The will to sustain American lead-
ership of the rule-based liberal international order – arguably a key part of US long-term global 
engagement and President Obama’s grand-strategic objective – appeared to have been re-
placed with a rejection of the order’s foundational values and institutions.  
According to critics, the current administration’s “America First” policy agenda exhibits a man-
ifest unwillingness on the part of the US to aspire to American political leadership of the liberal 
international order. At the same time, however, the pledge to “Make America Great Again”, 
and the administration’s plans to increase the defence budget, lead to the expectation that, in 
the military sphere, the material foundations of American hegemony will remain intact. In this 
sense, inherent in the Trump presidency is the potential of a partial retreat by the US from its 
global leadership role in the current order. 
This chapter investigates the uncertain future of the liberal international order and the internal 
and external challenges that it currently faces. From a longer-term perspective, the focus then 
turns to potential world-order trajectories in light of the current political situation in America 
and globally. 
6.2 The foundations of the liberal international order 
In broad terms, an international order is “the body of rules, norms and institutions that govern 
relations among key players in the international environment” (Brands 2016, 2). As such, it 
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has normative, institutional, economic and security components. The liberal international or-
der (also sometimes called the liberal rule-based order) evolved in the aftermath of the Sec-
ond World War. It was constructed upon a body of multilateral institutions, including the UN, 
the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank, the General Agreement on Tariffs 
and Trade (GATT), and later the European Community. Within these bodies, liberal values 
such as human rights, representative government, non-aggression, self-determination and 
the peaceful settlement of disputes were meant to flourish. The institutions also fostered the 
economic leitmotifs of the order, namely free trade and market-based solutions. In addition, 
security arrangements, most notably NATO and the US-Japan alliance, along with various 
arms-control agreements that emerged later, constituted a foundation that allowed other com-
ponents of the order to bloom (Brands 2016, 2).  
As the superpower rivalry between the United States and the Soviet Union became an en-
trenched fact of global life in the late 1940s and early 1950s, the US assumed the mantle of 
leader of the liberal international order. It became, in effect, a liberal hegemon, and the order’s 
fate became synonymous with the fate of its superpower guarantor (Ikenberry 1998, 65).  
The logic underpinning the liberal international order was simple: the US “provided global 
public goods such as freer trade and freedom of the seas and weaker states were given 
institutional access to the exercise of US power” (Nye 2017, 11). This grand bargain produced 
security and economic gains for both the US and its partners. In short, by agreeing to institu-
tional bargains that tied its hands to an extent – by exercising what has been termed “strategic 
restraint” to reduce other states’ fear of American power (Ikenberry 1998) – the United States 
created an orbit of friendly states that were willing to grant it “geopolitical access”. In return, 
its partners were given security guarantees. Americans also enjoyed the prosperity gains at-
tributable to increasingly uninhibited global trade, while other countries were given access to 
the burgeoning markets of the US (Ikenberry 2017, 4; Brands 2016, 2).  
Neither the US nor its allies and partners had reason to upend an order that not only accrued 
benefits to all involved, but also inhibited the unrestrained exercise of power on the part of the 
hegemon. In effect, US willingness to act as a relatively “benevolent hegemon” within the 
liberal international order has made its unrivalled power more bearable for others (Brooks 
2012; Walt 2002, 139). However, such “benevolence” did not always equate with non-coer-
cive behaviour. This was the case especially with regard to combatting the perceived threat 
of Communism in the developing world and, later, in the battle against transnational terrorism. 
The US also assumed normative leadership of the liberal international order by maintaining 
political commitment to its norms, values and institutions, oftentimes at the cost of short-term 
exigencies (Ikenberry 1998; 2008, 9).40 This liberal rule-based order has become increasingly 
robust and durable over the decades as its institutional webs have grown. In the meantime, 
key constitutive norms of the post-Second World War order have come to be regarded as 
legitimate in their own right: they “warrant respect and compliance for more than self-inter-
ested reasons, for reasons of their normative standing” (Reus-Smit 2007, 193). These insti-
tutions and norms play a dual function for the hegemon. They lend authority to its dominance, 
but also function as constraints on its behaviour. For other states, they provide a metric for 
evaluating the legitimacy of the hegemon’s conduct, and offer the normative ammunition with 
which to challenge it (Krisch 2005). 
Still, in spite of its robustness, the post-World War II liberal international order should not be 
equated with the international system or the world order writ large. In fact, although universal 
                                                     
40 Of course, the US has never been wholly consistent in living up to its promoted values (Finnemore 2009; Sinkkonen 2015). 
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in aspiration, the liberal rule-based order has never been universal in scope. This was cer-
tainly the case during the Cold War, when it functioned as a bulwark against the spread of 
Communism for its Western core. Although the scope of the liberal international order gradu-
ally expanded during the Cold War, and then with a bang in the 1990s, to this day some states 
remain on the fringes. Donald Trump’s labelled rogues North Korea, Iran and Syria would 
qualify as states that have either been pushed to the outside or have chosen to remain there 
(White House 2017k).   
For America, the commitment to lead, foster and extend the liberal international order has 
been a grand-strategic mainstay since the aftermath of the Second World War. This funda-
mental consensus has remained intact regardless of the different approaches that presidential 
administrations have taken to achieve these aims (Brands 2016; Dueck 2006). It has also 
endured in spite of the changing structural power dynamics in the global system. In fact, the 
commitment has not been a function merely of strategic imperatives, but also of factors tied 
to America’s political culture. At the heart of these is the widely held belief in the desirability 
of promoting the liberal democratic values that are central to the American creed (see Chapter 
2). 
6.3 Mounting challenges to the sustainability of the liberal rule-based order 
Nowadays there is considerable agreement among scholars of world politics that the liberal 
international order is in crisis mode, or at the very least is facing challenging times. One inter-
pretation is that the crisis began at the moment of the order’s greatest success, in other words 
the disappearance of bipolarity, the balance of power that had persisted between the US and 
the Soviet Union since the late 1940s (Ikenberry 2015). The international system transitioned 
to unipolarity at the end of the Cold War, when the United States was dominant in all spheres 
of power, be it military, economic or “soft” (Wohlforth 1999). In fact, the US had become so 
powerful that the incentive to restrain itself weakened considerably, as did the ability of other 
states to trust it not to use its acquired position to pursue narrow self-interests without taking 
into account the views and concerns of allies and partners (see Kydd 2005). The US invasion 
of Iraq in 2003, undertaken without explicit United Nations Security Council (UNSC) authori-
sation, appeared to confirm such fears as warranted.   
Related to this, the deepening of the global human-rights regime and the emerging notion of 
the responsibility to protect (R2P) has led to a situation in which sovereignty – the foundational 
norm of the international order of the state-based system since the Peace of Westphalia in 
1648 – has become increasingly conditional.41 This is most obvious in the case of interven-
tions undertaken by the United States and its allies in Kosovo (1999) and more recently in 
Libya (2011), the latter with UNSC backing. These episodes have spurred an on-going debate 
on the legality and legitimacy of such interventions, in other words who has the authority to 
undertake them and how such authority should be acquired in the future (Ikenberry 2015, 79; 
Bellamy and Reike 2011).  
Meanwhile, the number of stakeholders in the game of international politics has proliferated, 
and this movement has been both “horizontal” and “vertical” in nature (Nye 2011). With regard 
to the horizontal shift, more and more states previously relegated to the global peripheries 
have been incorporated into the liberal international order. At its inception they had little stake 
                                                     
41 The notion of the Responsibility to Protect is most clearly laid out in paragraphs 138 and 139 of the 2005 United Nations World Summit Outcome document 
and can be summarised thus: (1) The state carries the primary responsibility for the protection of populations from genocide, war crimes, crimes against 
humanity and ethnic cleansing; (2) The international community has a responsibility to assist states in fulfilling this responsibility; and (3) the international 
community should use appropriate diplomatic, humanitarian and other peaceful means to protect populations from these crimes. If a state fails to protect 
its populations or is in fact the perpetrator of crimes, the international community must be prepared to take stronger measures, including the collective use 
of force through the UN Security Council (ICRtoP 2017). 
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in it, and no say in negotiating its normative and institutional foundations (Ikenberry 2015, 79). 
Now, amidst increasing global complexity, this is no longer the case. Consequently, contes-
tation over international norms and institutions is likely to increase. This is especially true in 
the case of rising powers, most pressingly China but also India and Russia (although the latter 
is arguably not a rising power in the traditional sense of the term) (Prantl 2014; Hurrell 2006).  
In fact, many experts on international relations maintain that a horizontal power transition from 
the US/West to the “rising rest” is underway (Zakaria 2011; Kupchan 2012). The situation was 
exacerbated by the 2008 financial crisis, and the misnamed “Arab Spring” of 2011 set off a 
chain of events the repercussions of which have been felt in the West in the form of regional 
instability and migration flows (Wright 2015). Russian aggression in Georgia and Ukraine, 
along with Chinese assertiveness in the South East Asia maritime domain have led analysts 
to proclaim the “return of geopolitics” in Europe and Asia (Mead 2014). Still, there is little 
agreement on if, and when exactly, the United States would be replaced at the top of the 
global power hierarchy, and what this new power constellation and novel international order 
underpinned by it would look like (cf. Ikenberry 2012; Kupchan 2012; Jacques 2009; Nye 
2015; Zakaria 2011).    
Power is also diffusing vertically from states to non-state actors in the global arena, and this 
phenomenon is being accelerated by new communications technologies and common spaces 
in the cyber domain. The actors involved include multinational corporations and non-govern-
mental organisations but also cities and regions. There are also more insidious and disruptive 
players, such as organised-crime networks, terrorist organisations and hackers (Nye 2011). 
Moreover, the relationship of these other actors to states may be multidimensional and difficult 
to pin down. Of particular relevance is the fact that many such links are forged and maintained 
through cyberspace, making the attribution of actions to actors increasingly difficult. This novel 
state of affairs may well create unforeseen power dynamics. A telling case is the recent elec-
tion-influencing operation directed against the United States, when a plethora of actors and 
platforms including cyber espionage groups, websites, discussion forums, social media and 
(unwittingly) more traditional media outlets were involved in the conduct of an operation, which 
according to the US intelligence community was coordinated by Russia (Aaltola and Mattiisen 
2016; Aaltola 2017; National Intelligence Council 2017). 
Finally, it has become commonplace to argue that the liberal international order is facing its 
gravest challenge from within. Populist movements in Europe have tapped into the disillusion-
ment with the negative side effects of globalisation, which affects considerable portions of the 
European populace. The appeal of politicians parading nationalist messages is not limited to 
Central and East European states such as Poland and Hungary, which began their journey to 
democratisation during the so-called “third wave” in the late 1980s and early 1990s.42 The 
phenomenon is also manifest in Western Europe, including France, Germany, the Nether-
lands and the Nordic countries. In the UK, the country’s exit from the European Union could 
be interpreted as a repudiation of the most robust liberal institutional experiment of the 20th 
century, and of the EU’s core norms, the freedom of movement in particular. At its Western 
core, the malaise of the liberal international order is a “crisis of faith” in the very liberal norms 
that have undergirded the order for decades (Traub 2017).          
                                                     
42 The first wave of democratization began in the 1820s with the widening of suffrage, and ended in the 1920s with the rise of authoritarianism in Europe. 
The second wave ensued after the Second World War and ended in a backlash that began in the 1960s. The onset of the third wave came in the early 
1970s with the fall of right-wing dictatorships in Portugal and Spain, and spread to Latin America and ultimately to Central and Eastern Europe with the fall 
of Communism (Huntington 1991, 12–14).  
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6.4 The “Trump factor” and the liberal international order 
In light of the above, President Donald Trump’s rise to power is clearly not a cause of the 
malaise: he is at most a symptom of the broader challenges faced by American hegemony 
and the liberal international order in general. Trump has tapped into the domestic backlash 
against global engagement that is symptomatic of the disenchantment with the negative ex-
ternalities of an increasingly complex interconnected world harboured by certain sectors of 
the American public (see Chapters 2 and 3).  
As argued in Chapter 4 of this report, the isolationist strand of foreign-policy thinking has 
gained ground, and the wariness exhibited by portions of the American public towards global 
engagement has long historical roots (Drezner 2008; Pew Research Center 2016a). Similarly, 
the relationship of American leaders with global engagement, whether in the form of multilat-
eral institutions or the promotion of liberal values, has been historically ambivalent. In partic-
ular, aside from Woodrow Wilson’s activism during the First World War, engagement in the 
global arena was at most selective until the end of the Second World War (Cronin 2001; 
Mastanduno 2008). The unilateralist/multilateralist dichotomy that is habitually invoked to cat-
egorise the foreign policies of presidential administrations in the US, therefore, hides consid-
erable contextual shades of grey when it comes to the extensiveness of global engagement 
(see Brown 2004; Nye 2002, 154–63).  
By way of illustration, the George W. Bush administration, with its neoconservative-influenced 
foreign-policy agenda, is often presented as the epitome of US unilateralism (Chapter 4). In 
addition to its disdain for the UN, its extensive use of an extraordinary rendition programme 
and “enhanced interrogation techniques” were widely criticised as antithetical to the tenets of 
the international human rights regime and to liberal values. However, the Bush team retained 
its support for multilateral forays to foster free trade, took arms control seriously with the Pro-
liferation Security Initiative (PSI), and worked with NATO allies and partners in Afghanistan 
(Mastanduno 2008, 42).  
Although Barack Obama was pronouncedly more multilateralist in rhetoric, his administra-
tion’s record on multilateral engagement was also inconsistent. He did seek to recalibrate 
relations with allies, which had been frayed over the invasion of Iraq. Obama also re-engaged 
the world on climate change, sought a broad international coalition and UNSC backing for 
intervention in Libya, and used multilateral diplomacy to negotiate the nuclear deal with Iran. 
However, he avoided tying the US to potentially encumbering multilateral treaties, including 
the ICC statute and the Mine Ban Treaty (Skidmore 2012). He also sanctioned the use of 
drones for targeted killings – a practice of which the international legal credentials are at most 
questionable.43    
Nevertheless, the fact remains that Donald J. Trump is the first post-Second World War pres-
idential candidate to be elected on a platform that explicitly challenged the overall logic of 
America’s global engagement. In this respect, the Trump factor is manifest as a lack of will on 
the part of the liberal hegemon to lead the liberal international order, an order that is largely 
of its own making. This disinterest in (re)assuming leadership is at its clearest when it comes 
to fostering the normative and institutional foundations of the order. The situation is less clear-
cut in the economic and security spheres.  
                                                     
43 See e.g. “Symposium: Toward a Drone Accountability Regime”, Ethics & International Affairs 29 (1).  
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Through his rhetorical barrages in the first seven months of his presidency, President Trump 
has managed to call into question America’s espousal of core liberal values – including de-
mocracy, human rights and freedom of expression. In short, Trump does not champion the 
liberal normative parameters of the post-World War II order (Ikenberry 2017; Stephens 2017). 
Instead, his administration – in the words of Secretary of State Tillerson – has explicitly dis-
missed the promotion of human rights and diplomacy as “obstacles to our ability to advance 
our national security interests” (Piccone 2017; US Department of State 2017b). Meanwhile, 
the President himself has expressed admiration for strongmen such as Putin, Egypt’s leader 
Abdel Fattah al-Sisi and Philippine dictator Rodrigo Duterte (White House 2017x; Landler 
2017b). Most relevant of all, and in stark contrast to all four post-Cold War US presidents that 
preceded him, Trump emphasises the importance of sovereignty and patriotism as values 
that states in the international community should hold dear (White House 2017k).   
Beyond challenging the core liberal norms of the international rule-based order, Trump with 
his “America First” agenda has raised concerns that the US is no longer committed to sup-
porting the multilateral institutions that underwrite the order. He has, inter alia, criticised NATO 
for being obsolete, made unflattering comments on the European Union, fathomed drastic 
cuts to UN funding, announced America’s exit from UNESCO and threatened to leave the UN 
Human Rights Council. President Trump’s first forays into multilateral summits have done little 
to allay fears that America’s new president will be “socialised” into the game of international 
diplomacy. The May G7 summit in Sicily ended with a division between the US and the other 
nations on climate change (Chassany and Parker 2017). Similarly, the final communiqué from 
the Hamburg G20 summit in July failed to paper over differences between the US and the 
other countries on trade and climate change (Wagstyl 2017).       
When it comes to the economic sinews of the liberal international order, Donald Trump’s as-
cendancy leaves space for bleak prognoses, although the challenge has been largely rhetor-
ical so far. Trump’s decision to pull the US out of the TPP process is indicative of the fact that, 
as President, he will not subject the United States to novel multilateral trade deals that are 
not supported in his core constituencies. He is similarly unlikely to move forward on other 
analogous initiatives such as the TTIP, which have the express aim of allowing America and 
its Western partners to write the rules and regulations of global trade into the 21st century. 
Moreover, Trump could still choose to double down on China’s trade practices, for instance, 
by imposing steel tariffs or measures to counter the theft of US intellectual property (Chapter 
7). Such measures could be used as leverage to rectify America’s trade deficit with China or, 
in a more optimistic scenario, even to persuade it to integrate further into the liberal interna-
tional order as a more “responsible stakeholder” (Vezirgiannidou 2013).  
However, the opposite effect is also possible. Beijing could view the measures as offensive, 
and emerge as an (even more) forceful challenger to the current order. Similar protectionist 
measures against the European Union would add another layer to the inflammation of trans-
atlantic joints during Trump’s presidency (Eder 2017), and thus further undermine the trans-
atlantic link that constitutes the core of the current order. So far, however, it appears that the 
current administration’s threats in terms of erecting barriers to free trade have not materialised 
(Chapter 7). 
There is further light at the end of the tunnel in the security realm. Despite the criticism directed 
at its allies’ military spending emanating from the White House, the United States is likely to 
retain its military commitment to its core allies and partners in Europe and Asia, while remain-
ing engaged in the Middle East (see Chapter 5). Therefore, efforts to turn the tables on Amer-
ica’s military power are likely to be met by US resolve even during a Trump presidency. The 
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same could be said of forcible attempts by potentially revisionist powers (most notably Russia 
and China) to redraw internationally accepted boundaries or challenge the rules of the inter-
national order on issues such as free navigation of the seas. America’s top military leadership 
– including Secretary of Defence Mattis and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Dunford – 
remains dedicated to maintaining US commitments, and the President has thus far deferred 
considerable authority to “his generals” with regard to military matters. In fact, this has already 
occurred in Syria and Afghanistan. It is also possible that Trump – despite not being well 
versed in the intricacies of military policy – will remain aware of issues that have a bearing on 
sustaining international “respect” for America, which he tends to equate first and foremost 
with military might (Sinkkonen 2017). 
6.5 The liberal international order in flux: future trajectories of world order 
The challenges facing the liberal international order would be substantial even without the 
apparent leadership vacuum that has ensued since Donald Trump’s election victory. Ponder-
ing on the future of the current order – and world order in general – generates more open 
questions than answers. In light of the challenges to the liberal international order discussed 
above and the additional challenge related to the Trump presidency’s still-evolving foreign 
policy, at least six possible future scenarios are open to elaboration.  
(1) Great power competition: There is a possibility of an uncontrolled breakdown of the pre-
sent order and the return to a world of unmitigated competition among the great powers, re-
plete with the potential for military conflict. After Russia’s actions in Ukraine in 2014, it has 
been in vogue to speak of the “return of geopolitics” (Mead 2014; Mearsheimer 2014). Taken 
to its extreme, such a return would entail a more anarchical or Hobbesian world, in which 
great-power competition would increasingly crowd out the prospects of global cooperation 
and collective action to solve common problems. One trend in particular works towards the 
potential coming into fruition of such a scenario. Not only is the rise of nationalism evident in 
the domestic societies of the United States and Europe, it has also been strengthened by the 
leaderships of the (potentially) revisionist powers China and Russia (Laine 2016; Zhao 2013). 
Meanwhile, the Trump administration has made it clear – most recently in the new NSS – that 
it views the international arena in zero-sum terms, as a realm in which states compete for 
advantage (McMaster and Cohn 2017; White House 2017z). At worst, airing and acting in 
accordance with such views may turn the return of geopolitics into a self-fulfilling prophecy.  
(2) Competing civilizational entities: Relatedly, the US and Europe may take a more perma-
nent turn in a less liberal direction. Instead of relying on the liberal principles of individual 
freedom, democracy and human rights, the normative sinews of the West – and international 
order more broadly – would then be built on more “traditional” and conservative premises, 
such as a common Judeo-Christian heritage (Beinart 2017). This would fit the “clash of civili-
zations” worldview of President Trump and certain members of his administration, and might 
also garner support in the ranks of European populist nationalists.44 The struggle for future 
world order in this Huntingtonian scenario would be between competing civilizational entities, 
the boundaries of which could nevertheless prove to be more fluid than in Samuel Hunting-
ton’s original thesis (see Chapter 2). 
(3) A world of power blocs: It is also possible that no single great power will possess the 
wherewithal to assume a hegemonic position and, thus, the ability to lay down new norms 
and institutions for an international order in the 21st century. This “no one’s world” would be a 
                                                     
44 The jubilant reception of Donald Trump’s “civilization speech” in Poland is a case in point (Lyman and Berendt 2017). 
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realm of ideational contests, in which “alternative conceptions of domestic and international 
order will compete and coexist on the global stage” (Kupchan 2012, 183). However, this sce-
nario does not necessarily entail the full-scale breakdown of order, and could promote coex-
istence among different regional orders, issue-specific coalitions and more enduring power 
blocks. Great-power alliances would form to check potential regional and system-level 
hegemons before they can emerge.  
The reasoning behind this is that each of the great powers has weaknesses that are difficult 
to overcome. At present, the US appears to have squandered its “unipolar moment” in getting 
bogged down in intractable military conflicts in the Middle East. Related to this, even though 
America’s population seems set to increase throughout the 21st century, the political polari-
sation in the country and the rise of nationalism may be further accentuated by demographic 
changes to a minority-majority nation (see Chapters 2 and 3). In the case of China, demog-
raphy may prove to be an obstacle to becoming anything more than a regional hegemon. The 
Chinese population is aging rapidly, which will place considerable strain on Beijing’s re-
sources in the future, and a painful economic transformation may be on the cards as China 
moves up the global value chain. Other great-power contenders have their own long-term 
problems that will be difficult to shake off: Russia’s population is declining and the economy 
relies heavily on petroleum exports; the EU remains an economic giant and a military dwarf 
hampered by internal divisions; and India has internal issues with clashing minorities and a 
precarious geopolitical position (Katz 2017).   
(4) A China-led international order: Another potential scenario is Chinese hegemony, a full-
blown hegemonic transition precipitated by Beijing’s rise to military and economic promi-
nence. This would probably put an end to America’s global leadership, and to the liberal in-
ternational order as we know it. Chinese ascendancy would impose new parameters on the 
international order to suit Beijing’s normative values and economic and security interests. 
Given what we know about China’s current priorities, the order could well be rule-based with-
out the liberal caveat. Sovereignty, non-intervention in the internal affairs of others and checks 
on individual freedoms could serve as the foundational parameters of a new world order 
(Breslin 2013). One problem in the case of China’s ascendancy would be that, although Bei-
jing may overtake the United States as the world’s largest economy, the US will probably 
remain militarily ascendant for decades to come. In fact, the Trump administration looks to 
retain America’s military supremacy, if not to strengthen it (see Chapter 5). Moreover, in terms 
of soft power China has so far been unable to compete with the global reach of US culture 
and ideas (Nye 2015).  
(5) Renewal of the liberal international order: A fifth possible future scenario would be the 
rejuvenation of the liberal international order in a form that is less US/Western-centric. Such 
an update would necessitate giving more voice to the other great powers in negotiating the 
rules of the game, but this would be done in a manner that is consonant with the liberal char-
acter of the international order. Consequently, America’s leadership would be replaced with 
more universal and globally legitimate institutions such as a reformed and more inclusive 
UNSC, as well as a broadly accepted regime for checking Westphalian sovereignty when 
states cannot or will not fend for their people. In areas in which it is not possible to renegotiate 
established formal institutions, informal ones with more emphasis on ad hoc or sectoral co-
operation could come into being. This scenario would rise or fall depending on whether the 
United States was willing to renegotiate the parameters of its leadership and allow its super-
power prerogatives to be augmented with more consensual decision-making on global ques-
tions. At the same time, other great powers would have to be enticed to join the order as 
responsible stakeholders as opposed to “free riders” or revisionist disruptors (Ikenberry 2015).     
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(6) American liberal hegemony reclaimed: A sixth possible future scenario would be the reas-
sertion of American liberal hegemony, which would also largely sustain, if not update and 
expand, the grand bargains of the post-Cold War liberal international order. This could entail 
a newfound impetus to push for Western conceptions of trade rules (through an updated TTIP 
or TPP process, for instance), along with a novel drive to undertake democracy-promotion 
and nation-building projects in the developing world. In extremis, the US would undertake 
such projects unilaterally. Proponents of American primacy have recently lamented the un-
willingness of the US populace and its leaders to shoulder the burden of maintaining US as-
cendancy (Kagan 2017; Lieber 2012). However, it is worth pointing out that American foreign 
policy has been characterised by swings between “maximalist” and “retrenchment” tenden-
cies for decades, and if this ebb and flow continues, Donald Trump’s taste for global disen-
gagement might be offset by a more assertive policy in short order – even during his own 
presidency (Sestanovich 2014). Recurring cycles of declinism could also be seen as part of 
America’s politico-cultural narrative as drivers of US dynamism, and could even serve as a 
regenerative force in the future (Joffe 2009; see also Chapter 2).  
6.6 Conclusion 
Whether any of the potential scenarios comes to pass in reality will depend on a constellation 
of complex political, economic and cultural factors within the international sphere and domes-
tic arenas of states. Unexpected black-swan events – in the vein of 9/11 – could also throw 
previously sensible projections into the dustbin. The question of temporality and sequencing 
is also important: it is possible that the realisation of one scenario will bear fruit to the fulfilment 
of another. For instance, a Chinese hegemony could well be preceded by a period of intense 
conflict among the great powers. All this conjecturing is further complicated by on-going tech-
nological change and the vertical diffusion of power to various non-state entities capable of 
wielding new and relatively inexpensive forms of influence. 
In terms of the present situation, the likelihood of the confrontational scenarios of great-power 
conflict or a world in which civilizational entities clash is tied to domestic dynamics, both within 
the West and among its potential challengers. Domestic political outcomes will play a major 
role in the decision-making concerning what the US and its allies more broadly are willing to 
do to sustain or reform the liberal international order.45 If nationalist movements gain an even 
stronger foothold in Europe and the political polarisation in the US remains profound, domestic 
political tensions will sap the prospects of Western leadership and cohesion. If the authoritar-
ian and potentially revisionist powers continue to stoke the flames of nationalism at the same 
time, the likelihood of scenarios involving great-power conflict, a clash of civilisations or – at 
the very least – a world of power blocs increases.  
When it comes to the future of the liberal international order (as either a US-led constellation 
or a more egalitarian enterprise), it should be borne in mind that the normative, institutional, 
economic and military foundations of international orders are thoroughly interlinked (Kupchan 
2014). America’s leadership role in the liberal order has been so sustainable because the US 
has been regarded as a more benevolent hegemon than other alternatives. A key aspect of 
this benevolence has been commitment to the norms, institutions and interdependence that 
form the basis of the order and have,, by and large, legitimated US leadership. Undermining 
the normative, institutional and possibly economic foundations will thus have a bearing upon 
                                                     
45 For an elaboration of this argument, see the presentation by Jan Techau at the Fourth Annual Summer Session of the Center on United States Politics 
and Power (CUSPP), Finnish Institute of International Affairs, https://www.fiia.fi/en/event/4th-annual-helsinki-summer-session-decline-of-liberal-rule-based-
world-order.  
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America’s ability to project its power globally. Therefore, the maintenance of US military pri-
macy will not be enough to sustain the liberal international order in the 21st century – the 
country’s holistic commitment simply remains indispensable. Any measures that America’s 
allies and partners can take to bind the United States to the institutional and economic sinews 
of the liberal international order will therefore contribute to its endurance. 
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7. Global economic co-operation in the Trump era 
 There has been widespread concern about the future of free trade as the current 
White House has remained focused – at least rhetorically – on its “America First” 
agenda, which emphasises the negative aspects of globalisation and America’s bilat-
eral trade deficits. 
 So far, the Trump administration has withdrawn the US from the Trans-Pacific Part-
nership and initiated renegotiations on the North American Free Trade Agreement. It 
has also begun domestic processes that review key aspects of the US-China trade 
relationship. Furthermore, the administration could undermine the World Trade Or-
ganization by hampering the functioning of its dispute-settlement system, the Appel-
late Body. 
 However, worst-case scenarios of full-blown trade wars and substantial protectionist 
tariffs have not materialised, which points towards the diagnosis that Trump is, in fact, 
engaged in a bold negotiating tactic to achieve what he perceives as better deals for 
America. Over time, if not acted upon, these tactics might lose their effectiveness. 
 Yet, if the more disruptionist aspects of Trump’s trade agenda are adopted, the inter-
national rule-based trade system might end up facing severe challenges. In any case, 
the Trump presidency provides space for America’s European partners to assume a 
greater role in supporting the rule-based international trade system. 
7.1 Introduction 
Donald Trump’s election victory evoked anxiety in most parts of the world.46 Some of the most 
alarming comments the American President made during his election campaign concerned 
specific trade agreements, as well as global economic governance in general. The current 
White House remains focused – at least rhetorically – on bilateral trade deficits, and its “Amer-
ica First” agenda has the potential to radically shake the foundations of US policy on foreign 
trade and investment. 
The present chapter investigates the current administration’s international economic policy, 
especially in the area of foreign-trade relations. It begins with a brief account and evaluation 
of the motivations behind Trump’s trade policy. The focus then shifts to post-election devel-
opments. These include the US withdrawal from the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), the ac-
tivation of the re-negotiation process for the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) 
with Canada and Mexico, as well as early US reactions towards China and the World Trade 
Organization (WTO). 
7.2 Much talk, less action 
Donald Trump’s election campaign was a showcase of economic nationalism. According to 
the key narrative, trade agreements such as NAFTA were having a devastating impact on the 
US and, more broadly, America was being exploited by the apparently skewed system of 
global trade. Candidate Trump pledged to place “America first” and to get rid of the bad deals 
in which his predecessors had involved the country. 
                                                     
46 This chapter has also been published in an augmented form as Jacobsson, Johanna. 2017. “US Trade Policy: America Resigns from its Leading Role 
as a Global Rule-Setter.” FIIA Briefing Paper 229, December 7, 2017. https://www.fiia.fi/en/publication/us-trade-policy.  
  
 
70 
 
Among the concrete election promises in this regard were withdrawal from the TPP agree-
ment with eleven key nations on both sides of the Pacific, and the termination – or at least 
renegotiation – of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). When these pledges 
were complemented with Trump’s critical comments about the World Trade Organization 
(WTO), the incoming administration’s policy towards trade started to sound extremely alarm-
ing, not only to close neighbours and economic allies of the US, but also to the international 
economic community as a whole. 
The worst-case scenario was clear: a full-blown trade war. So far, however, President Trump 
has held back from drastic measures leading to such an outcome. His most significant move 
to date was, on his first full weekday in office, to pull the US out of the TPP, Barack Obama’s 
signature trade agreement. The decision to withdraw from the Paris Climate Agreement was 
another big blow and will affect economic relations with countries that remain committed to it.   
So far, Trump has emphasised that instead of pursuing large regional trade agreements (such 
as the TPP), the US will negotiate bilateral trade pacts. In the President’s view, they are better 
deals as they will bring jobs and industry back to America. The issue is also related to his 
concerns about trade deficits. Trump seems to believe that the US can control trade flows to 
the benefit of the American economy more effectively though bilateral arrangements.47  
There has been much confusion about the rationale behind this tactic. It seems that the Trump 
administration believes it will be able to leverage US influence and exert more pressure on 
single countries as opposed to larger groupings. There may be some truth to this. Both the 
EU and the US have in the last couple of decades been active in concluding bilateral trade 
agreements. Because the other negotiating party is economically significantly weaker, and 
often dependent on the stronger partner in other ways, these economic giants have been able 
to insert in the agreements provisions that are specifically advantageous to them. One of the 
key challenges in the project to conclude the biggest bilateral trade and investment agreement 
so far, the TTIP, was the equal negotiation power of the EU and the US. 
However, the geographical dispersion of global production networks calls for the harmonisa-
tion of rules in larger regions rather than through bilateral trade deals. Arguably, the national 
approach to international trade is an out-dated framework from an economic standpoint. In-
ternational competition today is based more on regions competing with regions rather than on 
countries competing with countries (Gereffi 2017). If the US chose to follow through on its 
bilateral inclinations, separate agreements with Canada and Mexico would be negotiated. 
Such an approach would almost certainly lead to the de-integration of the North American 
economy, and disturb the sophisticated value chains in the region.  
There has been less talk about the WTO than about NAFTA. It is not clear what the pledge to 
conclude bilateral deals means in terms of America’s commitment to the WTO. Trump’s criti-
cal remarks about the multilateral trade-liberalisation organisation have been vague, and in 
substance limited to his call to end unfair trade practices. Given that progress at the WTO has 
practically come to a complete halt in recent years, his strongest message is understandably 
directed elsewhere. However, one of Trump’s main targets in addition to the TPP and NAFTA 
is China. American trade relations with China are governed by the WTO, there being no bilat-
eral or regional deals in place between the two giants. One might therefore interpret this to 
                                                     
47 Trump’s mercantilist attitude contrasts with the widely-held consensus among economists that trade deficits are not inherently good or bad; they can be 
either, depending on complex circumstances. In the case of the US, one of the reasons behind the country’s trade deficits is the dollar’s position as the 
global reserve currency. But the dollar’s significance to global finance is also one of the factors that make America so economically powerful. 
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mean that, in his opinion, there are shortcomings either in the WTO rules or in their imple-
mentation on China’s behalf. 
The US is looking increasingly isolated on the key issues of trade and climate change. In 
rejecting the TPP the US has, for the moment, given up the powerful opportunity to give shape 
to international trading rules.48 (Although it still has a chance to do this by grouping together 
with the EU.) However, the TPP was considered a priority during the Obama administration 
in the light of Asia’s economic and geopolitical significance. It was also seen as necessary to 
maintain US hegemony in the Asia-Pacific region and to contain China’s ascendancy (Hamil-
ton 2014).  
Pulling out of the TPP has been the most significant trade-related measure taken by Trump 
thus far. However, the deal’s fate looked uncertain even before Trump won the elections. In 
fact, during the presidential campaign, the TPP became the symbol of decline in US manu-
facturing and was heavily criticised by Republicans and Democrats alike (see e.g. DiSalvo 
and Kusic 2015). It was never put to a vote in Congress.  
However, the Trump administration is preparing other trade-related measures, such as the 
re-negotiations for NAFTA, which are already underway. In the best scenario, the negotiations 
will end in a satisfactory result for all countries involved. The lack of action so far is probably 
due to an increasing understanding of the enormous negative effects that the termination of 
trade agreements and the introduction of protective measures could inflict upon the American 
economy and its relations with other countries. However, President Trump’s tone has not 
changed. In particular, he keeps criticising NAFTA and has suggested that he will probably 
end up terminating the agreement, despite the fact that renegotiations have just started. This 
kind of loose talk brings cheers from the crowds but groans from the business community. It 
would appear that the tactic is part of Trump’s game plan. By issuing threats and exerting 
pressure on his negotiation partners, he hopes to secure better deals. 
7.3 The Trump effect in the US 
American blue-collar communities have felt the impacts of free trade and technological 
change. The perceived benefits of globalisation have not been distributed equally. The situa-
tion is somewhat similar in Europe. Although the US and the EU as a whole continue to benefit 
from trade, some people are left behind. The same applies to technological development. 
When routine jobs become either automated or outsourced to other countries, it seems natural 
to try to stop the process. However, it is practically impossible to stop technological change, 
and no country in a globalised world can exclude itself completely: all stakeholders are forced 
to interact and “play the game”. Moreover, in the aggregate, technological progress and in-
creased trade bring huge benefits to societies. Internal adjustment is, however, needed – 
whether in terms of redistribution or the direction of resources to innovation, education and 
social support. These policies seem to have failed in the US and at least in some parts of 
Europe. As a result, there are increasingly large numbers of angry and frustrated citizens in 
the West. Although this is only one of the explanations behind Trump’s success, it is hard to 
ignore. 
President Trump dismisses the broader understanding of the overall benefits of trade, and 
instead focuses his energy on the negative side effects. The big picture still shows that the 
                                                     
48 Text analysis reveals that US treaty language is pre-eminent in the TPP, thus suggesting that the US heavily influenced the writing of the agreement. 
See Allee and Lugg (2016). 
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US continues to benefit from globalisation and integrated markets, particularly with its neigh-
bours through NAFTA (see McBride and Sergie 2017).49 Although import competition has had 
significant effects on manufacturing jobs in the US, the effect of automation and technology 
should not be underestimated. Moreover, the share of manufacturing in the American GDP 
has been on a steady level for the past 30-40 years (see Trilling 2016). However, Trump has 
chosen not to address the challenge that technology is posing to jobs. It is politically more 
expedient to blame foreigners rather than robots – many of which are being developed in the 
US. The effects of automation also tend to spread more widely than those of trade, and are 
less visible. 
The effects of trade are nevertheless clearly felt in certain areas and groups of society, and 
may be substantial and devastating. The real winners tend to reside in big cities, where the 
service industry in particular is booming. Instead of addressing economic displacement 
through domestic policies, Trump is entertaining the populist route of protectionism and eco-
nomic nationalism. The tactic may be mainly rhetorical, aimed at attracting Trump’s core sup-
porters and drawing attention away from the administration’s lack of progress in domestic 
policy. This, again, hides the above-mentioned issues that relate to domestic redistribution, 
education and innovation. Major changes in domestic policies are difficult to achieve, how-
ever, and they take time. It is easier to blame trade, foreigners and climate treaties. 
Nevertheless, President Trump seems to be right on one count. Trade agreements have be-
come out-dated. Although not entirely obsolete, most of them do not tackle the most pressing 
issues of today, such as digital trade and sustainable development. In this sense, there is 
indeed a need for upgrading. However, when Trump talks about renegotiating NAFTA or the 
2012 bilateral trade agreement with South Korea (KORUS), he does not talk about these 
issues. His message is that the agreements need to be torn up because the US is losing out. 
In some instances there might be some truth to such claims, but it is hard to ascertain who 
would lose or gain from updated regimes. In fact, this is not the key issue for the future – 
arguably not even in America. It would be more important to address the rise of digital tech-
nologies, the explosion in e-commerce flows, increased security concerns and tax evasion, 
just to name a few issues. It is clear that in the aggregate, no society is likely to benefit from 
rising tariffs. 
7.4 The Trump effect elsewhere 
The most highly developed areas of the world have become increasingly sceptical of globali-
sation. A part of the reason lies in the dissatisfaction caused by the unfair distribution of its 
benefits, which has been exacerbated by the hardships endured in the aftermath of the 2007/8 
financial crisis. Whereas all major economies in the world are now growing, global trade has 
not yet properly taken off. Protectionism increased significantly during the financial crisis, even 
though it is only one of the reasons for the slowdown in global trade: many of the explanations 
relate to other globalisation dynamics. The continuing trend is that trade growth is increasingly 
synchronised across regions, and that merchandise trade is no longer growing significantly 
                                                     
49 NAFTA, negotiated by the governments of Canada, Mexico, and the United States, entered into force in January 1994. It provided for the elimination of 
most tariffs on goods traded among the three countries. The liberalisation of trade in agriculture, textiles, and automobile manufacturing was a major focus 
of the agreement. For an analysis of the trade effects of NAFTA on the three countries’ economies, see McBride and Sergie (2017). Most studies conclude 
that NAFTA has had only a modest positive impact on US GDP. However, trade specialists tend to agree that the deal’s direct effects on trade and 
investment are difficult to separate from other factors, such as rapid improvements in technology and expanded trade with other countries. 
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faster than GDP (World Trade Organization 2016; 2017; Figure 9).50 At the same time, ser-
vices exports are growing, attributable largely to advances in technology (Loungani et al. 
2017a; see also Loungani et al. 2017b).51 
One of the significant developments after the election of Trump is the newfound sense of 
urgency within the EU. This could be attributable in part to America’s current trade policy, and 
in part to Brexit. However, the EU-27 seem to be more steadfast than for a long time in facing 
challenges as a united front. One sign of this was the conclusion, on the eve of the G-20 
meeting in Hamburg, of an agreement in principle on the main elements of an EU-Japan 
Economic Partnership Agreement. The hurried signature was heavy with symbolism. Japan 
is one of the countries that signed the TPP, now abandoned by the US, and it is one of the 
key markets for US exports. The signing of a free trade agreement with Japan ahead of the 
US is likely to give European manufacturers, farmers and service suppliers a head-start to 
enter newly-opened markets there. For the EU, the deal with Japan is the most important 
bilateral trade agreement yet. It is also significant in that it is the first trade agreement that 
includes a specific commitment to the Paris climate agreement. 
Figure 9: Ratio of growth in world merchandise trade volume to global real 
GDP growth, 1981-2017 
 
Source: World Trade Organization (2017) 
 
While the US appears to be taking a less engaged role on the world stage, other countries 
are keen to fill the void. This is the case with some of the BRICS countries, most notably 
                                                     
50 The figures from the last few years show a weakening in the relationship between trade and GDP growth. Over the long term trade has typically grown 
at 1.5 times faster than GDP, and in the 1990s world merchandise trade volume grew almost twice as quickly as world real GDP at market exchange rates. 
In recent years however, the ratio has slipped towards 1:1, below both the peak of the 1990s and the long-term average (World Trade Organization 2016; 
2017).  
51 Services trade is more difficult to track than trade in goods, but recent studies show that services seem to experience productivity growth through the 
same mechanisms that have traditionally made manufacturing the key driver of growth (see Loungani et al. 2017a; b). 
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China.52 Moreover, the TPP is back on the agenda, this time without the US. Japan has been 
active in holding discussions about reviving rules that would, among other things, open mar-
kets to agricultural products and digital services, improve labour conditions, and increase pro-
tection for intellectual property around the region. Whereas President Trump used the APEC 
summit in Danang in November 2017 to make it clear that he was only interested in bilateral 
agreements in Asia, the other 11 TPP countries have continued their efforts to keep the agree-
ment alive. The planned pact has now been formally renamed the Comprehensive and Pro-
gressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP), and is being negotiated in a way 
that would make it accessible to a future US administration.  
However, achieving success without the US will be challenging in the absence of one of the 
most attractive markets in the world. Developing countries in particular may be unwilling to 
accept the demanding rules on labour laws and patent protection without the incentive of 
getting improved access to American consumers. US GDP accounts for 69 per cent of the 
combined GDP of the 12 countries that negotiated the original agreement. 
Currently, none of the BRICS countries is involved in the CPTPP negotiations either, but there 
is speculation about China’s possible accession to the treaty. At the moment, however, China 
is pressing ahead with its own major trade project – the Regional Comprehensive Economic 
Partnership (RCEP). CPTPP and RCEP are not mutually exclusive, and some countries 
would possibly be members of both. If CPTPP members manage to conclude a deal and 
agree on high standards without the US, China would have an incentive to reform in order to 
accede to the agreement. If China is successful with RCEP, however, lower standards are 
likely to be attained. Avoiding the latter scenario was one of the biggest motivations for the 
US involvement in the original TPP process. 
Of the other major trade agreements under negotiation in recent years, the Transatlantic 
Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) remains a big open question. The negotiations be-
tween the EU and the US had stagnated already before Trump’s presidency, and are unlikely 
to go forward at least in the short term. If China presses ahead with RCEP, one possibility is 
that Europeans and Americans will find one another again and “accept the challenge” by ne-
gotiating a high-standard trade agreement between themselves. This would undermine the 
position of RCEP as the global rule setter. Although Trump has complained about the US 
trade deficit with certain European countries, Germany in particular, there is a slight chance 
that agreement could be reached, even with Donald Trump at the helm. Trump’s immediate 
instinct would probably be to negotiate separate deals with different EU countries. However, 
the EU negotiates and concludes trade agreements as a block, so any bilateral deal with a 
single EU member state is impossible to begin with, and even if Trump were to agree on talks 
with the entire EU, major difficulties in the relationship would not disappear. The EU and the 
US are close partners, but have major differences in their respective attitudes towards safety, 
social and health standards. The goal of the TTIP is a highly integrated market, which is, 
admittedly, challenging to achieve in the current political climate. 
7.5 Updating NAFTA – a worthy undertaking after all? 
Withdrawing from or renegotiating NAFTA was one of Trump’s prominent campaign promises. 
In fact, he was pledging to renegotiate all “bad deals” to which the US was a party. So far, 
moves have been made only on the TPP (termination) and NAFTA (opening of renegotia-
tions). With regard to KORUS, the free trade agreement with South Korea, the US Trade 
                                                     
52 The BRICS countries include Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa. 
  
 
75 
 
Representative Robert E. Lighthizer has approached the South Korean government and ex-
pressed America’s desire to revise the agreement. So far it is unclear whether Korea will 
agree to such a revision, especially given that the US accusations seem to be on very shaky 
ground.53 
The US has gone a step further with NAFTA. Canada and Mexico have agreed to renegotia-
tions, and the first round was held in August 2017. This and the Korean situation differ signif-
icantly, however. KORUS is a recent agreement and some of its commitments have not yet 
come into force. NAFTA, on the other hand, entered into force over 20 years ago, and parts 
of it have become outdated. Canada and Mexico know this, and agreeing to talks was there-
fore not a huge concession on their part. If the US demands are completely unreasonable, 
America’s partners are unlikely to agree to them. At the same time, Canada and Mexico are 
likely to conclude that Trump would not terminate the agreement given that the US still bene-
fits from NAFTA. However, Trump is playing “hard ball”. He is trying to show his determination 
by making public threats and hinting at terminating the agreement regardless of how the ne-
gotiation process unfolds. Even if the threat is exaggerated, Canada and Mexico must show 
that they are serious about reviewing NAFTA. 
At the time of its conclusion, NAFTA was a modern and innovative trade agreement. It was, 
for example, the first trade pact to include extensive discipline on intellectual property rights 
(such as copyright, patent and trademark rights) as well as provisions on the environment and 
labour (although non-enforceable). It has become antiquated by today’s standards, however, 
specifically because of the radically deeper integration in global supply chains and the revo-
lution in digital technologies. New rules and regulations are needed, especially in areas that 
relate to digital trade and services (see Lester and Manak 2017).  
For a while the current US administration had no clear vision for the future of NAFTA. Some 
clarity has emerged in light of the negotiation objectives released in July 2017, however. The 
key objective of the US is, unsurprisingly, “a much better agreement that reduces the US trade 
deficit” (see Office of the United States Trade Representative 2017a). This is an unusual way 
to start negotiating a trade agreement. As already discussed, trade deficits are not generally 
regarded as an adequate starting point. However, the way the US is aiming to reach its goal 
is more traditional. It is basically looking for wider market access for its products, to be 
achieved by “seeking the highest standards covering the broadest possible range of goods 
and services”. Because most tariffs between the three countries have already been elimi-
nated, the way forward is to tackle technical barriers, which make exports expensive, burden-
some or even impossible in some cases. 
One of the key areas is digital trade. The US has identified its objectives as “strong protection 
and enforcement for new and emerging technologies and new methods of transmitting and 
distributing products embodying intellectual property”. It is similarly eager to make sure that 
NAFTA countries do not impose measures that restrict cross-border data flows, and do not 
require the use or installation of local computing facilities. 
Rules of origin are another significant area for the US. These are the complex rules that are 
applied to determine whether a specific good qualifies as an originating good under the terms 
of NAFTA. Lower tariffs are applied only to goods originating from other NAFTA members. 
The purpose is to ensure that NAFTA’s benefits are not extended to goods that are exported 
from non-NAFTA countries, which have undergone minimal processing in North America. The 
                                                     
53 The USTR claims that KORUS is causing US a trade deficit. However, the sectors most responsible for the deficit in goods are autos and electronics. 
KORUS has not yet kicked in on the former, and does not touch the latter as trade in electronics was already tariff-free. The US is also ignoring the fact that 
it is running a surplus in its services trade with Korea. 
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US wants to update and strengthen NAFTA’s rules of origin to ensure that the agreement 
benefits North American production. The rules are dated, but the downside of pushing for too 
much “Made in North America” is the potential for disruptions in existing global value chains. 
Certain new rules may also be introduced to address some of the social, environmental and 
health concerns related to NAFTA. The updated version may include enforceable rules on 
labour issues (although perhaps not on the environment, given Trump’s views on climate 
change). In its most recent trade agreements, including the TPP, the US has managed to 
include rules that protect the rights of freedom of association and collective bargaining, as 
well as standards that discourage trade in goods produced by forced labour, and child labour 
in particular. The agreements have also established mechanisms to monitor and address 
other labour concerns. The US renegotiation objectives for NAFTA indicate that it would like 
to bring its labour provisions into line with the other recent agreements. Given that Mexico 
and Canada agreed to a similar approach in TPP, they are likely to agree on this. 
Another area under discussion is the investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS) system in-
cluded in Chapter 11 of NAFTA. ISDS has faced worldwide criticism in recent years, and has 
become one of the most toxic elements of trade and investment agreements. For that reason, 
the EU is currently pushing for a radical reform of ISDS and proposing a new international 
investment court. A plan for the court is already included in the EU-Canada Comprehensive 
Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA), as well as in a new agreement negotiated with Vi-
etnam. The EU’s proposal is a complete overhaul of the ISDS by bringing investment claims 
to a new multilateral and permanent court. There are no indications that the US will support 
the proposal, and its fate in the EU is open as well.54 
Given the areas that have so far been identified by the US as subject to negotiation, it is ironic 
that the TPP is thus far the only trade agreement that Trump has pulled out of completely. It 
was negotiated exactly as the kind of modern agreement that would address some of the 
pressing issues that the US administration is now talking about. However, it became a victim 
of extreme politicization during the election campaign, with Hillary Clinton also voicing her 
dissatisfaction with the deal. Now the US has the possibility to bring some of the modern 
elements of the TPP into NAFTA if Trump manages to control his inward-looking instincts and 
to reach a deal that seems reasonable to all three countries. The deadline for negotiations 
has been pushed from the end of 2017 to the first quarter of 2018, the Canadians and the 
Mexicans accusing the US of a “winner-takes-all” mind-set. 
7.6 Trump’s actions on China 
Concerns about unfair competition by China are not new, and the US is not the only country 
to have kept the issue on the agenda. For example, many businesses in the EU are similarly 
worried about the unfair advantage accorded to Chinese economic operators through state 
subsidies and the various forms of discrimination used against foreign companies in China. 
One of the key issues in this regard is the battle over China’s status as a market economy in 
the WTO, the recognition of which the Trump administration opposes (Donnan 2017). How-
ever, Trump stands out among world leaders with his particularly tough stance on China. 
During his campaign, Trump typically mentioned China alongside NAFTA as one of the big-
gest sources of misfortune for the American worker. He constantly tried to drive home the 
                                                     
54 The compatibility of the Investment Court System (ICS) with the European Treaties is currently at stake in a request for an Opinion by the Court of Justice 
of the European Union submitted by Belgium on 6 September 2017. See Kingdom of Belgium Foreign Affairs, Foreign Trade and Development Cooperation 
(2017). 
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idea that Beijing was using unfair trade practices to make US products uncompetitive in 
the world market. One of his rhetorical tactics was labelling China a “currency manipulator”, 
claiming that the Chinese government was taking illegitimate steps to keep the yuan’s value 
artificially low. Although expert opinion no longer supports this view, Trump stuck to it, and 
even threatened to slap a 45-per-cent retaliatory tariff on Chinese imports. 
Since taking office, Trump has kept quiet about currency manipulation, and has even seemed 
to enjoy somewhat friendly relations with China, especially during Xi Jinping’s visit to the US 
and his own reciprocal visit to China. Nevertheless, Trump has continued to test China's pa-
tience by initiating two separate procedures that carry potentially negative implications for the 
Chinese economy. 
The first of these is a national security review of Chinese steel. In this case the American 
approach seems openly protectionist, although Europeans have also raised concerns about 
the oversupply of Chinese steel in global markets. The Trump administration seemed to be 
prepared either to impose a broad tariff on all steel imports or to set up a system of quotas 
and tariffs that would, in effect, freeze imports from particular countries at existing levels and 
charge tariffs on any imports exceeding those levels. The choice of method is especially wor-
rying. If taken to WTO litigation, the US has threatened to invoke the national security option,55 
which is considered the “nuclear weapon of WTO law”. The WTO’s legal system gives lever-
age to countries choosing to use this option, but its limits are unclear given the practically 
non-existent case law. Were the WTO to find in favour of US in dispute settlement, it could 
give it carte blanche to invoke the provision, and thus introduce a new protectionist instrument 
that all WTO members could use. On the other hand, were the WTO to find against the US 
Trump might choose to ignore the ruling, which would seriously undermine the credibility of 
the organisation. In fact, the US is already challenging the WTO’s dispute-settlement system 
(see below). 
Another risk is that America’s tactic is not solely directed at China, its intended target. A broad 
move on tariffs and quotas would hit all steel imports, including those from Europe and Can-
ada, for instance. In anticipation of this, European NATO members launched a lobbying cam-
paign, also involving the Pentagon, in an attempt to convince the US administration to aban-
don its tactic by disputing the threat imposed by steel imports from longstanding ally countries. 
China also gave in. One week after the July G20 summit in Hamburg, Beijing proposed cutting 
steel overcapacity by 150m tons by 2022. Trump reportedly walked away from the offer and 
stuck to his demand for increased tariffs. He has not taken any action in this regard, but since 
then China has cut back on its steel production and there is a recovery in global steel prices. 
Trump’s threats may thus have worked, although at the expense of setting off the Europeans 
as well. 
The second concrete action taken by Trump on Chinese trade so far is the launch of a review 
into compulsory technology transfers and the theft of American intellectual property by Chi-
nese companies. Compared to threats against China made on the campaign trail, the ap-
proach appears quite mild. It entails launching a process that could continue with formal in-
vestigations. These would probably take up to a year, and would include talks with Beijing 
and wider consultations with the business sector (see Federal Register 2017).56 It is worri-
some that the US is considering a domestic investigation instead of taking the issue to the 
                                                     
55 The measure would be based on a little-used power referred to as the “big sledgehammer”: Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962 allows the 
Commerce Department to investigate if an import threatens US security, and gives the president authority to act without Congressional approval if the 
investigation concludes that it does. 
56 The process concerns a so-called “Section 301” investigation under the Trade Act of 1974. It is very rarely used and extremely controversial because it 
gives the President the power to impose unilateral tariffs and to take other measures against trading partners. In the worst case, it could end up sparking a 
trade war. See Federal Register (2017). 
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WTO. Trump’s strategy, however, may be to incentivize the Chinese to agree to buy more 
American products and thereby avoid a trade war, which in turn would allow Trump to save 
face to a certain extent. 
This strategy played out during Trump’s recent visit to China on his East Asia tour at the 
beginning of November 2017. China and the US concluded several deals – many of them 
tentative memoranda of understanding (MOAs) – in which China agreed to purchases worth 
250 billion dollars in the future (Einhorn 2017). No matter how lucrative they are for the US, 
such individual purchases and investment agreements do not address the structural issues in 
the two countries’ trade relations. The overall sum is less than the trade deficit that the US 
has accumulated with China over a one-year period.57 In addition, US businesses still have 
many long-standing concerns including limited access to the Chinese market, big subsidies 
that Beijing channels to domestic companies, and issues related to the Chinese theft of Amer-
ican intellectual property and cybersecurity. Nevertheless, the agreements allow Trump to 
portray himself as a master dealmaker, while drawing attention away from the lack of progress 
in addressing structural concerns. 
Another recent addition to the China puzzle is Trump’s threat to cut off US trade with countries 
that deal with North Korea, which has been viewed as a warning to China, North Korea's main 
trading partner and only major ally. In general, Trump increasingly appears to be linking the 
economy with security, as is also evident in his tactic of invoking national security concerns 
in relation to the high level of Chinese steel imports. Connecting Sino-American security talks 
with trade may increase the chance of retaliation from China on economic matters if it is 
pushed too far. 
7.7 America and the future of the WTO 
Global trade liberalisation is likely to continue only bilaterally and regionally in the coming 
years. Multilateral negotiations have not made serious progress for years on account of the 
many and diverse interests that encumber the WTO. One of the key issues is that emerging 
economies are not ready to liberalise as much as the developed countries would prefer. More-
over, the WTO is not capable of tackling the most pressing new issues related to digital trade, 
e-commerce, services and investment. Agreement on deep regulatory issues is more likely to 
be achieved among like-minded country groupings. 
Negotiations at the WTO had already stalled before Trump’s arrival on the scene. However, 
there is a worrying development regarding dispute settlement, which is the most efficient and 
functioning part of the WTO. For a while, the US has been voicing criticism of the highest 
organ of the dispute-settlement system, the Appellate Body (AB). 
The WTO Appellate Body is a seven-member, independent court that takes the final decision 
on the interpretation of WTO law and its application to WTO members. AB members are 
nominated and appointed by member governments, and serve a maximum of two four-year 
terms. In the first half of 2016, during the Obama administration, the US blocked the re-ap-
pointment of a South Korean judge to the Appellate Body, citing his role in a series of deci-
sions with which the US disagreed. This was heavily criticised by other WTO Members as 
amounting to meddling with the independent judiciary. In the end, another Korean national 
was appointed, but in August 2017 he unexpectedly resigned, taking up a position as trade 
                                                     
57 The annual trade deficit in goods has been closer to $300 billion in the past few years, peaking at $347 billion in 2016. However, service exports from the 
US to China have grown by over 400 per cent in the last ten years, and the US services trade surplus with China was $37.4 billion in 2016. See the webpage 
of the Office of the United States Trade Representative (2017b). 
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minister in the Korean government. The US has since blocked the recruitment of new judges, 
exacerbating the risk that the WTO could effectively run out of judges. In a statement in Au-
gust, the US said it would not move forward with the appointment procedures before its sys-
tematic concerns about WTO dispute settlement were addressed. The goal thus seems to be 
to pile pressure on other WTO members to accept US plans for reform, which appear to be 
going potentially as far as opening the door for individual WTO member states to block ap-
peals rulings in certain cases. 
The US attitude has raised fears about Trump’s reaction at any major negative WTO ruling 
against the US during his term. This is not likely to occur in the near future, as the US man-
aged to score an important victory at the beginning of September 2017. In the Boeing Case, 
the US won a dispute against the EU with the AB overruling a lower-level finding that $8.7 
billion in tax incentives awarded by Washington State to Chicago-based Boeing for the devel-
opment of the 777X jetliner constituted a violation of WTO law on subsidies. It would be tempt-
ing to read something political into the ruling, but the case is part of a long-running trade 
dispute, with both Airbus and Boeing scoring wins and enduring losses. The broader dispute 
on airline subsidies continues at the WTO, with claims being made by both the EU and the 
US. 
The international community should be most worried about the US administration’s shifting 
stance on the principal governing structures of world trade. During a rare public appearance 
in Washington in September 2017, US Trade Representative Lighthizer sent mixed signals 
on whether the administration would be willing to take its trade fights to the WTO. He also 
contrasted the ways in which Europeans and Americans saw trade agreements: Americans 
tend to see them as contracts, enforcing a clearly-defined set of rights and obligations, 
whereas Europeans and certain others see them as an evolving form of governance. This 
comment highlights the general suspicion and criticism the current US administration is pro-
jecting towards the WTO, and global governance more broadly. On the same occasion, 
Lighthizer argued that the WTO was not equipped to deal with China, and underlined the fact 
that the US would have to find other ways of defending its companies, workers and farmers, 
and its market-based economic system (Center for Strategic & International Studies 2017). 
7.8 Conclusion 
So far, the implications of Donald Trump’s “America First” agenda for the long-term trade 
policy of the US remain limited. The withdrawal from the TPP will have significant and far-
reaching strategic consequences for America and the world economy, but it appears to be 
the principal sacrifice that had to be made in light of the President’s campaign promises. As 
for the rest, it is too early to say. 
Trump’s actions would nevertheless indicate that he is relying on his own playbook, namely 
threatening and possibly bluffing. He already has two significant successes in this respect. 
First, he managed to curb Chinese steel imports, and second, he has opened the NAFTA 
renegotiation process. However, his motives remain hard for outside observers to pin down, 
and it is unlikely that he really believes trade is as harmful to the US as he maintains in his 
public statements. Nevertheless, his strategy seems to have worked so far. However, contin-
ued threats tend to lose their power if they are never acted upon, and it may become increas-
ingly difficult to lure other countries into making concessions as they become increasingly 
aware of Trump’s reluctance to carry out his threats. 
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Concluding and renegotiating trade agreements takes time, which Trump may run out of 
sooner rather than later. His re-election is uncertain (should he not be forced to step down 
beforehand), and he may not even choose to run for another term. The main trading partners 
of the US may therefore decide to lie low and avoid confrontation in the hope of dealing with 
a more reasonable administration in a few years’ time. This is especially the case with multi-
lateral trade deals, TTIP in particular. However, existing frameworks of global governance 
need to be safeguarded against gradual erosion or full-blown crisis. The US attitude towards 
the WTO’s well-functioning and respected dispute settlement is especially worrying. Other 
WTO Members, and especially the EU, should support it as a cornerstone of the global trading 
system. The central interest of the US for decades has been to assure that the world economy 
is (increasingly) open and rule-based. As long as the current president refrains from pursuing 
that agenda, whether because of political manoeuvring in front of domestic audiences or for 
ideological reasons, Europeans need to up their game. In addition to defending the existing 
legal framework, this includes devising new ways of dealing with the emerging economies 
and finding solutions to challenges of the new economy, especially in the digital sphere 
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PART IV: NEW GREAT POWER POLITICS 
8. The US-Russia relationship 
 President Trump, like many of his predecessors, came into office with the intention of 
improving relations between the United States and Russia. 
 However, the recalibration of the relationship appears extremely unlikely due to fun-
damental and persistent differences over various key foreign-policy issues and on-
going investigations into Russia’s election interference, as well as the Trump admin-
istration’s possible collusion and obstruction of justice. 
 Fears of a grand bargain between Washington and Moscow have largely subsided in 
Europe, and in Northern Europe in particular. However, assertive Russian behaviour 
and potential negative spill-over from crises in which Russia and America are im-
mersed continue to raise concerns.   
 Although Presidents Trump and Putin have both continued to entertain the possibility 
of improving the bilateral relationship, Russian-American relations are now poor and 
seem likely to remain so. 
8.1 Introduction 
The election of Donald Trump as President of the United States in November 2016 held out 
the prospect of an improvement in Russian-American relations from the poor state they had 
reached in the Obama years. Trump came to power promising to reset America’s relationship 
with Russia. In this, he did not differ from his two predecessors, Barack Obama and George 
W. Bush, who came to power with similar intentions. Russia remains important for the US as 
it has influence in regions and on key issues that matter to the United States, such as stability 
in the Middle East, security in Europe, and the power balance in the Asia-Pacific. However, 
strategic incompatibilities have often overridden underlying common interests in the past. 
Similarly, both Trump and Russian President Vladimir Putin initially made positive statements 
about each other, and both appeared ready to build stronger ties after the US presidential 
election. Some of Trump’s initial appointees – particularly Michael Flynn, who was quickly 
ousted from the post of National Security Adviser – seemed committed to achieving this goal. 
Soon enough, however, Russian-American relations turned sour once again under the Trump 
administration, as media and Congressional interest in the Russia investigations intensified. 
Recently, voices in Washington and Moscow have described the relationship as even worse 
under Trump than at any other time since the end of the Cold War. 
This chapter investigates the present state of the US-Russia relationship. In particular, it pos-
its that persistent differences between the two great powers have led to recurring cycles of 
frustrated expectations, of which the current impasse is only the most recent example. Alt-
hough Trump and Putin have both continued to give sporadic indications of their willingness 
to cooperate with each other to improve the situation, Russian-American relations are now 
poor and seem likely to remain so.  
  
 
82 
 
8.2 Persistent differences in the US-Russia relationship 
There are many reasons why Russian-American relations have been poor since the end of 
the Cold War and prior to Trump’s election in 2016. Russia resents the fact that the Soviet 
Union collapsed and that the Cold War ended with the loss of Soviet influence in Eastern 
Europe and elsewhere. A series of American foreign-policy actions thereafter have been 
viewed by Moscow as taking advantage of Russia’s temporary weakness (as many Russians 
insist on describing it). These include: 
- the expansion of NATO;  
- American and European military action against Russia’s ally, Serbia, vis-à-vis Bos-
nia-Herzegovina and Kosovo;  
- recognition of Kosovo’s declaration of independence from Serbia without Belgrade’s 
consent; 
- American efforts to limit Russia’s relations with Iran;  
- US withdrawal from the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty soon after Putin had ex-
pressed support for the US after 9/11;  
- the US-led intervention in Iraq without UN Security Council (and hence Russian) ap-
proval;  
- US support for “colour revolutions” in former Soviet republics, Georgia (2003) and 
Ukraine (2004) in particular;  
- American support for the “Arab Spring” opposition to governments allied to Russia 
in both Libya and Syria;  
- US support for another colour revolution in Ukraine in 2014, as well as negative re-
action to Russia’s annexation of Crimea and support for secessionists in eastern 
Ukraine. 
The US, of course, is not alone in incurring Russian resentment. Criticism of Moscow’s poli-
cies by European governments and the expansion of the European Union have also been 
seen by Moscow as directed against Russian interests. 
With the election of Donald Trump – who had praised Putin and called for improved US-
Russian relations – high hopes emerged in Russia about the prospects for improved ties be-
tween Moscow and Washington. However, this did not happen, for two main reasons. First, 
the scandal over Russia’s election meddling and the potential links between the Kremlin and 
Donald Trump’s team have made prospects for cooperation slimmer. Moscow sought to un-
dermine Hillary Clinton’s presidential prospects by releasing damaging e-mail messages 
hacked from her campaign organisation (National Intelligence Council 2017). In addition, 
members of the Trump campaign may have actively colluded with Moscow in this endeavour, 
and it also remains an open question whether this was done with Trump’s knowledge or not. 
Although Trump has vociferously denied all such allegations, there is now an on-going special 
counsel investigation into these matters and into the possibility that Trump may have sought 
to obstruct justice through firing FBI director James Comey, who was in charge of the FBI 
Russia inquiry at the time.  
The eventual outcome of this investigation – and of related probes by various Congressional 
committees – cannot be foretold. However, at the very least the whole debacle has already 
served to constrain the extent to which Trump can afford to cooperate with Russia: making 
what could be considered in the US to be undue concessions to Russia to improve relations 
would be seen as evidence of Trump’s being somehow beholden to Putin for his electoral 
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victory. Speculation that the president sought to prevent Moscow from revealing embarrass-
ing information about him, as it did with Clinton, would proliferate. Congressional Republicans 
have already limited Trump’s ability to improve ties with Russia through enacting, with bipar-
tisan support and in the face of White House objections, tougher economic sanctions that the 
President cannot lift without Congressional approval.  
The whole affair illustrates the underlying antagonism between the US and Russia, and also 
brings to the fore new areas of contestation. It highlights the wide-ranging challenge posed 
by Russia, and indicates new forms of hybrid influencing that autocratic governments can use 
to undermine Western democracies now and in the future (Aaltola and Mattiisen 2016; Aaltola 
2017). Russia is therefore likely to remain a thorny issue that cannot be resolved by the reset 
attempts of the current administration.  
Second, the relationship between the US and Russia remains fraught with policy differences, 
many of which have their roots in the past. Even without the above-mentioned concerns over 
Russian interference in the 2016 elections, continuing differences persist over numerous is-
sues, including sanctions, nuclear-arms control, NATO, Ukraine, Iran, Syria, North Korea and 
China. After Trump’s election there was a degree of optimism in both capitals that some, if 
not all, of the differences between Washington and Moscow could be resolved. Since then, 
however, none have been reconciled – or appear likely to be.  
This transition from optimism about the prospects for Russian-American relations after the 
2016 elections to the pessimism that has taken root since Trump has been in office should 
not be a surprise. From a historical perspective, every other American president since the end 
of the Cold War began his tenure hoping to improve relations between the two countries, but 
sooner or later saw these efforts fail. Bill Clinton’s hopes for better Russian-American relations 
in the 1990s foundered over the US-led military intervention in Kosovo against Moscow’s ally 
Serbia. Relations during the George W. Bush years improved when Putin backed the Ameri-
can-led intervention in Afghanistan after 9/11, but then deteriorated when the US withdrew 
from the 1972 Soviet-American ABM Treaty, and especially after the US undertook its inter-
vention against Iraq without UN Security Council – i.e. Russian – approval. Obama’s hopes 
for improved Russian-American ties were set back not only due to differing worldviews and 
global aspirations, but also because of the intervention by the US and its allies in Libya during 
the 2011 Arab Spring to overthrow Moscow’s long-term partner, Muammar Qaddafi (Stent 
2014). The only real difference under Trump has been that this period of hope was far shorter 
than in previous administrations. 
8.3 Frustrated expectations in the Trump era 
A key contributing factor to this rapid decline in Russian-American relations after Trump’s 
inauguration was the unrealistically high initial level of expectations on both the US and the 
Russian sides of the willingness to pursue improved relations on the one hand, and the infea-
sibility of such forays given the constraints of the current situation on the other. This, in fact, 
made mutual disillusionment all the more likely. It is worth exploring the substance of these 
unrealistic expectations. On the American side, (parts of) the Trump administration seem to 
have held the belief that Russian-American relations would improve simply because the in-
cumbent was the antithesis of Obama. Just as President Obama blamed the deterioration in 
Moscow-Washington ties during the Bush administration on his predecessor, Trump at-
tributed the failure of the highly publicised “Russia reset” almost solely to his predecessor, 
President Obama. President Trump has even boasted on several occasions that Putin “likes 
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me”, thus enabling him to make a deal with the Russian leader more easily than Obama 
(whom they both despise). 
The details of what such a deal would entail have never been made clear, however. President 
Trump seemed to expect that because he and Putin were “on the same wavelength” they 
could work together on what the new US incumbent saw as their common problems, including 
Syria (both opposed ISIS), Iran and even China. Trump also had a geopolitical logic support-
ing his Russia proposals: he thought that Obama had driven Russia closer to China – and 
China was a prominent target of his campaign rhetoric, especially on the issue of trade. In 
return, Trump made it clear that he would not try to promote democratisation in Russia, or 
hector Putin about human rights and the rule of law the way Obama had done. Going against 
the foreign-policy mainstream, even (or especially) that of his own party, the current US Pres-
ident considered such criticism of Russia ineffective, and thus unnecessary. Further, he 
seemed to hope that there was room for a grand bargain with Russia covering arms control, 
counter-terrorism, Crimea, economic sanctions and relations with China. He also seemed to 
expect that improved Russian-American relations would entice Russia to cooperate with the 
US against Iran. In return, Trump appeared willing to lift US sanctions, which had been im-
posed after Russia’s annexation of Crimea. This would have been part of a larger Russian-
American “deal” in which “the two leaders indomitably face down all comers like some mav-
erick geopolitical wrestling team” (Economist 2017a). 
The Kremlin’s expectations were quite different, however. To begin with, Russia did not view 
Iran or China as problems: they were partners, and therefore cooperation with the US against 
them was not on the Russian agenda. In addition, Moscow seemed to anticipate not only that 
Trump would end all efforts to promote democracy, human rights and the rule of law in Russia, 
but also that he would lift sanctions and accept as valid the Moscow-sponsored 2014 refer-
endum in Crimea, which called for the peninsula’s adhesion to Russia. America was also 
expected to acknowledge the Russian sphere of influence in its near abroad. This would have 
meant that neither Ukraine nor other former Soviet republics (except the Baltics) would join 
NATO or the EU.  
Even if such Russian expectations were unrealistic, it appears that the Kremlin actually had 
them. According to media reports, the Russian government sent a proposal to the US in March 
2017 for the immediate restoration of US-Russian cooperation in the diplomatic, military and 
intelligence fields, which had been severed in response to Russian intervention in Ukraine 
and Syria. The proposal appeared to have been made on the basis that the Trump admin-
istration would be willing to ignore reports that Moscow had interfered in the 2016 US presi-
dential election (especially since, after all, Trump had won), and that Trump would ignore 
Russian behaviour in Ukraine and lift the Obama-imposed sanctions against Moscow. Fur-
thermore, the Kremlin seems to have developed the expectation that all this would be possible 
from Western press reports about how Trump wanted to work with Putin, and from Trump’s 
own statements to that effect (Hudson 2017). If Russia really did interfere in the 2016 US 
presidential election to help Trump against Clinton, the Russian leadership may have felt not 
just disappointed, but tricked when Trump did not adopt the pro-Russian policies that the 
Kremlin expected from him. 
These differing expectations on the US and Russian sides were based on a mutually held 
assumption that the other side would be willing and able to modify its policies for the sake of 
improving relations. However, neither side had either the willpower or the ability to undertake 
such policy reorientation. Thus, although President Trump was willing to end the Obama-era 
calls for democracy, human rights and the rule of law in Russia, he could not drop the Ukraine-
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related sanctions that Congress (including the Republican leadership) insisted on continuing 
and even strengthening if Russia did not modify its Ukraine policies. The checks and balances 
inherent in the US political system set limits for the US president, even in foreign policy (see 
Chapter 3).   
For the Kremlin, however, Ukraine is not just a foreign-policy issue: it is also a domestic matter 
in that Russian nationalists genuinely consider much of it (Crimea and Eastern Ukraine espe-
cially) as rightfully belonging to Russia. This shows how foreign-policy considerations have a 
“cultural component” grounded in the domestic sphere that sets limits on manoeuvrability, not 
only in the United States but also in Russia. Making any concessions on Ukraine would risk 
undermining support for Putin not just among the Russian public, but also in his core security 
service and nationalist constituencies. 
In addition, although it might seem sensible to the Trump administration that Moscow should 
distance itself from Iran and China as part of Russian-American rapprochement, Russia re-
mains dependent on both. Tehran’s support is essential for propping up the Assad regime, 
and Russia’s status seeking in the Middle East is intimately linked to maintaining an influential 
role in Syria. China, on the other hand, has a role to play in buttressing the Russian economy 
through substantial investments and loans, and Beijing continues to share similar views about 
the coming of a multipolar world order. In addition to putting these benefits at risk, moving 
away from Iran and China at Washington’s behest would make Russia appear as “less than 
a great power”. Such questions of status are of great significance to the Kremlin. Nor will 
Russia support Trump’s efforts to end the Iranian nuclear accord, and will likely see the divi-
sions over the JCPOA as an opportunity for exploiting the differences between Trump and 
most of America’s allies on this issue. 
Similarly, Russia may see it as perfectly reasonable for the US to foreswear the expansion of 
NATO into any other former Soviet republic outside the Baltic states, or even anywhere else 
in Europe (such as Finland and Sweden). However, there are domestic and international con-
straints that limit President Trump’s ability to make such promises: precluding a possible 
NATO expansion would be a concession that most Republicans and Democrats in Congress, 
let alone most of America’s NATO allies, would not be willing to make. The alliance will not 
relinquish the principle that accession to NATO is decided by the current and prospective 
member governments alone, and does not require agreement from any third party such as 
Russia (even though, as a practical matter, Ukraine and Georgia are highly unlikely to be 
admitted into NATO). The Kremlin’s expectations about sanctions relief are also likely to be 
thwarted. Russia may be able to hold on to Crimea and Eastern Ukraine, but what it has been 
unable to do is to get America and its European allies to acquiesce to this and return to busi-
ness as usual. The issue is simply too fundamental to the interests of the Western actors 
involved. 
Yet, despite the many differences between the US and Russia that have persisted since 
Trump’s inauguration, Moscow and Washington continue to share some common interests. 
Both oppose ISIS and other jihadist groups in Syria and elsewhere in the greater Middle East. 
On this, Russian-American cooperation could be achieved. Further, the Trump administration 
does not appear to be insisting that Syria’s President Bashar al-Assad step down, as the 
Obama administration did, and this also constitutes a potential basis for cooperation with 
Moscow. Although they disagree on Iran, Moscow and Washington both have good relations 
with Tehran’s regional adversaries (Israel and the Arab Gulf monarchies). Indeed, both want 
to see the status quo in the Middle East largely preserved, and conflicts there to be contained 
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even if they cannot be ended. Unlike most governments in the region, Washington and Mos-
cow are sympathetic to the Kurds in both Iraq and Syria. Far from opposing the Kremlin’s 
support for right-wing nationalist forces in Europe, Trump has also expressed sympathy for 
them. At the same time, both are simultaneously pursuing good relations with moderate dem-
ocratic governments in Europe. 
8.4 Enduring uncertainties between the US and Russia 
There are also some uncertainties in the US-Russian relationship in several areas going for-
ward. If the hostility between the US and North Korea (or more accurately, between Trump 
and North Korean leader Kim Jong-un) intensifies, Russia’s response remains unclear. The 
Kremlin recently supported sanctions against North Korea at the UNSC, although they were 
a watered-down version of the more stringent measures called for by the US. In addition, it is 
not clear what Russia could (or would) do if Trump were to follow through on his threats to 
intervene in Venezuela to solve what he called a “completely unacceptable” situation in the 
country (White House 2017k). Similarly, it is unclear how the US would respond, in the current 
situation, to any additional Russian military moves in former Soviet republics such as Ukraine, 
Belarus or Moldova. It is not known, either, how both America and Russia would respond to 
violent conflict erupting between third parties such as India and China, India and Pakistan, 
Saudi Arabia and Qatar, for example. 
With both Putin and Trump cultivating reputations for acting quickly, decisively and unpredict-
ably, the future course of US-Russian relations with both men in power is less certain, as well 
as less stable, than under a more cautious American president such as Barack Obama. The 
inquiry into the Russia-Trump campaign connection will continue to limit the current admin-
istration’s ability to cooperate with Russia without generating domestic political opposition. 
Most notably, prominent Republican senators such as John McCain and Bob Corker have 
voiced strong concern over any concessions to the Kremlin without a discernible modification 
in Russia’s international behaviour.  
Furthermore, a decision by Congress to impeach Trump and remove him from office as a 
result of evidence uncovered in the Russia investigations would prevent his successor from 
pursuing a friendlier US policy toward Russia. A finding that Trump colluded with Russia would 
make it especially difficult for a Pence administration to pursue closer ties with Moscow. With 
Republicans currently enjoying a majority in both the House and the Senate, it is highly un-
likely that the House would vote to impeach Trump, or that the Senate would vote to remove 
him from office. If the Democrats were to regain control of the House as a result of the No-
vember 2018 elections, they could move to impeach Trump. However, even if the Democrats 
regained a majority in the Senate (which now seems increasingly possible), they will not have 
the two-thirds control needed to remove Trump from office.58 This would require some Re-
publicans to join them in such an effort, and it is highly doubtful that many would do so as 
long as Republican voters continued to support Trump, even though a majority of voters do 
not. It is more likely, but far from certain, that Trump will not run for re-election in 2020, or that 
he is not re-elected.  
Similarly, although a sudden leadership change in Russia could lead to a very different for-
eign-policy approach towards America and the West than Putin’s, it might not. Each new Rus-
sian leader seems to want to distinguish himself by criticising his predecessor’s policies and 
                                                     
58 For further elaboration on removing a president from office, see footnote 29. 
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adopting different ones that are “better”, but some policies will not change. It is simply impos-
sible to predict which of Putin’s policies his successor will change and which he will retain. 
For the time being, such speculation seems premature, as Putin has recently announced he 
will seek a fourth term as President. 
In the short-term, the most likely scenario is that the US and Russia will continue to undertake 
actions that the other does not like, while both simultaneously try to avoid situations that could 
spin out of control. Indeed, the various crises in the relationship may even provide opportuni-
ties for bilateral summits aimed at resolving, or at least containing, them. In addition to the 
domestic constraints described above, there are also external limits to US-Russia coopera-
tion. The problem facing both nations is that they may simply be unable to tackle issues ef-
fectively by themselves. In Syria, for instance, both Turkey and Iran are pursuing their own 
independent policies. Another danger for the US is that cooperation with Russia risks alienat-
ing America’s traditional allies and partners, especially in Europe where concerns about Rus-
sia’s influence in the region remain. Nevertheless, it seems unlikely that Trump will stray too 
far in this direction given that his top advisors – McMaster, Mattis, and Pence – remain dis-
trustful of Russia and retain some influence over the President’s foreign-policy decisions. Fi-
nally, it is possible that the period of unrealistic expectations and initial disillusionment has 
now passed, and that the US-Russia relationship will move forward on the basis of more 
realistic mutual expectations. This would allow Moscow and Washington to contain their dif-
ferences, if not to resolve them. 
8.5 The US-Russia relationship and Northern Europe 
Whether it is good or bad, the state of US-Russia relations has an impact on Northern Europe, 
not least on Finland, which shares a 1,300-kilometre border with Russia. Initial fears that 
Trump and Putin would get along well and reach an agreement affecting Europe without any 
consultation have dissipated in the wake of the deteriorating US-Russian relationship. On the 
one hand, poor US-Russia relations raise concerns about the possibility of some form of hos-
tile Russian actions or posturing towards America’s European allies. On the other hand, fric-
tions between the US and those very same allies may arise if Europeans wish to continue 
cooperating with Russia economically despite US-Russia tensions. The consternation caused 
in Europe following the imposition by Congress of the most recent round of sanctions against 
Russia (reluctantly signed into law by President Trump), highlighted this prospect (Weaver 
and Foy 2017). 
Russia has signalled that it respects NATO’s current membership level, but after the acces-
sion of Montenegro it does not want to see any further expansion. There does not appear to 
be sufficient appetite within NATO to accept any more former Soviet republics (after the three 
Baltic states) into the alliance in any case. The possible accession of Sweden and Finland is 
another matter. They are both Western democracies in good standing, and there is a stronger 
perception among existing NATO members that they should be allowed to join if they want to 
– and if they are willing to adopt and share the burden of collective defence. Russia, for its 
part, has indicated that there will be negative consequences for Sweden, and especially Fin-
land, if they do decide to seek membership of the alliance, but it has not specified what these 
might be. However, a recent report by a panel of experts argued that Russia’s political and 
economic responses would be strong, if not blunt, even if it did not resort to military means 
(which cannot be completely ruled out) (Bergquist et al. 2016). In the end, Russia’s threats 
may be intended more to deter Sweden and Finland from joining rather than to be acted upon 
if they do. However, it is unlikely that Finland will apply for NATO membership, at least in the 
near future. The situation in Sweden appears to be more uncertain (see Dalsjö 2017). 
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In the absence of NATO membership, both Finland and Sweden have pursued other avenues 
to enhance their security. Both have been increasing their bilateral security cooperation with 
the US, other NATO states and NATO itself, without eliciting an unduly negative Russian 
reaction.59 The Northern European states – especially Finland and Sweden – exercise a con-
siderable degree of control over the question of NATO expansion in the Nordic states, and 
thus over whether or how strongly US-Russian differences arise over it. They have less con-
trol, but could still be affected by, US-Russia differences elsewhere, especially in conflict sit-
uations such as Ukraine and Syria. There is understandable concern in Northern Europe that 
events in these two places could spill over and negatively affect them. This could happen in 
Syria, for example, where Moscow in September 2017 “raised the threat of a direct confron-
tation with US forces in Syria, saying that it would target areas occupied by American units 
and US-backed militias if its troops came under fire” (Filipov and Sly 2017). However, although 
the Trump administration is contesting the growth of Iranian influence in Syria, it seems to 
have accepted Russia’s presence there. In addition, despite their overall lack of cooperation 
in Syria, the US and Russia have taken care to pursue “deconfliction” (coordination aimed at 
avoiding any direct clash between their forces). What is even more relevant, the Syrian conflict 
contributed to the recent large-scale refugee flows into Europe, but for the moment the mas-
sive movement of people from Syria (and elsewhere) seems to have subsided. 
The heating up of the conflict in Ukraine would have greater spill-over potential in Northern 
Europe. The possibility that America will provide arms to Ukraine could well lead to the esca-
lation of the conflict given that Russia would undoubtedly respond by increasing support for 
pro-Russian separatists, or even sending in Russian military forces. The security situation in 
the Baltic Sea region could also take a turn for the worse, with the heightened risk of miscal-
culation. Russia, in fact, has been relatively cautious in using force, and it is doubtful that it 
would want to spread its military out too thinly through opening additional theatres of conflict 
in Europe. All in all, the best way for Northern Europe to mitigate the risk of an expanded 
Ukrainian conflict would be to engage in vigorous conflict-resolution diplomacy. This could 
also be significant in terms of keeping an expanded conflict in Ukraine from spreading else-
where in Europe. 
8.6 Conclusion 
As argued above, hopes for a US-Russia rapprochement have been dashed along with ex-
pectations in the Kremlin and the White House concerning a grand bargain and a rejuvenation 
of relations between the two countries. This has been due, in part, to the unfolding controversy 
and investigations concerning Russia’s election meddling and the Trump campaign’s possible 
collusion with Russian operatives. Congress has also taken a strong view on Russia, voicing 
public concerns and passing sanctions legislation that renders it increasingly difficult for the 
current administration to pursue a policy perceived as too Russia-friendly. Perhaps more rel-
evant still, enduring differences related to crucial issues in contemporary world politics – such 
as the situations in Ukraine and Syria, the actions of Iran, the role of China and especially the 
future of the European security architecture – are likely to add the Trump presidency to the 
long line of failed American attempts at reconciling fundamental disagreements with Russia. 
Nevertheless, irrespective of changes in leadership in Washington or Moscow, the US-Russia 
relationship remains crucial for the security of Europe, and Finland’s immediate neighbour-
                                                     
59 Further, the issue of how Russia would respond in practice to the accession of Sweden and Finland will not arise unless and until there is a firm decision 
(or a credible process leading towards it) on the part of these governments to apply for admission, and of existing NATO members to accept them.  
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hood in particular. In terms of immediate challenges, the US and its European allies and part-
ners on the one hand, and Russia on the other, must find ways of managing their differences, 
particularly over the conflict in Ukraine. At the very least, this should be done in a way that 
prevents the escalation and spillover that would further destabilise the European security sit-
uation. A resolution based on the Minsk II agreement should remain the desired ultimate ob-
jective. Overall, given the history of dispute and disappointment in the US-Russia relationship, 
suspicions between Washington and Moscow are likely to persist long after the Trump era 
and Vladimir Putin’s reign. 
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9. The United States and the transforming security environ-
ment in Asia 
 An increasingly assertive and self-confident China poses a challenge to US hegem-
ony in the Asia Pacific region. Perceptions of the US as a power in relative decline 
coupled with references by President Trump to US disengagement from the region 
have served to underscore the notion of an on-going regional power shift.  
 Nevertheless, US engagement in the region is likely to remain, by and large, the 
same. In an attempt to balance China’s rising prominence, the US will further build 
up military capabilities and continue its efforts to create a security network in the 
“Indo-Pacific”. Such efforts will include strengthening military ties with allies such as 
Japan and South Korea, and with strategic partner countries such as India.  
 Support for liberal values, human rights and normative principles, however, are likely 
to have a less important role. Nevertheless, the current focus on commercial access 
and national defence underscores the inconsistency and tension between self-deter-
mination and universal values that has also been present during previous US admin-
istrations.  
 Evolving US engagement in the region offers opportunities for the European Union to 
intensify commercial links and further promote free trade with its Asian partners. At a 
time when the US is perceived as relinquishing its strategy of promoting liberal norms, 
the EU could also revitalize region-to-region cooperation with ASEAN in particular, 
based on a shared commitment to a rule-based order, while continuing to emphasize 
human rights and normative principles. 
9.1 Introduction 
The US “pivot to Asia”, later renamed “rebalance towards Asia”, during the administration of 
President Barack Obama underscored the greater global importance of Asia, and the ensuing 
need for the US to strengthen its engagement in the region. This recently intensified emphasis 
corresponds with the general transition of global economic power, although the US was al-
ready playing a robust role in the region during the Cold War. However, once the administra-
tion under President Donald Trump began to function it was widely perceived that US foreign 
policy in Asia would shift dramatically towards a stronger focus on hard power, national self-
interest, protectionism and transactionalism. The aim in this chapter is to assess the manifes-
tation and significance of the perceived policy shift for the Asian region, and to examine its 
potential future implications, including for Europe. Will the US policy of rebalancing towards 
Asia be dead and buried in the Trump era and beyond?  
The chapter first sketches the main contours of the evolving security landscape in a region 
that is still marked by a strong emphasis on the nation state, sovereignty and non-interference, 
but which also has its territorial disputes, unstable regimes and imperfect democracies, ac-
companied with rising uncertainties and policies of hedging and balancing. Second, it ad-
dresses the question of change versus continuity, and assesses the extent to which, after one 
year in office, Trump and his Asia policy constitute a breach with the past. The focus then 
shifts to China’s challenge to US hegemony – its preponderant power position in the region 
and beyond – the aim being to extrapolate certain future developments in the relationship 
between China and the US and its regional allies. The final section draws overall conclusions, 
examines the changing role of norms and values, and considers the potential implications for 
Europe and its relationship with the US.  
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9.2 The evolving Asian security environment: flashpoints and challenges 
For some years now, Asia has been in the global spotlight as the world’s fastest-growing 
region holding the key to 21st-century history. The region stretching from Japan through China 
and from Southeast Asia to India has been called the “arc of ascendance” forecasting “Asia’s 
march on the future” (Campbell 2016, 1). Nevertheless, it is also a region of numerous security 
risks and potential hot spots. The way in which the Trump administration handles these chal-
lenges could have a more lasting impact as future administrations reflect upon them as “les-
sons learned” for America’s foreign policy in the area.   
First of all, an increasingly assertive China strongly affects the regional security environment. 
Its military expansion alongside its economic growth, its actions in regional maritime affairs 
(constructing artificial islands to reinforce claims on disputed territories in the South China 
Sea, for example) and growing influence in the region have contributed to raising threat per-
ceptions. According to the official rhetoric, China’s current strategy focuses on peaceful de-
velopment. Nevertheless, in the field of foreign policy Beijing takes a much more proactive 
strategic stance, coupled with a tougher approach towards national interests such as the 
South China Sea, or officially-recognised “core interests” such as the Japanese-controlled 
Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands in the East China Sea. The Taiwan Strait is another potentially dan-
gerous flashpoint because of the tension between US security commitments, its long-standing 
geostrategic vision as the guardian of the maritime commons, and China’s ambitions to re-
integrate Taiwan. Following a policy of “strategic ambiguity” the US has aimed to conduct a 
delicate balancing act, deterring China from using force against Taiwan and dissuading Tai-
wan from pursuing independence. It is clear that China has become more vocal about its 
great-power ambitions, making territorial claims as well as taking economic and finance-re-
lated initiatives. Contrary to its former low-profile strategy, since 2012 Beijing has actively 
sought to shape the regional and international environment under the banner of “major power 
diplomacy with Chinese characteristics”.  
Second, the situation on the Korean Peninsula makes the region highly volatile. Tensions 
reached a new peak in 2017 after the North Korean regime under its leader Kim Jong-un 
carried out its sixth nuclear test in early September, and in November conducted its sixteenth 
missile test in 2017 alone. It seems beyond doubt that North Korea is making progress in its 
missile programme, in terms of both nuclear technology and strike capability (Chapter 5). The 
alleged end of the “strategic patience” policy on the part of the US at the beginning of Donald 
Trump’s presidency has further exacerbated the North Korean belligerent rhetoric and ac-
companying regional tensions. The US has been appealing strongly to China to apply direct 
pressure on the regime, but has come to realise that the options are limited in view of China’s 
reluctance to exert its influence on Pyongyang and put pressure on the regime, even if Beijing 
has gradually taken a tougher line.   
Third, there are “non-state risks” including the proliferation of WMDs, as well as non-traditional 
security challenges such as terrorism, humanitarian crises, natural disasters and piracy. Vul-
nerability to terrorism is an outcome of poor border security, weak law enforcement, and poor 
coordination and information sharing among relevant agencies, whereas piracy has been on 
the rise, particularly in Southeast Asia (Green et al. 2016, 28). 
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Lastly, the region is characterised by what is often referred to as the Asian paradox. In other 
words, in East Asia, vibrant economies, rapidly growing economic interdependence and inte-
gration, and deepening trade and investment networks, on the one hand, coexist with tense 
diplomatic relations, increasing political nationalism and regional rivalry, unresolved territorial 
disputes, lingering historical grievances, an on-going arms race and relatively limited security-
related cooperation on the other (see Pollack 2016). The paradox is also evident in the rela-
tionship between two of America’s military allies, Japan and South Korea (ROK, Republic of 
Korea). Both countries have deep cultural ties as well as close trade relations, but bilateral 
relations are strongly impeded by differing views on wartime history and mistrust, as is most 
obvious in disputes over the issue of comfort women, visits by Japanese politicians to the 
controversial Yasukuni shrine and territorial claims to Dokdo/Takeshima. 
9.3 The US policy on Asia from Obama to Trump 
The pivot to Asia highlighted the need for the US to devote more energy and resources to the 
burgeoning Asian region. According to then-Secretary of State Hillary Clinton’s (2011) article 
in Foreign Policy launching the pivot, “(t)he future of politics will be decided in Asia, not Af-
ghanistan or Iraq, and the United States will be at the center of the action”. The US rebalance 
towards Asia therefore also implied a shift away from seemingly endless engagements in the 
Middle East. Heralding “America’s Pacific Century”, Clinton expounded Washington’s ambi-
tions to form a counterweight to China and to take on a leading role in a region “eager for US 
leadership and business” – along with its traditional allies and, possibly, India. According to 
one of the main architects of the pivot, former Assistant Secretary of State Kurt Campbell, the 
new policy had one important additional objective, namely to move away from the hitherto 
predominant “China first” policy or the “G2” approach (proposed at the start of the Obama 
administration), and instead apply an integrative approach by embedding a China strategy in 
a larger regional framework and advancing relations with countries across the region (Camp-
bell 2016, 7). The purported goal was not to contain China but to engage it, and to preserve 
and extend American power in Asia.  
The extent to which the pivot materialised in terms of the resources allocated to a strength-
ened military and diplomatic presence in Asia is open to debate. One element seems beyond 
doubt, however: it had an effect on alliance partners. Countries such as Japan duly strength-
ened their physical as well as, importantly, their legal capabilities to reinforce the alliance and 
ensure US commitment. More relevant still, rhetoric focusing on closer ties through trade, 
diplomacy and defence reassured allies in the region, and expressed support for norms and 
values reflected US ambitions for continued regional leadership. Both of these aspects con-
tinue to play a key role among countries in the region as a tool for future hedging against 
China’s rise to preponderance.  
The election of Donald Trump as US president seemed to indicate a shift from Obama’s “Asia 
first” policy to a new “America first” orientation. Already during his election campaign Trump 
set himself apart from the Obama administration. Both before and after the election, he dis-
played a shallow understanding of the history, legacy and underlying purpose of the US alli-
ance system in the region, and of East Asian geopolitics in general. Instead, he gave prece-
dence to balancing trade relationships, reviving American industry and creating jobs. Trump’s 
efforts were clear during his recent tour of Asia, where he boasted of his apparent success in 
securing economic, energy and military trade agreements with China, Japan and South Korea 
that would “bring jobs to the United States and reduce the trade deficit” (Qiu 2017).  
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At least as significant as a result of Trump’s election was the fallout for alliance partners. The 
US-Japan alliance, for example, has been both the cornerstone of Japan’s security and the 
hallmark of the power structure in the Asia-Pacific region for most of the post-war period. Now, 
more than ever before, question marks abound over the role and function of the alliance for 
Japan and in the region. Trump referred to the alliance as a one-sided and unfair agreement, 
saying that Japan was over-reliant on America. He contended that countries such as Japan 
should cover more of the costs of maintaining US forces on their soil. Concerns about the 
need for greater burden-sharing had been raised during former administrations as well, but 
the fact that Trump placed doubts on the entire alliance set off alarm bells in Tokyo and ex-
acerbated existing fears of future abandonment: “Japan used to beat China, they routinely 
beat China. Why are we defending them at all?” During his election campaign Trump already 
hinted at the possibility for both Japan and South Korea to acquire nuclear weapons so as to 
reduce their reliance on Washington. Within Japan, this has given a boost to conservative 
politicians, including Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, in their efforts to strengthen the Japanese 
military and give it more autonomy, the long-term goal being to change the “US-imposed” 
constitution. On the regional level, many observe an on-going power shift, while casting doubt 
on whether the US presence at the core of the post-war system in the Asia-Pacific is sustain-
able. 
Furthermore, vowing to place American business first, Trump has been openly wary of re-
gional alliances, multilateral deals and multinational trade agreements. Since taking office he 
has pulled out of the Paris climate accord and the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), a planned 
mega-FTA including twelve Asian-Pacific countries initially led by the US, intended not only 
to foster trade but also to bolster America’s geostrategic position in the region (Chapter 7). 
This seemed to indicate that the US was relinquishing its global leadership on key issues such 
as climate and trade, with ramifications in other fields including security. Instead, Trump has 
been advocating bilateral trade deals, including with the eleven TPP countries, which have 
decided to move forward with the regional trade agreement without the US.  
Lastly, among the more substantial changes during the Trump administration is the ambition 
to uphold the liberal order based on universal norms and values (see Chapters 4 and 6). One 
of the key objectives of the US pivot to Asia was to reinforce critical norms and values under-
pinning a secure and prosperous regional and international order, through bilateral, trilateral 
and multilateral means. Trump, on the other hand, has made no mention of “traditional” US 
leadership in terms of liberal values, progressive norms, or open economic philosophy. In-
stead, with his aim to place “America First”, he is criticised for jeopardising US ambitions to 
continue to be a “force for good” in the world. According to a recent editorial in the Economist 
(2017b):  
“[p]erhaps the greatest damage that Mr Trump has done is to American soft 
power. He openly scorns the notion that America should stand up for universal 
values such as democracy and human rights. Not only does he admire dicta-
tors; he explicitly praises thuggishness, such as the mass murder of criminal 
suspects in the Philippines. He does so not out of diplomatic tact, but appar-
ently out of conviction. This is new.”  
9.4 The pivot to Asia: dead in the water or continuity after all? 
It is therefore tempting to depict the transition from Obama to Trump in terms of discontinuity. 
As Storey and Izzuddin (2017, 2) argue, Obama’s pivot to Asia is more or less dead in the 
water. For one thing, Trump explicitly aimed to dismantle the Obama legacy; second, his TPP 
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withdrawal dealt a major blow to the earlier strategy; and third, his preoccupation with com-
bating ISIS will ensure that the emphasis remains on the Middle East, at the expense of Asia. 
In other words, it is not difficult to focus on a change from openness to isolationism, from 
multilateralism to a retreat from global governance, from free trade to protectionism, from 
dialogue and engagement to confrontation, and from an “Asia First” to an “America First” 
policy. Nevertheless, one should not overemphasise the breach with the past. From a wider 
and longer-term perspective, the focus may still remain on continuity, in particular when it 
comes to the US’s grand strategy for Asia. All in all, the following elements point to continuity 
rather than change.  
First, there is history. Since the start of its engagement with Asia in 1784, the main focus of 
US strategy has been to prevent the rise of a hostile hegemon that would threaten US inter-
ests. To quote Green (2017, 5): 
“[i]f there is one central theme in American strategic culture as it has applied 
to the Far East over time, it is that the United States will not tolerate any other 
power establishing exclusive hegemonic control over Asia or the Pacific. Put 
another way, for over two centuries, the national interest of the United States 
has been identified by key leaders as ensuring that the Pacific Ocean remains 
a conduit for American ideas and goods to flow westward, and not for threats 
to flow eastward toward the homeland.” 
The US grand strategy, in other words the interplay between intelligence, diplomacy and mil-
itary strength, for the Asia-Pacific has therefore remained a constant, even when a “fluctuating 
roster of mostly incompetent leaders are unsure as to why they do anything” (McDougall cited 
in Green 2017, 3). It is therefore important to distinguish between Trump’s rhetoric and the 
bigger picture. As Parameswaran (2017) argues, US commitment to the region is structural, 
not situational. Continuity is particularly prominent at the level of defence, as the Pentagon 
tends routinely to continue engagements such as exercises and military transfers in a less 
visible fashion.  
Second, key pillars of the US strategy in Asia remain unaltered. As was clear in the Trump 
administration’s first major Asia defence-policy address, given by Secretary of State Mattis 
during the Shangri-la Dialogue in June 2017, the three core components of strengthening 
alliances, encouraging a more interconnected region, and building US military capabilities, 
were all essential parts of the pivot or rebalance under the Obama administration 
(Parameswaran 2017).  
The objective to strengthen existing alliances and forge a denser security network of like-
minded countries specifically denotes continuity with preceding administrations. In spite of the 
above-mentioned concerns that Trump raised vis-à-vis its alliance partners in the region, his 
administration appears to be seeing eye-to-eye again with countries such as Japan and South 
Korea. Relations with Japan were reset after two meetings between Abe and Trump, in which 
the latter vowed to be 100-per-cent on the side of Tokyo, complemented by visits to Tokyo by 
Secretary of Defence Mattis and Secretary of State Tillerson. Moreover, during a recent visit 
to Seoul Trump managed to iron out his differences with South Korean President Moon Jae-
in and reconfirm US deterrence commitments.  
Furthermore, partly as an outcome of the limited overarching regional security institutions 
(often described as talking shops), for some years now the region has been characterised by 
the on-going creation of so-called strategic partnerships on the bilateral, trilateral, or even 
quadrilateral level. The hub-and-spokes system with US-centred military alliances at its core 
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has remained central, but countries are increasingly hedging their bets by establishing issue-
based and functional partnerships with other countries. These partnerships tend to comple-
ment more formal and military-oriented alliances such as the one between the US and Japan. 
Strategic partnerships are therefore an instrument for multiple hedging, against both a threat-
ening China and possible abandonment by a potentially weakening US. They are increasingly 
becoming a key factor in what Buzan (2012, 11) refers to as the Asian “supercomplex”, a 
regional security complex covering South and East Asia and marked by the continuing rise of 
China and India and a weakening US. 
As a strong sign of the increasingly important regional role of India, in particular as a hedge 
against possible Chinese predominance, the Trump administration has started to emphasise 
the concept of the Indo-Pacific.60 Following a reference in an earlier speech by Secretary of 
State Tillerson, at the most recent APEC summit in November 2017 Trump repeatedly re-
ferred to “Indo-Pacific”, rather than using the more common moniker “Asia-Pacific“.61 Using 
Indo-Pacific as the strategic definition of Asia was originally a Japanese idea, launched in 
2007 by current Japanese Prime Minister Abe during his first term in office. The concept de-
notes a wider area including South Asia, stretching to Southeast Asia and Oceania, and en-
tails a “dynamic coupling” of both the Indian and the Pacific Oceans. The term also gives a 
key role to India as a regional power, denoting a region in which China plays a relatively lesser 
role. It thus dovetails with Abe’s idea of the “Asian security diamond”, a free and open mari-
time region connecting the US, Australia, India and Japan. References to a “free and open 
Indo-Pacific” are therefore explicitly aimed at denoting a strategy in which countries such as 
India, Japan, Australia and Southeast Asian nations such as Vietnam, equally wary of China’s 
ascendency, will contribute to countering Beijing’s strong maritime ambitions in the South 
China Sea and far beyond. It is likely that less formal alignments such as the US-India-Japan 
trilateral dialogue and US-Japan-India-Australia quadrilateral cooperation will continue to de-
velop under the Trump administration and beyond (see also Chapter 6).  
9.5 The China challenge 
The single most important predicament for the US remains China’s challenge to US hegem-
ony. An increasingly assertive China under President Xi Jinping clearly harbours the ambition 
to regain a central role in Asia and to acquire a larger role in global affairs. This has led to 
speculations about the unavoidability of conflict in the long run, and a debate on whether both 
powers will be able to avoid “Thucydides’s trap”, which postulates that when one rising power 
threatens to displace another great power, war is almost always the result (Allison 2017). 
China’s challenge to American hegemony and international principles is clear. China has chal-
lenged the freedom of navigation and strengthened territorial claims in Southeast Asia. Its 
military spending continues to rise. It has been aggressively investing in anti-access/area de-
nial (A2/AD) capabilities as well as in cyber, electronic warfare, a blue-water navy, missiles, 
and intelligence-surveillance-reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities, all intended to undermine the 
US military capability to protect its interests in the region (see Green et al. 2016, 2-3). The US 
remains the dominant naval power in the Asia-Pacific, but is being increasingly challenged by 
                                                     
60 It is obvious that the definition of Asia as a geographically-based grouping of countries representing a region is highly fluid and variable. The concept of 
Asia differs according to the strategic goals, identity and national interests of a certain country’s government. This automatically implies that definitions also 
shift over time, reflecting the evolving definitions of interests and national identity. As pointed out by Green (2017, 14-15), US definitions of Asia have 
evolved historically from a focus on the East Indies, Northeast Asia, the wider Asia-Pacific with a rising China at its core, to the current concept of the Indo-
Pacific, especially salient in terms of the balancing efforts against China’s ascendancy. 
61 The term “Asia-Pacific” would also have been the expected term to use within the framework of APEC (Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation). 
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China, which no longer accepts that the US is the sole naval power in the region. According 
to China’s Defense White Paper of 2015, the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) is grad-
ually seeking to shift the defence focus from offshore waters to include “open seas protection” 
(Green et al. 2016, 18) and long-distance operations in the Indian Ocean and the western 
Pacific (Economist 2015).  
In addition, China has ambitions to create alternative systems of governance, including 
through the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), 
the BRICS Bank, and the proposed Shanghai Cooperation Bank. The 16+1 grouping of Cen-
tral and Eastern European countries plus China could be seen as an example of China’s 
strategy not to displace existing structures (as “Thucydides’s trap” would predict), but to create 
parallel ones. Economic development, continued growth and sustainable prosperity are key 
determinants of whether China can further boost its clout in the Asia-Pacific in particular. In 
the aftermath of the US withdrawal from the TPP, China is profiling itself as the champion of 
free trade. Beijing is pushing forward with its own regional trade construction, the Regional 
Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP). 
China also displays a newfound self-confidence. At the recent Congress of the Communist 
Party, President Xi Jinping referred to China as a “mighty force” in the world and a role model 
for political and economic development, adding that his country’s political system “is a great 
creation” that offers “a new choice for other countries” (Doan 2017). Furthermore, since the 
rise to power of Xi in 2012, China has come to see US power in the region as a lesser con-
straint on China’s exercise of influence, and relations with the US in general have seemed 
less of a preoccupation than in earlier years (Green et al. 2016, 14). Trump has only strength-
ened that tendency: his numerous missteps and mishaps, both at home and abroad, have 
boosted the Chinese leadership’s confidence. When Trump cast doubt on US adherence to 
the One-China policy, Xi made the non-negotiable demand that Trump reassert the policy 
before any conversation between both leaders could take place. The fact that Trump duly 
reversed his view only reinforced a strengthening conviction in China of American weakness 
and of the US as a “paper tiger” (Economist 2017c). 
One key element that will determine whether conflict in the region can be avoided and a bal-
ance of power achieved, is the extent to which the US can maintain and strengthen the hub-
and-spokes system of alliances. It is said, for example, that within the next 30 years China’s 
navy might match the American navy, but this discounts the fact that the US could cooperate 
closely with the powerful Japanese Maritime SDF and the growing Indian navy (Economist 
2015). The extent to which the US can complement the alliance system with the strengthened 
strategic partnerships with other countries in the “Indo-Pacific” is a core determinant in the 
China-US rivalry.  
A second key element is Japan’s stance. Japan has historically refused to submit itself to a 
China-dominated order, seeing itself as an equal. As Michael Green argues, in view of Ja-
pan’s own expansionist policies during the Pacific War, and the lingering grievances concern-
ing its actions during the first half of the 20th century, the country will not be able to become a 
dominant regional power through a Pax Nipponica. At the same time, Japan will reject domi-
nation by China (Pax Sinica). Peace and stability in the region therefore hinge upon the 
strength of the security alliance with the US and the continued Pax Americana (Green 2001).  
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9.6 Conclusion 
The debate on the US as a power in relative decline in the Asia-Pacific, coupled with Trump’s 
references to US disengagement from the region, have served to underscore the notion of a 
continuing power shift in the region propelled by a strongly (re)emerging China. One core aim 
of the Obama administration’s rebalance to Asia was to “bend Asia’s evolving distribution of 
power away from hegemony and more toward balance” (Campbell 2016, 157). The US aimed 
to engage China and cooperate with Beijing, but at the same time sought to hedge against 
China’s rise. The prime instrument for achieving this was engagement with India, Australia 
and individual Southeast Asian countries through economic diplomacy, and the strengthening 
of military ties to establish a security network in the Asia-Pacific. Relations with alliance part-
ners Japan (e.g. through collective security) and South Korea (e.g. the THAAD missile de-
fence system) were strengthened. In addition, the US was a driving force behind the creation 
of strategic partnerships with countries such as India and Australia. The creation of these 
partnerships has gained popularity in the region as a highly flexible foreign-policy instrument 
to promote cooperation on a limited number of specific issues. Countries such as Japan, for 
example, aspire to build strategic alliances of like-minded, democratic Indo-Pacific countries 
that share similar anxieties about China’s growing naval might. Many countries in the region, 
including Southeast Asian states, Australia and Japan, therefore welcome a stronger pres-
ence and a regional role for the US, as this allows them to conduct a “dual hedge” and play 
both great powers against each other. China, for its part, has been highly active in exerting 
influence in the region through different degrees of charm offensive and tactical intimidation 
to test US standing as the region’s security guarantor (Gill et al. 2016, 16).  
Compared to the Obama era, at first sight the Trump administration has changed tack by 
emphasising an “America first” policy and shifting towards isolationism and self-interest. Nev-
ertheless, US grand strategy is likely to remain by and large the same. The extent to which 
the Trump administration can uphold these efforts in the years to come is the key to balancing 
China’s rise. Trump’s recent tour of Asia confirms that a prime goal for now is to build personal 
relationships and cement partnerships, but this is likely to be done at the expense of express-
ing support for human rights and normative principles, as the President’s visit to the Philip-
pines made clear. The promotion of liberal norms has been a key element in US foreign policy, 
given “the clear strategic advantages of maintaining a favorable ideational balance of power 
in which like-minded states reinforce American influence, access, and security” (Green 2017, 
9). Trump is seemingly overturning this policy. However, it should be kept in mind that strong 
tension between self-determination and universal values has been an equally consistent ele-
ment of US policy in Asia. Trump’s focus on commercial access and national defence under-
scores the inconsistency that has also been present during preceding administrations.  
Propelled by China’s ascendency, US re-engagement with East Asia has drawn other players, 
old as well as new, more closely into the East Asian power game. The EU remains a more 
important trading partner for East Asia than the US. The total volume of EU trade and the 
relative importance of the East Asian region have increased significantly. As a political actor 
however, the EU continues to have a limited role. A major milestone towards assuming a 
more influential role in political affairs was its attendance at the East Asia Summit as a guest 
for the first time in November 2017. This was preceded by the Union’s accession to the As-
sociation of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in 2012 – a 
pre-requisite for being considered a candidate for a seat at the East Asia Summit table.  
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Another possible element contributing to a potentially larger security role in the region is the 
EU’s agreement (signed by 25 member states) to establish Permanent Structured Coopera-
tion (PESCO), which aims to increase joint military investment and defence capabilities. Fur-
thermore, as the US appears to be less interested in promoting liberal norms, the EU could 
revitalise region-to-region cooperation with ASEAN based on a shared commitment to a rule-
based order, and emphasise human rights and normative principles in the process. America’s 
evolving engagement in Asia thus provides opportunities for the EU, not only to intensify com-
mercial links and promote free trade, but also to engage more closely with Asian countries by 
offering – in the words of European Commission vice-president Jyrki Katainen – “stability, rule 
of law, [and] a rules-based system of multilateralism” (quoted in Beesley et al. 2017). Ulti-
mately, it will be in the interest of the US to work with Europe in upholding support for a rules-
based order in Asia.  
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PART V: THE UNITED STATES AND EUROPE 
10. Trends in the transatlantic security relationship 
 The United States and its allies across the Atlantic constitute a security community 
wherein the use of force has been replaced by debate and negotiation in settling dis-
agreements. 
 President Trump’s various remarks have raised concerns over the foundations of the 
transatlantic relationship, including the ironclad nature of NATO’s security guarantee, 
the smooth continuity of transatlantic free trade and the upholding of shared liberal 
values.  
 Transatlantic unity has witnessed tensions, bickering and occasional crises over the 
years. In this sense, the Trump administration’s “America First” approach could be 
seen as merely another American (re)articulation that US interests should matter 
more within the transatlantic security community. 
 Institutionalised security cooperation, extensive economic relations and shared val-
ues are likely to continue guiding the relationship between the United States and Eu-
rope, even if uncertainty over the normative common ground, in particular, raises 
some concerns for the future.  
10.1 Introduction 
The first year of the Trump administration was characterised by growing strain in relations 
between the United States and Europe. Politicians, the media and foreign-policy experts have 
questioned assumptions about institutional sustainability and certainties of commitment. Nev-
ertheless, the cornerstones of the transatlantic security community remain. Security cooper-
ation, extensive economic relations, broadly shared values and a mutual interest in backing 
the existing international order continue to guide the relationship between the United States 
and Europe. 
This chapter considers the Trump presidency in the context of the enduring bonds that have 
kept the transatlantic community together since the end of the Second World War, including 
the cycles of tension that have been symptomatic of this overall relationship. The present 
situation and future trajectories of the transatlantic link are also discussed in terms of security 
and economic relations, and with reference to the common institutional and value base. 
10.2 Enduring foundations of the transatlantic security community 
The United States and its allies across the Atlantic constitute the core of the liberal interna-
tional order (see Chapter 6). It has often been claimed that they comprise a “security commu-
nity”, a constellation wherein “war or the threat of force to settle disputes within the region is 
unthinkable” (Ikenberry 2008, 7). In short, members of security communities “entertain de-
pendable expectations of peaceful change”, and such expectations become embedded in the 
social fabrics of the states and their constituent communities (Adler and Barnett 1998, 34). 
Security communities are typically defined in terms of three elements characterised by con-
fluence between community members, namely: 
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1. power and security interests;  
2. economic interdependence and market relations;  
3. common institutions, values and political identity.62  
Security cooperation across the Atlantic is institutionalised in the form of NATO, which has 
shown an ability to change in response to evolving security-related demands emanating from 
its members on both sides of the Atlantic. Operations in the Balkans and Afghanistan, and a 
more recent re-focus on collective defence in Europe constitute evidence of this. In addition, 
there is an increasing number of flexible formats that enable multilateral cooperation, which 
are nonetheless more formal than the coalitions-of-the-willing format championed by the 
United States during the early 2000s. The benefits of this security cooperation have been 
clear to US military personnel and civil servants and, after varying lengths of time, to every 
US administration since the end of World War II.  
Mutually beneficial extensive economic relations between the United States and Europe 
stretch back to the founding of the original thirteen colonies on the eastern-seaboard of to-
day’s United States. Given the nature of the economies involved, the relationship is primarily 
among myriad private-sector actors on both sides of the Atlantic. Governments, or more re-
cently the European Union, have tended to be involved by facilitating the frameworks of trade 
liberalisation (e.g. GATT/WTO, TTIP negotiations, the EU’s four freedoms and the EMU) and 
enforcing their own national or supranational laws. It is this multiplicity of actors and extensive 
web of relations that make the transatlantic economic relationship so robust.  
The cornerstone of the transatlantic relationship is the idea of a shared set of values. On the 
very broadest levels, such as the promotion of democracy, a market economy and citizens’ 
rights, it is possible to make the case that both Americans and Europeans hold a broadly 
similar set of values. On individual issues such as gun ownership, however, there is a clear 
gap. Surveys also report wide variability within the United States and between different Euro-
pean states on matters such as drug policy, the role of religion in society and the rights of 
sexual minorities. For the purposes of evaluating the political state of the transatlantic rela-
tionship, perhaps the key metric is the extent to which both Europe and the United States 
seek to uphold and buttress these and other universal values on the global stage.  
Continuing to support and underwrite the existing international order has been a broadly 
shared mutual endeavour on both sides of the Atlantic, which has held the transatlantic rela-
tionship together politically for the past seventy years. One of the drivers of the TTIP negoti-
ations, for instance, was the recognition that together the US and the EU could guide and 
shape the evolution of the global economic framework. Only a few other state actors (most 
notably China) have the power to seek meaningful change in the existing order. However, 
non-state actors – primarily global multinational companies – have emerged as perhaps the 
more serious challengers, while at the same time greatly benefitting from the current order. 
From the perspective of the transatlantic relationship, it is fortunate that many of the key global 
companies have roots in the Anglo-Saxon transatlantic space.  
                                                     
62 This typology draws on Risse (2008, 268). 
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10.3 Transatlantic security relations: continuity in cooperation and cycles of 
tension 
Donald Trump is the first post-World War II US president to assume office articulating a plat-
form of detachment from America’s global commitments. This included questioning the col-
lective defence commitments the United States had taken on through NATO. For nearly seven 
decades, NATO has embodied the unwavering American and European support for collective 
defence, and has harnessed America’s preponderant power for the common good of the 
transatlantic security community. All American presidents since the organisation was founded 
have acknowledged and recognised Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty in particular. Prior 
to President Trump’s incumbency, US demands for Europeans to spend more on defence 
had not been read as a sign of a more conditional commitment. In fact, the US had been 
demanding for decades that Europeans do more for their own security. This trope has prolif-
erated in American discussions since at least the Eisenhower presidency.  
President Trump’s first visit to Europe in 2017 was seen as a sign that the US might, also in 
the future, perceive its commitments as grounded on transactional reciprocity. According to 
some, more equitable burden-sharing would ensure the sustainability and vitality of the trans-
atlantic link. However, if Europeans do not commit more funds to their common defence, the 
US may rethink its efforts regarding the defence of Europe (see e.g. Mandelbaum 2017; Gor-
don 2016). Nevertheless, whenever periodic discussions about the need for increased “stra-
tegic autonomy” surfaced in Europe, multiple US administrations have cautioned against it, 
fearing it could ultimately reduce American influence in European security and defence affairs.  
One should therefore consider the perceived crisis in the transatlantic security community that 
accompanied the election in the context of long-term oscillation in the transatlantic relation-
ship, and America’s commitment to the liberal international order of which the West consti-
tutes the core (see Chapter 6). In fact, transatlantic relations have rarely been unproblematic, 
not even in the security sphere in which continuity has persisted across US presidential ad-
ministrations on the subject of America’s commitment to Europe.  
The transatlantic security community experienced multiple crises during the Cold War, and it 
was often thought to be on the verge of a “divorce”. These critical episodes included external 
events such as the Suez Crisis in 1956 and the oil crises of 1973 and 1979, as well as do-
mestic political shifts such as the inception of German Ostpolitik in the late 1960s and Ronald 
Reagan’s initially confrontational attitude towards the Soviets in the early 1980s (Green 
Cowles and Egan 2016). At the time, they were all seen as risks to future transatlantic security 
cooperation.  
After the end of the Cold War, each US administration had to deal with its own form of trans-
atlantic strains. This was the case, for instance, when the United States pushed for German 
Reunification under George H.W. Bush, and as NATO sought to identify a new post-Cold War 
role and membership profile under US leadership during Bill Clinton’s presidency. During the 
George W. Bush presidency, Europeans were concerned about his willingness to espouse a 
unilateralist worldview – a “go it alone” attitude stressing the role of “coalitions of the willing” 
and challenging core international norms (see Chapters 4 and 6). In other words, the problem 
in the early 2000s was hyper-militarised involvement, not a lack of involvement per se. Amer-
ica’s willingness to assert leadership consummate with its position in the global power hierar-
chy was not questioned by the Bush administration (see Brown 2004; Nye 2002; Reus-Smit 
2004). 
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President Obama, in turn, pressed Europeans on NATO burden-sharing (Howorth 2010, 463), 
and the much-touted “rebalance to Asia” policy did not exactly indicate that the transatlantic 
partnership would be a priority for him (Chapter 9; see also Cox 2012). Moreover, both the 
Libya intervention and vacillation over Syria showed that Obama would not assume as much 
of a leadership role as some allies might have hoped. As a result, the Obama administration 
came to be associated with the foreign-policy approach termed “leading from behind”63, which 
as a mode of leadership rested on the assumption that military action could be both legitimate 
and effective if it was not branded as solely American, and if others – particularly European 
partners – took a more active role (Reich and Lebow 2014; Aaltola et al. 2014a). In this sense, 
Obama’s foreign policy was a corrective to the failures of the more unilateral military cam-
paigns during the Bush era. 
In reality, therefore, tensions, bickering, and occasional crises have tended to characterise 
transatlantic unity in action. Squabbles over whose interests should have priority in common 
actions and whose resources are burdened the most have persisted in the transatlantic se-
curity community, fuelled by disagreements over who should take the leadership role, what 
means should be used, how unilateral versus multilateral the operations should be, and how 
US and European security interests were related. In this sense, Trump’s “America first” slogan 
could be seen as merely another American (re)articulation that US interests should matter. 
Trump’s leadership instincts and style merely highlight the burden-sharing element. 
Nevertheless, the burden-sharing issue is not likely to result in fundamental long-term differ-
ences within the transatlantic alliance. The extraterritorial nature of NATO’s “out of area” cri-
sis-management operations during the 2000s turned the organisation into an increasingly 
global security actor. The operation in Afghanistan in particular – launched after the first ever 
evocation of Article 5 following the 9/11 terrorist attacks (NATO 2017) – was more difficult, 
complex and costly than was initially thought. However, the emergence of the Russian geo-
political challenge and ISIS-related terrorism in Europe has turned NATO’s attention and plan-
ning back towards territorial defence and the security of Europe. Given that the interests of 
European states are more obviously at stake, increases in defence expenditure are less trou-
blesome politically. The issue of a bigger role for Europeans within NATO is not likely to lead 
to major divisions in the end, especially given that the division within Europe between states 
focusing on the east and those focusing on the south makes little difference to the United 
States, which as a global actor is interested in both. 
In the current climate of increasing defence investments the question of whether to develop 
stronger European defences within NATO or the EU is less important to Washington than to 
its continental allies. Increasing the strategic autonomy of the EU was highlighted in the after-
math of President Trump’s ill-received visit to Europe in May 2017. Most notably, Chancellor 
Merkel referred to the discussions with Trump as “unsatisfactory”, and added that “the era in 
which we could fully rely on others is over to some extent” (quoted in Politico 2017). The 
development itself has long roots, and could arguably be traced as far back as the failed 
European Defence Community (EDC) in the early 1950s, although the symbolic “re-launch” 
of the current ESDP/CSDP framework under EU auspices took place in 1998.64 Moreover, 
initiatives to strengthen the EU’s defence arm are supported by recent geopolitical trends in 
and around Europe (see above). 
                                                     
63  Leading from behind was an ambiguous concept and it is unclear who in the Obama administration originally evoked it (Rogin 2011). It was used by 
Obama’s critics during the 2012 presidential elections as a quick descriptor for the President’s allegedly passive foreign po licy. For a thorough discussion 
on the concept, see Lizza (2011). 
64 The St. Malo Declaration on December 4, 1998 by then British Prime Minister Tony Blair and French President Jacques Chirac stated: “the Union must 
have the capacity for autonomous action, backed up by credible military forces, the means to decide to use them, and a readiness to do so, in order to 
respond to international crises”. For the full text of the declaration see CVCE (2008).   
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Brexit has also fuelled the EU’s ambitions to develop its own defence capabilities further now 
that Britain, the leading military power alongside France, is leaving the Union. Paradoxically, 
Brexit may serve to increase EU defence cooperation and foster regional forms of multilateral 
security collaboration. The Northern Group65 and the British-led Joint Expeditionary Force 
serve as examples of such forms of cooperation in northern Europe, the implication being that 
Brexit may not have an altogether negative effect on the transatlantic relationship from a se-
curity perspective (see Chapter 12). 
Alongside the EU’s common defence policies and plans for more efficient pooling and sharing 
among national forces and defence procurements, the closer relationship between the EU 
and NATO is a significant development that is now relatively uncontroversial in the US and 
Europe. It is increasingly seen as a win-win situation on both sides of the Atlantic, given its 
potential to foster more efficient European defence while heeding enduring American calls for 
more equal burden-sharing. For example, plans to ensure the mobility of military troops across 
national borders within the EU would support NATO efforts at collective defence in Europe 
(Michel 2017b). In the long term, such developments are also likely to alleviate fears of US 
unilateralism, in that more effective European defence would increase the Europeans’ say in 
collective operations aimed at furthering common agendas, such as countering terrorism.  
10.4 Enduring transatlantic economic bonds 
The transatlantic economic relationship was built upon an often-forgotten bargain. Combined 
with the US military presence to keep potential expansionist plans by the Soviet Union at bay, 
the Marshall Plan – initiated in 1948 – made it possible for Europe’s devastated economies 
to begin rebuilding after the horrors of the Second World War. It also functioned as the stim-
ulus behind European economic integration. This economic commitment by the US not only 
fortified the capitalist core of the West in the Cold War power struggle, but also re-established 
trade links across the Atlantic and fostered a culture of cooperation in various rounds of ne-
gotiations on global trade liberalisation.  
The relationship remains robust and strong to this day, and is still arguably the most important 
trade relationship in the world, both quantitatively and qualitatively. It comprises, primarily, a 
web of private sector relationships and rules-based market-driven logics. Consequently, de-
spite criticism from politicians on both sides of the Atlantic regarding individual aspects of the 
economic relationship, it will take more than a disruptionist presidency in the United States to 
sever the economic sinews that bind the transatlantic community.  
Although America and its European allies have not always seen eye-to-eye on trade matters, 
to this day their economies remain irredeemably interdependent. The US-EU trade and in-
vestment relationship is the most extensive in the world, and it also remains the most closely 
integrated one. The value of total trade in goods between the two partners in 2016 was over 
€600 billion, and the EU enjoyed a €115-billion trade surplus (European Commission 
2017a).66 Most relevant of all, foreign direct investment (FDI) between the US and the EU in 
2015 totalled over €4 trillion – the US total in the EU at over €2.5 trillion is three times as large 
as US investments in the whole of Asia. In terms of total trade, the EU remains America’s 
largest partner and its largest export market. The Union is also the second largest exporter of 
goods to the United States, surpassed only by China (European Commission 2017b). This 
extremely robust level of economic interdependence is essential for the sustenance of the 
                                                     
65 The Northern Group consists of the UK, Poland, Germany, the Netherlands, the Nordic countries and the Baltic States. 
66 The latest available data on services is from 2015. Imports from the US to the EU totalled €212.8 billion, and the EU’s surplus totals €13 billion.  
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transatlantic security community, as it fosters transatlantic contacts on all societal levels. To 
some extent, these relationships are a reflection of path dependency, but they also flourish 
because companies on both sides of the Atlantic appreciate the relatively stable social and 
economic (regulatory) environments in which they can operate (Salonius-Pasternak 2016). 
The average level of tariffs between US and EU markets is low, only three per cent. If it were 
to be concluded successfully, the trail-blazing TTIP trade agreement would create a massive 
free trade area by abolishing customs and reducing non-tariff trade barriers. More importantly, 
it would also mean that the US and the EU could, in practice, set the rules, norms and regu-
lations of global trade for decades to come. The TTIP process was launched in earnest in 
2013, but has faced an uphill battle ever since, not least because of the controversial Investor 
State Dispute Settlement procedure included in the treaty (Chapter 7). In his at times inflam-
matory campaign rhetoric, President Trump attacked both TTIP and its “sister agreement” 
TPP, from which he has already withdrawn the US. It thus appears unlikely that negotiations 
on TTIP will proceed during Trump’s tenure, as he enacts his pledge to fight for bilateral and 
“fair but tough trade deals” for American workers (White House 2017c).  
Trump’s challenge to the transatlantic economic relationship was thus initially viewed as po-
tentially grave. Beyond downgrading the prospects of an already unlikely free trade agree-
ment, however, the administration’s actual policies have not supported his nationalistic rhet-
oric on international trade (see Chapter 7). For instance, Trump’s threat to slap 35-per-cent 
tariffs on German cars has not materialised (Taylor and Rinke 2017). Nor has he begun to set 
up steel tariffs that would, according to reports, prompt countermeasures from Europe (Fran-
cis 2017). It appears that the Trump team has concluded that a trade war would be detrimental 
to America’s economy, which is actually showing solid growth rates – a fact that Trump con-
stantly highlights. The economic base of the transatlantic security community therefore seems 
set to persevere regardless of the Trump presidency, just as it has endured and matured 
throughout the post-Second World War era.  
10.5 The future of a shared mission and shared values across the Atlantic 
It is frequently accepted that a common normative base – even a collective identity - underpins 
the transatlantic community. Despite differences in national political structures and cultures, 
this has facilitated the undertaking of a joint strategic and political project to build a liberal 
international order based on core liberal ideas, including democracy, freer trade and human 
rights – values unfortunately too often respected in the breach.67 A substantial weakening of 
this shared value foundation could have significant potential implications for the joint project 
to buttress the existing world order, because for better or for worse, the transatlantic security 
community still makes up the dense core of the liberal international order. The political insti-
tutions and values are the glue that holds this core community together. Currently all three, 
the liberal international order, the political institutions and the shared value base, are under 
pressure, attributable to both external and internal developments (Chapter 6).  
Evidence of the shared transatlantic value base is to be found in both the Transatlantic Trends 
and the World Values surveys, according to which significant majorities in the United States, 
Great Britain, France and Germany have a favourable view of each other and agree that the 
United States and Europe share common values (Dalton 2013). As recently as the start of 
2017, both sides of the Atlantic continued to see each other as valuable allies in international 
                                                     
67 The EU and the US have traditionally shared the belief that their conceptions of democracy and human rights are worthy of active promotion to the 
outside world (Nicolaïdis 2005). Differences have usually arisen over how to go about this process of promotion, rather than over the actual desirability of 
such forays (for instance during the George W. Bush era). 
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affairs, with 73 per cent of Americans seeing Europeans as such and 67 per cent in Europe 
seeing the US as such (Ewering 2017). However, there are considerable fluctuations. For 
example, in addition to historically grounded anti-American sentiments on the old continent, 
European views of the US tend to track changes of presidential administrations (and their 
policies) in America (Pew Research Center 2017f; Katzenstein and Keohane 2007).  
In fact, President Trump has made it abundantly clear that he does not agree with the Euro-
pean elites on the normative foundations of the transatlantic security community and the lib-
eral international order (Ikenberry 2017; Stephens 2017). For example, his Secretary of State 
has explicitly downgraded the promotion of human rights and diplomacy in America’s set of 
foreign policy priorities (Piccone 2017; US Department of State 2017b). The new National 
Security Strategy only mentions “human rights” once, in the context of punishing those (re-
gimes) that abuse them (White House 2017z). Additional examples of differences between 
European foreign-policy elites and President Trump include frequent expressions of admira-
tion by the latter of autocratic leaders, and casual suggestions that the torture of terrorist 
suspects should be reinstated (see Chapters 4 and 6).  
By calling into question America’s espousal of core liberal values upon which the collective 
identity of the transatlantic community has traditionally been built, President Trump has raised 
concerns in Europe (Ewering 2017; Pew Research Center 2017f). However, the “fraying” of 
the shared normative base is also an internal phenomenon, both in the United States and 
within the European Union. This explains, to some extent, why President Trump’s approach 
– and the sentiments that fuel it – have met with applause from some in Europe, including 
national political leaders of EU member states.  
Although there is strong mutual support for the transatlantic relationship, it is worth pointing 
out that there are genuine and substantial differences within Europe and the United States. 
In Europe, for instance, there are significant differences in terms of values relating to political 
systems (democracy vs. other systems) and individualism, and commonality is common within 
groups/states that share a particular religious affinity (protestant or catholic) or a recent his-
torical background (part of Western Europe during the Cold War) (see Pew Research Center 
2016d). This has an impact on the functioning of the European Union, and thereby on the 
transatlantic relationship. Comparable divisions also exist within the United States. Moreover, 
the US has domestic drivers that do not always move in synchrony with the internal and do-
mestic dynamics of its European allies and partners – when it comes to support for global 
institutions and US engagement, for example (Chapter 2). 
The key question is whether the shared transatlantic mission of buttressing the current inter-
national order can survive the diverging values and fluctuating commitments to shared politi-
cal institutions that are visible on both sides of the Atlantic. 
Now at the end of the first year of the Trump presidency, concerns regarding the interest of 
the US in continuing to underwrite the current international order have been alleviated to a 
degree. After a tumultuous beginning, the administration has taken policy positions that are 
increasingly in line with the longer-term trends in the American global role, and in keeping 
with its commitments. Several key advisors who pushed for policies specifically aimed at 
breaking with tradition, most notably Stephen Bannon, have left the administration. Moreover, 
experienced generals and businesspersons occupy many key positions in the White House 
and cabinet. Trump’s early critique of Brussels has also largely disappeared from his rhetori-
cal toolbox, which may have something to do with a general sense of a resurgent EU and 
NATO. 
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What has not disappeared is the almost total abdication of US leadership on issues relating 
to climate change. Although individual states and US actors (including corporations) continue 
to work to reduce the impact of climate change, official United States is likely to remain on the 
sidelines in terms of global efforts, occasionally even taking the role of a spoiler. A genuine 
difference between the United States and Europe is the level of politicization and science 
denialism that infuses the policy discourse on climate issues. Even if future administrations 
wanted to take a more proactive role, this underlying trend would be likely to surface with 
regularity (Mehling and Vihma 2017; see also Chapter 11). 
However, the rhetorical dismissal of the need to uphold norms and values is not entirely con-
sistent with the actions of the Trump administration. For example, it cited the prohibition on 
the use of chemical weapons to justify its bombing of the Syrian airfield in April, which some 
liberal-leaning foreign-policy commentators actually regarded as a positive development. In a 
departure from Trump’s rhetorical cosying-up to authoritarian strongmen, the US withheld 
portions of its military aid to Egypt in August 2017. The decision was reportedly attributable 
not only to Egyptian links to North Korea, but also to Cairo’s continuing crackdown on civil-
society organisations (Tamkin 2017; Harris and Walsh 2017).  In any case, it is unlikely that 
democracy and human-rights promotion will be at the top of Trump’s policy agenda. 
Similarly, it is likely that President Trump’s focus on the defence of Western civilisation will 
shift from liberal values towards the defence of more traditional common threads that trans-
cend the Atlantic, the shared Judeo-Christian heritage in particular (Chapter 2). This qualita-
tive shift in how Washington views the value base of the Transatlantic community, and the 
normative parameters of American leadership in the world, looks to persist throughout Presi-
dent Trump’s tenure. 
10.6 The future role of the US in Europe 
One of the challenges in trying to predict the future of the transatlantic relationship is that 
although the cornerstones remain, they are shifting in different directions. This does not mean 
that the foundations of the relationship are crumbling: it is simply that a variety of approaches 
should be taken to ensure the transatlantic structure remains vital and fit for purpose. 
In terms of security cooperation, both sides of the Atlantic are concerned about the impact of 
continuing instability in the MENA region as well as Russia’s actions that challenge Europe’s 
security architecture. Nevertheless, there are clear differences between Americans and Eu-
ropeans regarding how the Asia-Pacific region is perceived, and what actions are necessary. 
The United States is likely to find little appetite among its European allies to engage militarily 
in the Pacific theatre. There are overlapping interests in Central Asia (including Afghanistan), 
MENA and Africa that could boost cooperation. Defence spending, and particularly the ability 
to generate new capabilities and project force even over medium distances, will remain a 
cause of tension in the relationship. However, because of its institutionalised nature and mul-
tiple overlapping security interests, the security cooperation component is likely to remain 
robust. 
Barring a global cataclysmic event, the transatlantic economic relationship will continue to be 
strong, because the US remains the biggest economic power in the near term, and Europe 
has shown itself to be economically more resilient than many doomsayers expected. The 
combined financial might in terms of capital and investment flows suggests that the relative 
global position of the United States and Europe still has long-term sustainability. However, 
the US and its European partners should be prepared for challenges ahead, particularly as 
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the relative shift in the balance of global economic power towards the major production and 
(increasingly) innovation centres in the East Asia and China continues. 
Major global digital and ICT companies such as Google and Facebook are US-based, leading 
to the contention that an “innovation GAP” exists between America and Europe. Reality does 
not support this claim, however. Innovation exists on both sides of the Atlantic, as the Global 
Innovation Index reveals (Cornell University et al. 2017): European actors dominate the TOP 
10. Moreover, much of the innovation in Europe occurs within existing corporations, rather 
than in start-ups. This makes it easier for US firms to develop services that challenge existing 
business models, particularly in the consumer sector, but also benefits Europe (and Asia) in 
the development of other kinds of business-focused technologies (Ezell and Marxgut 2015). 
Nonetheless, together the United States and Europe will remain major market areas that are 
also relatively predictable from the perspective of corporate investors. An individual US ad-
ministration is unlikely to drastically alter this picture. 
As suggested in surveys on values, a core set of normative beliefs is shared across the At-
lantic, albeit with regional and religion-based variances. The general trend towards political 
polarization is evident on both sides of the Atlantic, too. Although the diversity of values within 
the United States and Europe has the potential to cause internal tensions, such tensions often 
tend to be subsumed and “averaged out” in the context of the transatlantic relationship vis-à-
vis the rest of the world. 
In terms of their role in upholding the international order, from the European perspective the 
US will remain Europe’s major democratic ally and “indispensable” partner. As a panel of 
German foreign-policy experts recently noted: “[t]oday, no other actor in the world can offer 
the same advantages to Germany that it gains from its alliance with the United States. No 
other power takes on such far-reaching security guarantees and offers such comprehensive 
political resources. If Germany wants to be an effective actor in Europe, it needs the United 
States” (New York Times 2017b). This point of view acknowledges and reaffirms the durable 
nature of the transatlantic bond. From the perspective of Europe, the United States remains 
an important ally, not only in terms of security and economic cooperation but also in various 
multilateral fora.  
Still, there is a necessary psychological shift to be made among current and subsequent US 
administrations, politicians and even the populace at large. The United States can only hope 
to influence global events: the era during which the US (even together with Europe) steered 
or even dictated them has passed. What it can do, together with its allies and partners in 
Europe and Asia, is to make adjustments to the current international order, so that there are 
fewer incentives for others to challenge it. Here, Europe’s role may be to remind the United 
States that the “American century” was made possible by strategic restraint – that America 
limits its power by binding itself to broader normative structures of the liberal international 
order (see Chapter 6). 
10.7 Conclusion 
Although the transatlantic relationship is attacked on both sides of the Atlantic with increasing 
frequency – and at times ferocity – it remains the key political and economic relationship for 
both the United States and Europe. The extensive and deep web of relationships, as well as 
its institutional nature in security matters, serve as bulwarks against attempts by any single 
individual, even the President of the United States, to dramatically change it overnight.  
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A comparison of the outcomes of Donald Trump’s 2016 and President George W. Bush’s 
2003 statements regarding America’s European allies illustrates this very clearly. Disap-
pointed that not all of its allies rushed to join the invasion of Iraq in 2003, the Bush administra-
tion sought to actively divide Europe into “old” and “new” parts. Nonetheless, transatlantic 
security cooperation continued and even flourished in some fields. President Trump’s state-
ments have been aimed at the institutional core of the transatlantic relationship, which has 
resulted in a “circle the wagons” effect among European allies. Still, the current US admin-
istration has suggested almost tripling the amount of money the United States is to spend on 
security-assurance measures in Europe. It is a testament to the strength, continuity and im-
portance of the transatlantic relationship that the US position has (once again) reverted to 
more traditional American expressions of commitment to existing agreements. 
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11. US engagement in the Arctic 
 Traditionally a reluctant Arctic actor, the United States has started to pay closer at-
tention to the transforming circumpolar north. During the Obama era, the US empha-
sised combatting climate change and international co-operation in the region. 
 The current White House has remained silent on America’s Arctic policy. Despite ini-
tial concerns, the US appears to recognise enduring strategic interests in the circum-
polar north, and continues to participate in the practical co-operation in the region. 
 However, President Trump has voiced broader views on climate (and energy) policy, 
multilateral co-operation and America’s relationship with Russia that create strategic 
ambiguity, which is not likely to disappear overnight. 
 Although the Arctic may not be on the White House radar, these more general policy 
tendencies have an Arctic aspect and, in the worst-case scenario, might result in col-
lateral damage to the enduring elements of US Arctic policy and Arctic co-operation 
in general. Nevertheless, comprehensive and constructive US engagement in the re-
gion remains important, and has implications for the foreign and security policy envi-
ronment in Northern Europe.  
11.1 Introduction 
The United States faces a transforming circumpolar north. Driven by climate change, the Arc-
tic is warming up twice as fast as the rest of the world, with no end in sight at least in the near 
future. The warming in the region continues to exacerbate the melting of the ice cover. Along 
with the terrestrial thawing, some estimates suggest that as much as 70 per cent of the total 
ice volume in the Arctic Ocean may already have been lost. It is highly likely that the Arctic 
Ocean will be free from summer ice by the middle of the century (Arctic Institute 2013; Pero-
vich et al. 2016). 
This Arctic transformation is expected to have various economic consequences. Potentially 
time- and money-saving Arctic maritime routes are projected to become more easily accessi-
ble for a variety of activities, including maritime trade, tourism and fishing. The region is also 
estimated to reveal substantial new sources of oil and gas, and other minerals. As an opening 
geopolitical frontier with novel economic opportunities and serious environmental challenges, 
the Arctic is attracting an increasing amount of global attention. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
110 
 
Figure 10: The Arctic maritime area 
 
Source: Humpert and Raspotni (2012)  
 
The United States is one of these global players. This chapter investigates US engagement 
in the Arctic. The focus is, first, on the US relationship with the circumpolar region and its 
enduring strategic interests there. Against this backdrop, the discussion turns to the potential 
consequences of certain policy inclinations of President Trump for US policy and for co-oper-
ation in the region more generally. 
11.2 The United States and the Arctic 
Since the purchase of Alaska from the Russian Empire in 1867, the United States has been 
an Arctic nation. However, although one of the five Arctic Ocean littoral states and one of the 
eight Arctic Council (AC) member states, the US is often referred to as a “reluctant Arctic 
power” (Huebert 2009). The Arctic is simply very far away from Washington, both geograph-
ically and mentally. This peripheral position, a lack of public awareness, the low-threat security 
environment in the region, budgetary concerns and more pressing global issues have, in com-
bination, meant that the Arctic has been perceived as a minor element of the geopolitical 
landscape and foreign-policy agenda in post-Cold War America (Käpylä and Mikkola 2013). 
Nevertheless, for the past two decades the US has had a clearly defined Arctic policy that 
outlines a broad range of strategic interests in the region. The key elements of the policy were 
spelled out in the 1994 Presidential decision directive on the Arctic and the Antarctic, and 
subsequently reaffirmed in the 2009 National security Presidential directive on the region. 
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However, it was only during President Obama’s two terms that the Arctic gradually came to 
be regarded as important in Washington. 
By way of an illustration, the US published various new strategy documents to guide the fed-
eral government’s response to the transforming region. These included an updated national 
strategy for the Arctic region in May 2013, its implementation plan in January 2014, and Arctic-
specific strategic papers by various federal agencies such as the Department of Defence, the 
US Coast Guard and the US Navy. In December 2016, just before President Obama left office, 
the Pentagon further updated its own Arctic strategy. This strategic work was complemented 
in early 2015 with the establishment of the Arctic Executive Steering Committee to improve 
the coordination of inter-agency co-operation across the federal government. The legislative 
branch also increased their level of attention to the region, with Senators Lisa Murkowski and 
Angus King establishing the Arctic Caucus in the US Senate in 2015 (Carney 2015). 
US engagement in the region rose to a new level when Hilary Clinton decided to attend the 
ministerial meeting of the Arctic Council (AC) in 2011 as the first US Secretary of State in 
history to do so. John Kerry continued the tradition of active participation during his tenure 
from 2013 to 2017. In hindsight, this was a relatively unsurprising development, given that the 
US held the chair of the Arctic Council from 2015 to 2017. US engagement was further 
strengthened by the nomination of Admiral Robert J. Papp as the Special Representative to 
the Arctic in July 2014. 
The Arctic also fitted neatly into broader US foreign-policy goals that included a potential leg-
acy item for President Obama. While steering the work of Arctic Council, the US vigorously 
highlighted the theme of climate change in the area. This was not only an opportunity for the 
US to assume international leadership, it also went hand in hand with the Obama administra-
tion’s broader policy to combat climate change globally. During its chairmanship period the 
US also organised noteworthy events on climate issues in the region, including the first-ever 
White House Arctic Science Ministerial and high-level GLACIER Conference in Alaska, 
hosted by President Obama himself. Obama’s visit to Alaska was also significant symbolically, 
him being the first sitting US president to visit the US Arctic. As President, he also took steps 
to limit the extraction of hydrocarbons from America’s offshore areas in the polar region. Fur-
thermore, some of the US sanctions imposed as a response to the crisis in Ukraine targeted 
offshore hydrocarbon production in the Russian Arctic. 
In spite of all this, US engagement in the Arctic continued to have its handicaps. As a thematic 
cutting across and between various departments and agencies, the Arctic was – and contin-
ues to be – easily overlooked in the US government. Furthermore, despite the release of 
various policy papers and the growing awareness of environmental, economic and geopoliti-
cal dynamics, Washington remained uncertain about when and exactly how to commit its 
financial and political resources to its Arctic engagement and the region’s development. This 
included concrete issues related to the lacking infrastructure in Alaska, for example, and the 
re-modernisation of US ice-breaking capability.68 The overall uncertainty increased the dan-
ger that US investments in the Arctic would be too late as opposed to too early – that the US 
could even “miss the Arctic train”. 
                                                     
68 On the theme of US icebreaker modernisation, see O’Rourke (2017). 
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11.3 Enduring US interests in the Arctic 
The Arctic has never been a top priority on the US foreign-policy agenda, even though Amer-
ica has had a broad range of strategic interests in the region. These were outlined in the 1994 
Presidential decision directive and its subsequent variations.  
First, the US has a range of significant national defence and security interests in the region. 
This is primarily due to the geographic location of Alaska in the near vicinity of Russia, coupled 
with an openly hostile North Korea and an ascendant China in the broader Asia-Pacific secu-
rity environment. Consequently, crucial elements of US strategic deterrence, global missile 
defence and early-warning architecture are situated or operational in the North American Arc-
tic. US strategic submarines continue to operate regularly below the surface of the Arctic 
Ocean. The US also maintains two strategic early-warning radar stations and NORAD’s nu-
merous atmospheric air-defence radars in the region. In terms of operational capability, the 
US military also has an interest in guaranteeing its ability to show its presence, conduct mar-
itime operations and be able to strategically transport troops to the region. In practice, it has 
tended to emphasise sub-sea and aerial assets, with no permanent Navy presence69 and only 
limited ice-trained ground forces in Alaska.  
Since the rapid deterioration of the European security environment due to the crisis in Ukraine 
and Russia’s more assertive behaviour, the strategic value of the North Atlantic Basin – and 
particularly the maritime area between Greenland, Iceland and the United Kingdom (GIUK-
gap; see Figure 10) – has increased once again (Olsen 2017). Much akin to the Cold War 
years, this maritime area is particularly relevant for securing the transatlantic sea-lanes of 
communication to ensure the credible defence of Europe by NATO forces. The US, the UK 
and key Nordic countries have taken measures to increase their deteriorated maritime situa-
tional awareness in this interface between the Arctic and the Atlantic oceans. For example, 
the US and Iceland have agreed to (re)station American maritime surveillance aircraft on a 
rotational basis to Keflavik airport in Iceland. The US has also sold new surveillance aircraft 
and has helped to outfit a state-of-the-art intelligence naval vessel for Norway, in addition to 
deploying a rotational company-sized army contingent to the country. The UK has resumed 
its submarine activity in the region, too.  
NATO, as a whole, is also planning to establish a new North Atlantic command structure to 
facilitate the improvement of alliance deterrence capability and situational awareness in the 
GIUK-gap area (Peel and Bond 2017). That said, the US has not pushed for an explicit NATO 
presence in the Arctic, despite Norwegian calls to the contrary. This is primarily because of 
Canada’s objections to the “internationalisation” of the region, but also to avoid expected con-
flict dynamics with Russia that could annul the prospects of continued co-operation in the 
region and tie the US to yet another global “hot spot”. 
Freedom of navigation in the Arctic is another important long-term security interest for the US. 
It is also a key trend in its global geostrategy. Accessible and open international maritime 
routes are the arteries of the global economy, and key enablers of flexible power projection 
by the US military. Consequently, the US is adamant about defending the freedom of naviga-
tion and open sea-lanes globally, including on maritime routes in the Russian and Canadian 
Arctic. Although there have not been significant diplomatic disputes over the issue in recent 
years, the stance puts the US at odds with the above-mentioned Arctic Ocean littoral nations 
that emphasise their respective sovereignty in their adjacent maritime areas. The status of 
                                                     
69 The US Coast Guard, part of US Navy, currently has a seasonal presence (from July 1 to October 31) at a permanent base in Kotzebue. See Andrews 
(2016). 
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Arctic maritime routes is a matter of global strategic significance given the wider implications 
that an unfavourable precedent in the region would have for the principle of freedom of navi-
gation elsewhere – such as in the South China Sea.  
Second, the US also has an interest, although currently also inadequate capability, in provid-
ing safety and law enforcement – responding to oil-spill or cruise-ship accidents and policing 
the opening sea-lanes – in the increasingly busy and navigable Arctic maritime environment. 
This specifically involves the US coast Guard and its ageing fleet of one medium (Healy) and 
one heavy (Polar Star) icebreaker in need of urgent modernisation. That said, a lack of stra-
tegic awareness, the relatively low level of activity and the fact that the US has paid more 
strategic attention to its southern rather than its Arctic border have meant that investments in 
Arctic infrastructure and capabilities have stalled. Furthermore, the US has had the benefit of 
having Canada provide its own Arctic capabilities to monitor and govern large parts of the 
North-American Arctic. 
Third, the exploitation of natural resources – gas, oil, minerals, and fish stock – has been 
another key component of US policy in the Arctic. The US has a long history of hydrocarbon 
production in Alaska, particularly in onshore/coastal areas in Prudhoe Bay. Oil, and to a lesser 
extent gas, constitute a major source of socio-economic development in the American Arctic: 
they are a central source of Alaska state revenue and bring employment opportunities, eco-
nomic activity and the potential for infrastructure investment. However, Alaska and Washing-
ton have often been at odds over the latter’s emphasis on environmental protection at the 
cost of focusing on socio-economic development by the former. This is especially the case in 
Alaska’s federal areas, including the Arctic National Wild Refuge70 and the offshore maritime 
areas in the Chukchi and Beaufort Seas (Huebert 2009, 4-5). 
To enhance US energy security and to strengthen the economy, the Obama administration 
tended to accept the responsible development of domestic oil and gas production elsewhere 
in the US. During the past decade, due to declining production in Alaska’s existing oil fields 
coupled with a lack of new onshore sites, there has been domestic pressure to explore off-
shore oil in the Beaufort and Chukchi Seas (Conley 2012, 3; Huebert 2009, 4-7). Major energy 
corporations from the US and abroad have acquired licences for offshore production blocks. 
However, these efforts have been challenging due to pressure from the strong environmen-
talist movement and the Obama administration after recent environmental accidents (e.g. the 
2010 Gulf of Mexico oil spill and the 2012 Shell oil-rig incident in Alaska), coupled with the 
growing awareness of climate change. In addition, advances in unconventional gas and oil 
production elsewhere in the US have generally reduced the urgency to “go Arctic”. The fact 
that expensive exploratory drilling did not yield the expected results was probably the final 
straw in the process of abandoning offshore/deep-water activities around Alaska for the time 
being. Shell, the leading actor in the American offshore, abandoned its multi-billion dollar ef-
forts in 2015.  
Fourth, the US has recognised the unique and fragile character of the Arctic environment, and 
the need to protect it through conservation, regulation and international co-operation. It also 
acknowledges the immediate impact of environmental dynamics on indigenous populations 
and their way of life. In an attempt to understand and react to the complex environmental 
dynamics that pose challenges in the region, the US has invested in scientific monitoring and 
research on Arctic environmental dynamics. It has also been a forerunner in international 
                                                     
70 The ANWR is protected by the 1980 Alaska National Interests Land Conservation Act, according to which hydrocarbon extraction could occur in the 
coastal part of the refuge only with the consent of the US Congress. The protection of ecological diversity and especially fragile wildlife in the area (e.g. 
Porcupine caribou and their calving grounds, as well as polar bears and their dens) has been of particular interest to those who oppose drilling in the region.  
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climate research, with notable scholars and research institutes dealing with the topic and con-
tributing to current knowledge on climate change in high latitudes, including in the context of 
the Arctic Council (Conley 2012, 27-28; Huebert 2009, 14).  
Last but certainly not least, the US has a broad interest in supporting peace and co-operation 
in the Arctic. All Arctic nations recognise the importance of the 1980 United Nations Conven-
tion on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). However, the US approach to Arctic legal governance 
has been ambivalent. Although de facto adhering to the UNCLOS as customary international 
law, the US has not ratified the treaty despite wide support for it across the federal govern-
ment. The continuing failure to ratify because of objections from certain GOP representatives 
hampers US leadership in Arctic multilateral governance. Non-ratification also denies America 
a legitimate legal framework within which to ensure the freedom of navigation, settle disputes 
in the Arctic maritime environment, and pursue economic interests by extending its Arctic 
EEZ. To date, the US has followed President Truman’s unilateralist proclamation that re-
sources in or below the US continental shelf are the sole property of the United States (Cohen 
2011, 11). 
The US policy on Arctic institutional governance has also been ambivalent. Initially, during 
the 1990s, the US only grudgingly endorsed the creation of the Arctic Council, which in its 
view had only limited political importance, status and role. In practice this meant that its man-
date was to be limited to environmental matters, and that it would not be a full-fledged inter-
national organisation with a bureaucracy and a budget (Huebert 2009, 12). Later on, given 
the growing awareness of the economic prospects and geopolitical stakes related to the 
warming Arctic, the US was willing to consider the group of five Arctic littoral states (the “Arctic 
Five”) as a format within which to discuss topical issues, including those related to sovereignty 
and security in the Arctic. This emphasis de facto further marginalised the prospects of the 
AC. As implied above, in recent years the US has reversed its policy on the Council and has 
started to regard it as the “pre-eminent forum for international cooperation in the Arctic” 
(Pedersen 2012, 149). After a long silence, in 2013 it also endorsed the inclusion of new 
observers – including China – in the AC. This not only reaffirmed US commitment to multilat-
eralism in the Arctic, but also expressed America’s willingness to strike new bargains with 
rising powers such as China within the parameters of the rule-based multilateral order (in the 
region). 
11.4 US Arctic engagement in the Trump era 
As discussed in this report, the election of Donald Trump as the 45th president of the United 
States in 2016 has raised concerns about the future of US foreign policy and global engage-
ment. In this respect, the Arctic is no exception. After the November surprise, experts, advo-
cates and former civil servants dealing with the region have continued to express unease 
about the future of US Arctic policy, some even raising concerns about America’s commitment 
to co-operation in the region (see e.g. Huebert 2016; Hammit 2017; Panetta 2017). 
US government representatives dealing with Arctic issues have tended to emphasise conti-
nuity over change, however. For example, David Balton, the chairman of the Senior Arctic 
Officials during the US AC chairmanship (2015-17), stated in January 2017: 
“[t]he truth is I don't think anybody really knows yet. But — and now I speak as 
someone who has been at the State Department for more than 30 years — 
U.S. policy in the Arctic has not changed appreciably in that time […]. And so 
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if the past is prologue, my supposition is that U.S. policy in the Arctic is not 
likely to change in the next few years either […]” (quoted in Rosen 2017a). 
The main reason for this, Balton continued, is the fact that although there may be changes in 
emphasis, “U.S. interests in the Arctic are profound and enduring […]”. 
There are, indeed, indications that point towards such a conclusion. For example, although it 
is not a top priority, the US military continues to understand the strategic importance of the 
region on both sides of the Atlantic. The intensified situation with North Korea highlights the 
significance of early-warning and ballistic-missile defence capabilities in Alaska. China’s 
growing maritime capabilities and non-military ventures in the Arctic are being monitored 
closely. On-going efforts to bolster European defence through rotational deployments in the 
Baltic States, Poland (European Reassurance Initiative) and Norway (bilaterally), coupled 
with intensified exercising, are intended to create much-desired stability in the broader Nordic-
Baltic region in the wake of an increasingly unpredictable Russia (see Chapter 12). In addition, 
the expected establishment of NATO’s North Atlantic Command and on-going improvements 
in maritime surveillance capability in the GIUK gap support this effort in the long run – not 
least because they will further facilitate the detection and monitoring of Russian submarine 
activity passing through the Arctic Ocean. 
The Pentagon has also persevered in developing its Arctic strategy to guide the response of 
US military in the region, with the last update approved in December 2016 and released in 
February 2017. Among the very few explicit statements by the current administration, the 
then-nominee for Secretary of Defence James Mattis explicitly acknowledged in his Senate 
confirmation hearing that the Arctic is one of the regions in which the US continues to have 
responsibilities. With regard to the military, this includes a variety of security tasks ranging 
from search and rescue to patrolling and maintaining sovereignty in the region. In particular, 
Mattis stated that the US needs to understand what Russia’s increased military presence and 
activity in the Arctic means, and to make sure that it is not able to dominate what has been 
up until now “part of the international commons” (quoted in US Senate Committee on Armed 
Services 2017, 96-97). 
While it remains unlikely that a Republican-dominated Senate would ratify the UNCLOS, 
should President Trump unexpectedly suggest it based on the guidance of his advisors, Amer-
ica will nevertheless continue to participate in a regular manner in various Arctic governance 
forums that advance international co-operation and the softer aspects of security in the region. 
These include, for example, the Arctic Council and the most recent innovation, the Arctic 
Coast Guard Forum. In fact, in some instances co-operation seems to have only strength-
ened, maritime safety and security being a prime example. In the light of the new risks in this 
opening maritime area, co-operation between national Coast Guards in the region has only 
intensified during the first year of the Trump presidency (although not specifically because of 
it). The Coast Guard Forum organised its first search and rescue exercise Arctic Guardian in 
Iceland in September 2017, at which the US Coast Guard was present (Finnish Border Guard 
2017). 
Furthermore, despite the apparent demoralisation at the State Department (Chapter 3), the 
US successfully led negotiations on an international fishery agreement to prevent unregulated 
commercial fishing in the international waters of the Arctic Ocean. According to US officials 
involved in the process, the State Department worked smoothly on this issue, forging the 
agreement between five Arctic Ocean coastal states and other notable fishing nations with an 
  
 
116 
 
interest in the matter – namely China, Iceland, Japan and South Korea, and the EU as a whole 
(Rosen 2017b; 2017c).  
These developments suggest that the US government continues to perceive, and advance, 
enduring national policy objectives in the region while also seeking practical win-win outcomes 
through regional co-operation with other Arctic nations. However, President Trump remains 
something of a wild card in this respect, too. Swamped by various domestic and foreign issues 
– and public controversies – the White House has remained silent on the direction of US Arctic 
policy. Nevertheless, President Trump’s specific policy decisions and broader foreign-policy 
inclinations do raise questions about the nature of US Arctic engagement, and ultimately 
about the prospects of (consensus-based) international co-operation in the Arctic. 
First, there are uncertainties with regard to the future of international co-operation on climate 
change in the Arctic. The Arctic Council is the principal intergovernmental body in the region 
with a focus on climate change. In this regard, the 2004 Arctic Climate Change Impact As-
sessment was a key milestone upon which subsequent work in the forum has built. As men-
tioned, the United States continued this progressive work during its chairmanship of the Coun-
cil (2015 to 2017) by giving priority to addressing the impacts of climate change.  
Donald Trump was dismissive of climate change during his presidential campaign, and vowed 
to undo President Obama’s climate legacy. Subsequently, as president, he has stated that 
his administration will pursue a “balanced approach to climate policy” that re-evaluates the 
relationship between emission reduction, economic growth and energy security (Tillerson 
2017a). As a notable component of this policy, the President decided to withdraw the US from 
the Paris Climate Agreement after months of suspense and speculation. The international 
accord – in its current form71 – apparently stifles domestic economic growth, fails to fulfil US 
energy needs, and shares the financial burden of climate action too favourably with regard to 
developing nations such as China (Volcovici and Mason 2017; Chapters 3, 4 and 10). 
Although previous Republican administrations have advanced a progressive environmental 
policy –  President Nixon established the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) in 1970, for 
example – Trump’s decision to withdraw from the climate agreement is broadly consistent 
with the more recent GOP environmental politics and ideologically motivated critique of cli-
mate change in particular (Mehling and Vihma 2017, 7-9). This raises the question of whether 
the US is currently comfortable supporting the continuation of the work on climate change in 
the context of the Arctic Council, and if so, in what substantive terms and with what concrete 
scientific contributions. 
Curiously, the decision to withdraw from the Paris Agreement actually contradicted the earlier 
US endorsement of the declaration of Foreign Ministers in the Arctic Council ministerial meet-
ing in May 2017. In the declaration, albeit after last-minute reformulations (see more below), 
the US did acknowledge the existence of climate change and the need to tackle it. This indi-
cates that it chose – at least initially when President Trump was still weighing up his options 
on climate policy and the Paris Agreement – not to politicise the work of the AC by actively 
obstructing climate action in the forum. The decision (by Tillerson) was probably made easier 
by the fact that the current White House is unlikely to pay very much attention to the AC. In 
                                                     
71 According to a leaked State Department diplomatic cable from August 2017, the US has decided to withdraw from the Paris Agreement, but the President 
remains “open to considering the possibility of re-engaging under terms that are more favorable to the United States”. However, the same cable also states: 
“there are no plans to seek renegotiate or amend the text of the Paris Agreement, or begin negotiations toward a new agreement” (Tillerson 2017a; see 
also Torbati and Volcovici 2017). 
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fact, the US could simply ignore the national implementation of any unwanted decisions in the 
Council. 
Given subsequent developments, it is likely that initiatives framed in terms of environmental 
protection (conserving clean air and water), health and technological solutions with an eco-
nomic component (perhaps even renewable energy) rather than climate change will more 
easily secure the support of the administration – or at least stand a chance of not raising any 
unnecessary red flags in the White House. This could well mean, for example, that work re-
lated to pollution prevention, such as the reduction of black carbon emissions, will continue in 
the AC. As President Trump’s America First Energy Plan states, “our need for energy must 
go hand-in-hand with responsible stewardship of the environment. Protecting clean air and 
clean water, conserving our natural habitats, and preserving our natural reserves and re-
sources will remain a high priority” (White House 2017d). Furthermore, despite the reluctance 
of the current administration, it is worth remembering that action taken in response to the 
challenge of climate change proceeds at the state level (and among the private sector) in 
contemporary America – Alaska included (Rosen 2017d). 
The Trump administration has also sought cuts to environmental bureaucracy and research 
in its recent budget proposals. For example, the administration has wanted to downsize the 
EPA and reduce funding for various federal science agencies and their research programmes, 
many of which have a climate-change focus. In addition, it has aspired to slash international 
funding to tackle climate change and pursue sustainable development (Henry 2017a,b; Den-
nis and Eilperin 2017; Meyer 2017; Chapter 3). 
While highlighting administration priorities, these efforts have not, for the most part, been ap-
proved by Congress so far. The administration’s critical views are nevertheless unhelpful in 
advancing long-term scientific work done in the US, and subsequently also in the Arctic Coun-
cil in which US scientists and their research have played a significant role. Over time, should 
this tendency persist and affect federal funding decisions, it might even affect the status of 
the US as an “Arctic science power” (Conley 2015: xiv). Furthermore, suggested cuts to US 
international financial commitments raise a potential question mark on the long-term feasibility 
of the two overarching themes – the implementation of the Paris climate agreement and UN 
sustainable-development goals in the Arctic – which Finland has decided to advance as the 
chair of the AC from 2017 to 2019. 
Second, and closely related to the climate thematic, the Trump administration also seeks to 
plot a new climate-unfriendly course for America’s energy policy. This involves – as per the 
America First Energy Plan (White House 2017d; see also Tillerson 2017a) – the elimination 
of allegedly burdensome regulations, the utilisation of untapped fossil-fuel reserves and the 
revival of the domestic coal industry. With regard to the Arctic, in particular, the administration 
has sought to re-open federal maritime areas around Alaska for offshore hydrocarbon pro-
duction by reversing President Obama’s key decisions. These include the exclusion of federal 
waters in the Arctic from the next offshore oil and gas leasing strategy for 2017-2022 and the 
subsequent decision to ban indefinitely future hydrocarbon production in the majority of the 
US offshore Arctic. The Trump administration is also taking steps to open two federal onshore 
regions – the Alaska National Wild Refuge (Eilperin 2017) and the National Petroleum Re-
serve in Alaska (Harball 2017) – for future production. 
However, efforts to rejuvenate hydrocarbon production in the American Arctic are unlikely to 
result in numerous new development projects any time soon. Not only will the reversal of 
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Obama-era regulations take time, environmental groups will seek every opportunity to chal-
lenge them in public debate and in the courts. Furthermore, whereas onshore projects may 
be economically and practically more feasible, long and challenging development projects in 
offshore areas around Alaska will remain unprofitable if the price of a barrel of oil hovers 
between $55 and $65. 
The recent much-touted but non-binding agreement by Chinese entities to invest in the $43 
billion Alaska LNG project is a good example of long timeframes and existing uncertainties. 
Even if President Trump and public officials highlighted reductions in the US trade deficit, 
billions of dollars in state revenue and up to 12,000 new jobs throughout the construction 
phase, the project’s future remains open. It still requires a permit to export the liquefied gas, 
for example, and negotiations on concrete financing are far from complete, with current esti-
mates suggesting a final investment decision in 2019. Before the Chinese came along, key 
players including Exxon Mobil, ConocoPhilips and BP had already withdrawn from the project 
(Murtaugh and Collins 2017; Mason 2017). 
Third, the current administration’s foreign-policy tendencies also raise questions about Amer-
ica’s commitment to multilateral co-operation in the region. The State Department continues 
to suffer from understaffing and demoralisation. With regard to the Arctic, two key figures – 
Special Representative Papp and Ambassador Balton – are no longer present to steer US 
policy and keep Arctic cooperation on the agenda.72 However, these losses are, to some 
extent, covered in two respects. First, other key parts of the US government, including the 
Pentagon and the Coast Guard, recognise the importance of Arctic multilateral co-operation 
for peace, stability and practical safety in the region. Second, the Secretary of State, given 
his background in high-stakes oil business in the Russian Arctic and sub-Arctic, is also likely 
to give his attention to the Council. At least, he was the first Republican Secretary of State to 
attend the AC ministerial meeting last May. 
However, the person sitting in the Oval Office is the one who ultimately formulates US foreign 
policy. Or, as the current occupant put it recently, “I'm the only one that matters, because 
when it comes to it, that's what the policy is going to be” (quoted in Chappell 2017). President 
Trump is also likely to promote, as much as possible, a transactionalist as opposed to a mul-
tilateral approach to foreign policy. As elaborated in this report, a transactionalist US foreign 
policy emphasises bilateral relations and the sovereign ability to make the best possible deals 
that advance America’s interests as defined by, in this case, the President himself (Chapter 
4). As such, it entails “the implicit rejection of the US role in the international system that has 
underpinned the west” (Stephens 2017). 
Secretary of State Tillerson downplayed this scenario in the 2017 ministerial meeting of the 
AC. According to him, the AC is “an indispensable forum in which we can pursue cooperation” 
and the US will continue to participate in Arctic multilateral governance by being “an active 
member in this council” (Tillerson 2017b). However, the overall transactionalist emphasis in 
US engagement with the world may result in less political attention to and emphasis on co-
operation in multilateral governance forums in the Arctic, including the Arctic Council. 
Whereas federal agencies appear to continue practical co-operation to fulfil their legally re-
quired duties and tackle practical challenges, the political leadership at the top is unlikely to 
pay as much attention to circumpolar co-operation as the previous administration did. To the 
extent that there will be political interest, it is likely to be more sporadic and motivated by 
issues that either raise ire (climate change) or support broader policy goals – e.g. economic 
                                                     
72 David Balton, previously the top diplomat on Arctic affairs in the US State Department, held the rank of an ambassador. However, the United States does 
not have an official Arctic ambassador’s position. Currently, Julia Gourley continues to work as the US Senior Arctic Official. 
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activities in Alaska (oil and gas) or national defence. In the long term, there is a danger that 
US Arctic policy may become more selective and conditional, in other words that the US will 
support the work of the Arctic Council insofar as it directly advances specific (perceived) na-
tional interests, not because a commitment to multilateral governance in the region is valuable 
in its own right, accrues benefits for all participants and helps to solve common problems. 
A potential indication of this newfound emphasis on “America First” attitude was seen prior to 
the aforementioned AC ministerial meeting. The United States had initially expressed no ob-
jections to the final declaration of the meeting. However, last-minute uncertainty over refer-
ences to climate change and UN Sustainable Development Goals due to US reservations – 
assumedly higher up in the chain of command – put the unanimous acceptance of the final 
declaration exceptionally in jeopardy (Shankman 2017). Although a compromise was ulti-
mately reached, events in the Fairbanks meeting suggest that, in addition to creating uncer-
tainty about the seamless continuity of co-operation in the Council, a more transactional and 
bullish US policy even has the potential to create a new dividing line within the Arctic between 
the US and other Western nations. 
Finally, President Trump has also made it clear that he wishes to improve the relationship 
between the US and Russia (Chapter 8). As his Secretary of State has pointed out, the ad-
ministration’s view is that the “world’s two foremost nuclear powers cannot have this kind of 
[poor] relationship” (quoted in The Economist 2017d). These kinds of comments quickly raised 
the possibility that President Trump might singlehandedly relax or undo some, or all, sanctions 
that the US had placed on Russia and Russian entities in reaction to the crisis in Ukraine and, 
subsequently Russia’s interference in the 2016 US presidential elections. Not only would the 
cancellation of sanctions effectively legitimise Russia’s recent revisionist activities in Europe, 
it would also enable the resumption of offshore energy co-operation in the Kara Sea in the 
Russian Arctic between Rosneft, Exxon Mobil and others. Whereas the former would create 
geopolitical uncertainty in the European Arctic (the Nordic countries), the latter development 
would be detrimental to efforts to combat climate change, given that all the hard-to-recover 
resources in the Arctic probably ought to be left untouched to successfully limit global warming 
in the coming decades (McGlade and Ekins 2015). However, recent legislation that codified 
the above-mentioned Russia sanctions into law – passed almost unanimously by Congress 
and reluctantly signed by the President – made any unanimous decision to undo them by the 
executive branch impossible.  
11.5 Conclusion 
What does the election of Donald Trump actually mean for the US Arctic policy and the future 
of Arctic governance? So far the US appears to recognise its enduring strategic interests in 
the circumpolar north and continues to participate in the practical co-operation in the region. 
Private discussions with people familiar with the Arctic Council, for example, indicate that co-
operation is continuing relatively well, despite initial worries to the contrary. The above-men-
tioned examples of Coast Guard co-operation and successful fishery negotiations further il-
lustrate this. All these developments are encouraging, but the worry remains that President 
Trump will continue to advocate certain policies that are contradictory to the long-term goals 
and aspirations of international co-operation in the region that have been established during 
the past two decades. In particular, his views on climate change, multilateral co-operation and 
the US relationship with contemporary Russia create ambiguity that is not likely to disappear 
anytime soon. Although the Arctic might not be on the White House radar, these more general 
tendencies have an Arctic aspect and could result in some collateral damage to the enduring 
elements of US Arctic policy and Arctic co-operation in general. In the end, the fewer the 
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Arctic (related) issues that reach the Oval Office, the better it might be in terms of continuing 
co-operation. 
From a Finnish point of view, the Arctic cannot be separated from the broader foreign and 
security policy environment in Northern Europe. This means that here, as elsewhere, com-
prehensive and constructive US engagement in the region will continue to be important. To 
maintain this, it is essential to keep open the lines of communication to key parts of the US 
government, and to encourage them to pursue co-operation in the region. In addition to finding 
politically plausible and concrete initiatives, it is equally important, when necessary, to voice 
critical concerns about potentially detrimental policies the US is, or might be, pursuing. The 
safest bet is to do this within a broader framework, such as the Arctic Council, the Nordic 
states or the EU. 
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12. The US and the security of the Baltic Sea region 
 The United States has become more interested and invested in the security of the 
Baltic Sea region during the past four years as the security environment has evolved.  
 The Baltic Sea is a strategically important regional gateway to the global maritime 
and other commons, and in its own right a security concern for the US. Strategic 
uncertainty and an increasing sense of the “return of geopolitics” has drawn the US 
into the region. Given its multiple NATO allies as well as partners (Finland and Swe-
den) in the area, failure to uphold its security commitments would undermine Amer-
ica’s global influence. 
 As a response to growing strategic uncertainty, the US has ramped up its engage-
ment by supporting new forms of security cooperation, increasing its military presence 
and intensifying inter-personal contacts in the region. 
 These developments began prior to the Trump era, and highlight broader transatlantic 
and North European security trends. Despite initial concerns in the Nordic-Baltic re-
gion, the current administration seems to have come to the conclusion that supporting 
its European allies and partners is actually a good deal for the United States in the 
present situation. A possible significant improvement in the security environment – 
although not likely anytime soon – might decrease US interest and engagement. 
12.1 Introduction 
The United States has become considerably more interested and invested in the security of 
the Baltic Sea region during the past four years (from 2014 to 2017). The primary reason for 
this is the changed security environment, and the increasing recognition that more needed to 
be done to ensure the security of US allies in the region. 
This chapter investigates US security engagement in the Baltic Sea region. It first places the 
Baltic Sea in the global geostrategic context, and illustrates how the US has responded to the 
changing balance between the normative/economic and geostrategic pressures that animate 
its involvement in this region. The US response is then examined on three levels of interaction: 
the institutional, the practical and the personal. On all three levels there is evidence of a sig-
nificantly more active United States, which through its myriad actions has managed both to 
reassure its allies in the region, and to draw in Sweden and Finland as closer partners in a 
regional security-enhancing web of cooperation. 
12.2 Evolving US engagement in the Baltic Sea region 
Although Russia’s moves against Ukraine constitute the proximate cause of increased US 
interest in the Baltic Sea region, the US had been paying more attention to the area since the 
early days of the Obama administration, when the 2008 war between Russia and Georgia 
was still fresh in the collective memory. At the time, major European NATO members did not 
yet appreciate the emerging strategic challenge, and were unwilling to make significant 
changes to NATOs collective defence posture. Nevertheless, between 2009 and 2014 the US 
began to take increasing note of the slowly deteriorating security environment in the region. 
Starting in about 2012, the United States also notably increased its bilateral cooperation with 
the Nordic countries. This happened within more of a global context, however, as the US was 
increasingly interested in putting its resources into cooperation with allies and partners with 
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which it could operate as “peers” in international operations. Two years later, in the spring of 
2014, this ramped-up cooperation took on a more regional focus, as the United States began 
to pursue a multi-pronged approach to increasing the security of the Baltic Sea region. In line 
with this approach, the US has engaged with countries on a bilateral basis, pushed for reforms 
and a refocus of NATO (at both the 2014 Wales and the 2016 Warsaw summits), and has 
become more active in less formal multilateral forums such as the Northern Group. 
Driving all of this has been a growing understanding by US policy makers and civil servants 
about the changed security environment in the region and its implications for US interests, 
commitments and partnerships. The growing need to find partners and new types of security 
arrangements to address different global and regional issues and challenges also implies that 
the United States perceives the Nordic-Baltic region as a whole as a compelling partner. 
None of these elements of US engagement in the Baltic Sea region have changed materially 
during the first year of the Trump administration. In contrast to expectations, continuity be-
tween the Obama and Trump administrations has been the key theme when it comes to real 
cooperation and US activities. This is attributable in part to the geopolitical drivers in the re-
gion, in which two strategic spheres of interest have not only met but have also overlapped 
during the past two decades (Salonius-Pasternak 2017).  
12.3 The Baltic Sea in the global geostrategic context 
The broader US geopolitical approach provides a framework for understanding the US role in 
the Baltic Sea region. America has long acted as the global guardian of the freedom of navi-
gation and the provider of maritime security around the world. This global mode of engage-
ment and the associated maritime geostrategic orientation has often become manifest in the 
need to keep the key sea-lanes open for trade and economic activity. This includes the Baltic 
Sea, a key economic transit corridor for many states in the region. 
Nordic-Baltic states have been subjected to two forms of adaptive pressure, the norma-
tive/economic and the geopolitical. Following the end of the Cold War, the main pressure was 
to create open national strategies that allowed their integration into the regional and global 
models of the liberal international order. The second underlying pressure – the need to secure 
state sovereignty and territorial existence – receded into the background due to the primacy 
of economic prosperity. Nowadays, all the states in the region appreciate the significance of 
the second set of geopolitical concerns, which are manifest in the gearing up of defence-
related solutions and networks (Salonius-Pasternak 2017). However, the heightened geopo-
litical tensions also extend into the economic realm. Especially in the field of energy politics, 
some of the states are concentrating their efforts on lessening their dependence on Russia 
(although others remain committed to increasing energy cooperation with Moscow). This trend 
is likely to sustain at least in the near-to-medium term. Together with sanctions policies aimed 
at conditioning the underlying geopolitical challenge, the perceived geoeconomic tools of 
statecraft will remain sensitive issues (Wigell 2017). 
These two types of pressure are also evident in a number of locations around the world. In 
the South China Sea, China is increasing its efforts to control and secure the trade flows upon 
which it is highly dependent. Russia might shift its policy in a more assertive direction in the 
Baltic Sea region, ostensibly to secure its own energy trade through this maritime area. This 
could take place through a combination of means in the economic, diplomatic and security 
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spheres. However, the uncertainty of control over the Baltic maritime route and the conse-
quent potential inability to secure access to the maritime lifeline emphasises Russia’s need 
to diversify and seek other maritime routes – in particular the Northern Sea Route. 
It is not an accident that this characteristic of geostrategy is also present in the Baltic Sea 
region. The Baltic Sea and its coastal states comprise one of the most active areas of global 
trade and economic activity. The Baltic is among the major maritime shipping regions on a 
global level. Its trade flows account for up to 15 per cent of global seaborne trade, making it 
one of the busiest maritime environments in the world. There are approximately 2,000 larger 
vessels operational in the Baltic Sea at any given moment. The coastal states are relatively 
dependent on the Baltic Sea as a shipping route, and it is also an important maritime route 
supplying strategic natural resources such as oil and gas. Nearly half of Russia’s energy ex-
ports flow through the Baltic. The Danish Straits are more congested as an oil transit choke-
point than the Panama Canal or the Turkish Straits, and not far behind the Suez Canal (Inter-
national Shipping News 2017; Aaltola et al. 2014b; Behr et al. 2013). 
All its coastal states, including Russia, are economically and societally dependent on the Bal-
tic Sea. According to general liberal theory, growing economic interdependence should act 
as a stabilising force. From this perspective, mutual dependence should stabilise the Baltic 
Sea region and lower the likelihood of disruptive conflicts (Aaltola et al. 2014b). 
However, dependence has evolved qualitatively. The trade and supply flows are asymmet-
rical, and some states are more dependent on them than others. Between 80 and 90 per cent 
of Finnish exports by volume are shipped along the Baltic Sea, for example. Finland, like 
many other coastal states, is a relatively small, highly open and connected society that has 
actively sought to become connected to global lifelines through the Baltic Sea. However, the 
increase in connections and value chains is likely to result in new vulnerabilities, as well as 
opportunities. For example, the development of Helsinki as a Baltic Sea hub and a multidi-
mensional gateway – via its maritime, air and data connections – has also exposed Finnish 
society to potentially complex security-of-supply vulnerabilities. Finland is also directly de-
pendent on free and secure access to the global commons more broadly (air, maritime and 
cyber domains). With its open, export-driven economy the United States has been important 
to Finland in terms of safeguarding the rule-based international order, including the maritime 
commons (see Chapters 6 and 10). Therefore, from a Finnish perspective, the US has been 
an indispensable security provider not only in a regional context, but also more comprehen-
sively and globally. 
The scope of security issues has broadened as the countries in the region have become more 
digitalised. The Baltic Sea is also a data corridor, most of the data travelling to and from the 
coastal states being transmitted though undersea data cables. Modern economies are also 
heavily energy-dependent, and Baltic Sea hydrocarbon flows are intensifying through the con-
struction of the NordStream II pipelines, for example. Although security-of-supply issues still 
tend to be national-level considerations, they are increasingly coordinated through the Euro-
pean Union and its common resilience-creating policies. Sanctions regimes also play a role, 
and continuing coordination of such regimes between the US and the European Union would 
be desirable. However, there have recently been signs of disharmony in this respect. For 
example, the US Congress passed a law that opens up the possibility of sanctioning certain 
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energy projects in the Baltic Sea region, NordStream II in particular. This could cause dishar-
mony and divergence in interests between the US and the EU, and between regional states 
and the US (Foy 2017).73    
12.4 Harder Baltic Sea insecurities and the US response 
The United States recognises that although Baltic Sea littoral states are vital actors in assuring 
the region’s security, the US plays an important role (in parallel with the EU) as a stabiliser 
against more assertive Russian efforts to coercively extend its influence beyond its territorial 
borders. 
Although the Baltic Sea is a gateway that needs to be secured to enable access to the global 
maritime and other commons, it is in itself a more complex security concern for the US in a 
way that goes beyond such considerations. The US has multiple NATO allies as well as part-
ners (Finland and Sweden) in the region. The NATO membership of the Baltic States has also 
increased America’s need for know-how, and the decline in stability and a growing sense of 
the “return of geopolitics” has drawn the US further into the region. America’s strategic inter-
ests could be at stake under certain (extreme) circumstances, such as if the safe and secure 
use of Baltic maritime routes were to be compromised or if the security of the allies was im-
perilled.  
The growing interest of the United States has manifested itself in many ways, on the institu-
tional, practical and personal level. Much of this increased attention is focused on security-
related issues, but a focus on three sub-themes is clear: military defence, co-operation in 
global counter-terrorism and in cyber/intelligence.  
12.4.1 The institutional level 
 
From an institutional perspective, the most noticeable trend of the past decade is that the US 
understands, and in certain cases is even ready to support, different forms of cooperation 
aimed at enhancing regional security.  
If the United States previously objected to defence cooperation at the European (EU) or re-
gional level, fearing that non-NATO cooperation would weaken its influence and role in Eu-
rope, bilateral and multilateral cooperation between northern European (Northern Group), the 
Nordic countries (NORDEFCO) and bilaterally (FISE, Finland-Sweden) appears to be sup-
ported as a synergic complementary element. Another initiative for which the US has pledged 
its support is The European Centre of Excellence for Countering Hybrid Threats (Mattis 
2017b). This movement towards multi-layered security relationships is also in line with the 
Trump administration’s apparent preference for bilateral relationships (see Chapter 4; White 
House 2017y).  
The longer-term trend underlying the development towards complementary security networks 
and bilateral relationships is the deepening awareness in Washington that any action that 
increases the security of the area – and, consequently, of American allies – is useful. Implicit 
in this awareness is the acknowledgement that the project to make Europe “whole and free” 
through enlarged NATO membership is no longer sustainable as a guiding principle on mat-
ters concerning the Baltic Sea region. Difficulties in the NATO-accession process with some 
of the former Eastern-block states, as well as the growing demands placed on candidate 
                                                     
73 Although to prevent disharmony, the bill calls for coordination with America’s European allies. 
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states regarding defence spending and capabilities, are likely to accelerate the development 
of informal bilateral or multilateral security networks and relationships. 
The United States is also increasingly favourable towards regional formal and institutionalised 
cooperation in the form of the Northern Group or the British-led Joint Expeditionary Force. A 
clear example of this is US Secretary of Defence James Mattis’ participation in the Northern 
Group ministerial meeting in Helsinki in November 2017, something that US officials had 
sought for a long time (Standish 2017). Such geographically limited groupings are more likely 
to share common geographically delimited security challenges, unlike pan-European group-
ings such as NATO and the European Union. Hence, practically useful and pragmatic coop-
eration is also easier to elicit.  
Nordic Defence Cooperation under the NORDEFCO umbrella took its first steps in 2009. Its 
establishment meant that three separate streams of cooperation were included in one flexible 
structure, which enabled all five Nordic countries to participate voluntarily in any given pro-
ject.74 This ensured that only those with a genuine interest would participate, and that project 
goals would not be limited to the lowest common denominator. More than a hundred areas of 
cooperation were identified initially, among the better-known of which are weekly cross-border 
training by national air forces and information exchange on maritime and air spaces. Although 
not one of its explicit goals, NORDEFCO also provides a loose structure that enables US 
allies (NATO members) and partners to collaborate more smoothly on regional security and 
defence issues.  
Recognising the need for a softer touch, the United States has, in recent years, accepted that 
its efforts to persuade the Nordic states to include Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia as permanent 
members of NORDEFCO are unlikely to result in anything positive. This has, again paradox-
ically, made it easier to cultivate real cooperation within a loose Nordic Baltic collective.  
In addition to supporting multilateral forms of cooperation, the United States has also agreed 
to institutionalise its bilateral security relations with two Baltic Sea non-NATO-member coun-
tries: Finland and Sweden. The Statements of Intent signed in 2016 underline the fact that 
the United States sees both Finland and Sweden as individual actors capable of contributing 
to their own and regional security, while also encouraging ever deeper regional cooperation 
with NATO allies. The Swedish Statement of Intent locates Sweden as a bilateral partner of 
the United States, whereas the Finnish one points out that this strengthened link with the 
United States is part of the overall web-of-security cooperative relationships that Finland has 
sought to build.75  
12.4.2 The practical level 
 
In terms of practical activity, the United States has significantly increased its military and in-
telligence activities in the Baltic Sea region. Although there was an initial effort after the 2008 
Russian invasion of Georgia to assuage newer NATO members in the Baltic Sea region, the 
step-change in US activity began in the spring of 2014. Immediately after the invasion of Cri-
mea, America sent company-sized airborne units to Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia and Poland. At 
the same time, it increased the number of fighters in its Baltic Air Policing rotation from four 
to ten. 
                                                     
74 On the history of Nordic defence cooperation, see NORDEFCO (2017). 
75 For the official statements of intent see the Government Offices of Sweden (2016) and the Ministry of Defence of the Republic of Finland (2016). 
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These immediate actions of military reassurance were followed by political and diplomatic 
efforts, including strengthening cohesion within NATO and shifting the focus of the Alliance 
from crisis management to collective defence. Thus, by 2015/16 the initial reactions in 2014 
had given way to the adoption of a longer-term approach to deterring Russia, while still show-
ing a readiness to engage in dialogue. The Obama administration’s well-meaning but ineffec-
tual “reset” policy with Russia was thus replaced with strong signalling regarding the sanctity 
of Alliance members’ territory. 
In the summer of 2014, the Obama administration decided to package separate efforts to 
reassure allies into the European Reassurance Initiative (ERI). The ERI aimed to spend ap-
proximately one billion USD annually across five sets of actions, all with the aim of reassuring 
and then deterring Russia in the European theatre of operations. Increased to $3.4 billion for 
2017, the ERI focused on participation in training and exercises, infrastructure, prepositioning 
equipment, supporting partner capacity building and simply maintaining a presence. President 
Trump has signalled that he would like to increase the amount spent on the initiative (renamed 
the European Deterrence Initiative or EDI) to nearly five billion USD.  
The impact of these efforts is already visible in the Baltic Sea region. Numerically, more US 
troops and equipment are participating in more exercises than at any point since the end of 
the Cold War. Qualitatively, the biggest change is that US forces are focusing on conventional 
warfare that takes into consideration the limitations that facing a near-peer adversary involves 
in terms of air-superiority, electronic warfare et cetera.  
The US Navy has also increased its presence in the Baltic Sea region, with frequent port calls 
by large Arleigh Burk-class ships and participation in operations such as BALTOPS and 
Northern Coasts, and a range of bilateral exercises. Here, again, both numbers and focus 
together emphasise the step change in US engagement and activity in the region. 
These actions, which have strengthened NATO's common defence and deterrence, have led 
to counter-measures by Russia. Although it should not have done, this came as a surprise to 
most US decision makers. Russia sees itself as having lost influence in the area since the 
end of the Cold War, as well as, on average, about a thousand kilometres of “defensive depth”. 
Russia has sought to restore this “defensive depth” by technological means, creating what 
NATO and the US often refer to as anti-access area denial (A2AD) capacity in the Baltic Sea 
region – in other words the ability to prevent the unimpeded use of the area. The United States 
is a strong supporter of the concept of freedom of navigation, and wants to secure its ability 
to help its allies and thereby to strengthen the credibility of its global alliance network. It is 
thus likely to continue its current level of activities in the near and medium term. Significant 
increases in the volume of activity should not be expected unless the general security situation 
deteriorates considerably. Individual incidents are unlikely to be met with a permanent change 
in force posture. 
In Finland, this increased readiness on the part of the Americans to participate has become 
evident during the past three years: American naval, air, land and special-forces units have 
been participating in exercises in Finland. 
Bilateral exercises between US and Finnish air forces have also increased in volume and 
scope, with two separate two-week exercises in 2016 involving US F-15s and Finnish F-18s, 
as well as in 2017 with US A-10s. In addition to this, the two air forces have exercised together 
in various multinational manoeuvres such as the Arctic Challenge Exercise series, and in 
more limited activities in which US refuelling planes practise with Finnish fighters, for example. 
Although US F-15s first visited Finland in 1997, and the two countries started their cooperation 
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in the early 1990s, the step-change lies in the quantity and quality of the exercises currently 
going on. 
Furthermore, there have been more US Navy port visits – and the accompanying training – 
as the US has brought more ships into the Baltic Sea. Perhaps the most notable change has 
been in the willingness of Finland to take in and the US to send land forces to participate in 
national exercises, the most obvious ones being the mechanised exercises ARROW 16 and 
17 (in which Norway was also involved). In addition to this, American special operations sol-
diers and units have continued their bilateral training cooperation. 
12.4.3 The personal level 
 
The third discernible manifestation of America’s increasing interest in the Baltic Sea region 
lies in the qualitatively and quantitatively intensified contacts between high-ranking US politi-
cians, soldiers and civil servants with their Nordic and Baltic counterparts over the past three 
years. Examples abound. There was a joint visit of Nordic leaders to the Obama White House 
in May 2016. President Sauli Niinistö visited Washington during Donald Trump’s first year in 
office, as did Danish Prime Minister Lokke Rasmussen. Vice President Pence toured the Bal-
tics in the summer of 2017, and Secretary of Defence James Mattis attended the Northern 
Group meeting of defence ministers in Helsinki in November. In addition, representatives of 
almost all security-relevant US governmental organisations have met with Finnish authorities 
over the last few years. Similar flows have been reported in other regional capitals, too.  
In addition to high-level interaction, and of particular relevance to Finland, doors in Washing-
ton and its surroundings have also opened with increasing frequency. Although nominally 
national representatives, Finnish officers serve as integrated contributors in various parts of 
the global US command structure. This increased flow has strengthened the web of personal 
relationships between security actors in Finland and the United States, thereby laying the 
foundation for the formation of long-term relationships. This is a clear by-product of what one 
person familiar with the US-Finland bilateral relationship described as the current reality: “Fin-
land is now pop in Washington.” 
12.5 Conclusion 
Recent years have seen increasing American interest in the Baltic Sea region as a result of 
the changing geopolitical dynamics and the consequent need to ensure the security of US 
allies – and, increasingly also of its partners – in the area. The fact that the three levels through 
which this burgeoning interest has materialised – the institutional, the practical and the per-
sonal – were all established prior to the Trump administration highlights broader transatlantic 
and North European security trends. Despite initial concerns in the Nordic and Baltic capitals, 
the Trump administration seems to have come to the conclusion that supporting its European 
allies and partners is actually a good deal for the United States.  
Nevertheless, although US interests in the Baltic Sea region are not dependent on any given 
US administration, the effort put into it during the past three years is unlikely to be sustained 
indefinitely. Rather, after the on-going ramp-up period, which included strengthening institu-
tional and inter-personal bonds, a steady-state period is to be expected. It is also possible 
that US interest in the region will wane if the transatlantic relationship is completely under-
mined, or if the relationship between the West and Russia improves significantly. Given the 
weight of history and even the present state of affairs, both possibilities seem unlikely to ma-
terialise in the near to mid-term.  
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Barring a major regional war outside of Europe or the Middle East, the scenario in which the 
United States would pay less attention and decrease its security investment in the Baltic Sea 
region would probably involve a significant thaw in the icy relationship between Moscow and 
Washington and its allies. Should this come to pass, it is likely to take at least as long as the 
deterioration of the relationship in the first place – that is, about a decade. This trend would 
have to withstand multiple presidential and Congressional elections in the US and a possible 
change of government in Russia (see Chapter 8).  
In Finland’s case, the increased interest and engagement of the United States could be 
viewed as a positive development because it creates strategic stability, facilitates the mainte-
nance of the broader transatlantic link and enables the further strengthening of bilateral rela-
tions. The United States appreciates Finland’s level-headed approach to security and de-
fence. The US military and civilian bureaucracy is also increasingly adept at understanding 
and working with the particularities of Finland’s approach to communicating and conducting 
security policy. This has contributed to facilitating more and deeper cooperation on Baltic Sea 
security in a way that suits both Finland and the United States. 
The general Finnish-US bilateral relationship stands on considerably firmer ground than it did 
a quarter of a century ago, largely because the relationship is both more extensive and deeper 
than at the end of the Cold War. It is able to withstand individual political or diplomatic predic-
aments, and in the realm of security policy it enables Finland, in particular, to participate in 
certain international endeavours (ISAF in Afghanistan or OIR in Iraq) while not contributing to 
others (the invasion of Iraq in 2003). 
It was already a major step change in the security and defence-policy aspects of this relation-
ship when Finland decided to procure F-18 Hornets from the United States in 1992. At the 
time, it was the largest foreign military sale in US history, concluded when Finland was expe-
riencing its deepest economic crisis since the 1930s. While the security and military relation-
ship has expanded and deepened significantly – as has the overall bilateral relationship – 
many are aware of the potential impact of the upcoming procurement of new fighter jets (HX-
programme) on the latter. The fact that security-policy considerations will be among the fac-
tors influencing the choice of jet has been freely acknowledged since the beginning of the 
process.  
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13. CONCLUSION: THE EMERGENT WAITING 
GAME 
This report identifies observable longer-term trends that are likely to have relevance in the 
future, as the US is moving deeper into and, eventually, beyond the Trump era. US foreign 
policy has often been seen as oscillating between more withdrawn isolationist and more ex-
pansive interventionist tendencies, which are also highlighted in different schools of foreign-
policy thought that frame America’s grand-strategic options across decades. At the same 
time, it should be noted that this oscillation always varies qualitatively as the global context 
changes. In many ways, the US is fundamentally more global and interdependent, and cannot 
withdraw in the same way as during previous periods of isolationism or minimalism. The kind 
of drastic retrenchment that occurred after World War I is too simplistic a parallel for what is 
happening today, for example. The US will remain welded in complex ways to the global ar-
teries of trade, finance, information and data. This renders withdrawal a relative and context-
specific question. 
The 2016 presidential election provides another vantage point from which to understand 
America’s foreign-policy future(s). Even though it was a surprise, the election result can still 
be seen as an expression of underlying trends that can last over several presidencies. Pres-
ident Trump has taken anti-free-trade and anti-immigration positions. The Republican Party 
has altered its pro-free-trade stance, which had prevailed since the Reagan years, to give at 
least lukewarm support to the Trump administration’s agenda. Irrespective of the relative re-
luctance expressed by some key Republicans, especially during the election campaign, this 
is a marked shift. The Democratic Party, in contrast, seems to be moving towards the left in 
its criticism of wealth inequalities and support for policies that promote social justice. This is 
a discernible change in comparison to the Obama and Clinton years. On the right, nationalist 
populist sentiments have been surging and blatantly xenophobic views that highlight Amer-
ica’s white Christian heritage are more openly expressed. These trends indicate that the US 
is moving towards a phase characterised by reluctance towards certain aspects of globalisa-
tion. This is a departure from the neoconservative legacy of the Bush era and the pragmatic 
internationalism of the Obama years. 
Polarisation is deepening, and internal animosities are becoming a driver of foreign policy as 
well. The discussions, investigations and suspicions over collusion with an external power for 
electoral gain, for instance, are yet another milestone in the saga of increasing divisions 
among America’s political elites and the body politic. The Ancient Greek historian Thucydides 
once wrote about the dangers of political regression into a situation in which external enmities 
matter less than internal feuds and conflicts. In today’s information age, external actors can 
easily meddle in networked societies that are plagued by internal divisions. There is a risk 
that the mutually felt suspicion among political rivals will become the key constitutive element 
in the political life of contemporary America. In effect, ideological divisions and party politics 
have started to outweigh patriotism and the sense of national belonging. 
However, there are also hopeful signs. America is still regarded by many as an indispensable 
ally, especially in Europe and Asia. The US is economically strong and innovative. It is in-
creasingly self-sufficient in energy production, and its role in global energy markets has grown 
– some even project it will become a net exporter of energy during the 2020s. Even the cloud 
of post-election controversies, however unsettling, could have a silver lining and act as a 
wake-up call for a better understanding of global dependencies and vulnerabilities. It is clear 
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that, by and large, US awareness of its global interconnectedness within a more complex, 
globalised, and networked world has, in fact, grown. This would suggest the emergence of a 
more globally engaged US in certain key functions, sectors and regions, and a less engaged 
one in others. That is to say, in a feverishly intertwined world, even isolationist aspirations 
could have different contents, contradictions and consequences than in the past. 
Politics, and especially foreign policy, tends to fuse specific political leaders’ inclinations with 
traditions, institutions and structures. Donald Trump’s agency, although potentially disruptive 
especially in the short term, should therefore not be overstated. Foreign-policy prognostica-
tion typically draws upon the relative constancy of US foreign policy. After years of culture 
wars, political polarisation and decision-making problems, there is still substantial common 
ground amongst US foreign-policy stakeholders over America’s global engagement. Even 
significant portions of the American public continue to prefer a globally active role. The con-
troversies that resulted from the apparent reluctance of President Trump to mention and rec-
ognise America’s Article 5 responsibilities during his first trip to Europe in late May 2017, for 
example, reveal that there are enduring expectations concerning how the American President 
should conduct himself. So far, he has had to concur with many consensus expectations, 
although his reluctance to do so has probably stretched the boundaries of consensus to a 
degree. This change may have staying power as a key legacy or as a failed experiment, 
catapulting into prominence a different mix of foreign- and economic-policy doctrines in future 
elections. Meanwhile, the world is still holding its breath. As a result, a new “waiting game” 
has emerged, characterised by interplay between expected continuities and newfound uncer-
tainties concerning America’s future direction. 
It is therefore plausible that areas of strong national consensus can still be used to shed light 
on America’s future foreign-policy tendencies. Furthermore, future administrations, Congress 
and the so-called foreign policy establishment can garner support for particular strategic op-
tions that remain within the bounds of the underlying foreign-policy common ground. Existing 
areas of commonality are enablers that can be used to enhance understanding of and even 
envisage future pathways of US foreign policy. This is also the case in turbulent times, when 
different actors cannot agree on the specific definition of US national interests. The areas of 
consensus also serve an important yet complex signalling role in the outside world: they em-
body intended messages to allies, partners and potential adversaries. 
In sum, there are at least three areas in which a long-term bipartisan consensus on global 
engagement has existed in post-Second World War America. These commonalities will likely 
continue to exist, but differences over policy formulation and implementation can still be ac-
commodated within them. 
First, it is generally agreed that the US will continue to have an important role in the world. 
However, the specific modes of this engagement are negotiable. At present, it is especially 
relevant to assess the extent to which and in what fields the US is a pragmatic arbiter of 
common global problems and to what extent it is a custodian of principle on a mission to 
remake the world in its own image, a core tenet of American “exceptionalism”. Under Trump, 
it is trying to manage the North Korean issue and the Russia challenge in a way that is interest-
driven and transactional – in a word, pragmatic. However, it is also trying to declare a moral 
mission in defence of “civilisation”, national sovereignty, and a conservative interpretation of 
the American creed based on Judeo-Christian values, which at least partially clashes with the 
more liberal rights and value-based definitions of the West.  
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Second, although the importance of America’s engagement with the world is rarely contested, 
there is considerable contention over the specific means it should adopt. The choice is fre-
quently articulated through the opposition between “hard” (military and economic) versus 
“soft” (diplomatic, institutional, cultural) means of power. At present there is a trend away from 
reliance on softer means towards the prioritisation of military might and coercive aspects of 
economic power, such as more bullish negotiation strategies and extensive sanctions. The 
accompanying worldview is markedly pessimistic and gloomy. Since 9/11, America has em-
ployed different mixes of these two forms of power. It prioritised hard power for the first years 
of the George W. Bush presidency, only to shift towards a softer approach (out of necessity) 
during his second term. The Obama administration favoured a more balanced approach in 
which soft tools were visible in public, whereas harder tools were frequently used, but largely 
out of the public view (e.g. through special operations and remote-controlled aerial vehicles). 
On the basis of its first year, one could say that the Trump administration has clearly shifted 
towards a mode of engagement emphasising hard power and a zero-sum worldview rather 
than soft power and win-win scenarios. 
Third, most foreign-policy analysts and practitioners in Washington agree on the importance 
of fulfilling existing international responsibilities and commitments. Nevertheless, open ques-
tions remain over the extent to which these commitments should be made conditional on the 
willingness of allies and partners to engage in more equitable burden-sharing and, relatedly, 
on the degree to which the US needs to accommodate others’ interests by engagement in 
multilateral forums. Moreover, there are debates over the balance of priorities and related 
commitments when it comes to different regions around the world. For instance, although the 
post-Cold War shift from Europe towards the rest of the world was “delayed” by US-supported 
efforts to make Europe “whole and free”, as well as by wars in the Balkans, the increased 
focus on Asia that started during the Obama administration was relatively uncontroversial. In 
reality, however, the shift towards Asia has been piecemeal, even in the hard-power realm. 
The recent agreement by numerous countries to negotiate a post-TPP agreement without the 
United States underlines the nascent nature of the so-called pivot to Asia. 
The uncertainties related to these three areas of consensus have put Europe and the Nordic-
Baltic region on the alert. To a degree, increasing unpredictability in Washington is intentional. 
US foreign policy has evolved by design during the first year of the Trump administration, 
away from President Obama’s penchant for risk-aversion and strategic patience to more con-
frontational rhetoric that aims consciously to keep both friends and foes on their toes. These 
ideas are not new. They were used during the Nixon administration, and they have bubbled 
to the surface occasionally, especially in political rhetoric, as a tool to warn potential enemies. 
George W. Bush had his controversial use of the “axis of evil”, and his Secretary of Defense 
Donald Rumsfeld spoke of “old” and “new” Europe. 
It could be argued that contingent events rather than strategic leadership and progressive 
visions have played a significant role in Western politics in recent years. After many relative 
shocks – from the Iraq debacle, the financial crisis of 2007/8 and the Euro crisis to elections-
related unpredictability – the strong teleological belief in the inevitable progress of liberal mar-
ket-oriented democracy has declined. The arch of history does not appear to bend in the 
direction of justice if there is no one to bend it. There is a growing awareness that at least a 
pause has taken hold over hitherto steady progress, and a rising sense of crosscurrents and 
uncertainty has started to prevail. This is another characteristic of the “waiting game”. As well 
as adapting to the unpredictability in the US, actors in Europe and the Nordic-Baltic region 
have to defend the resilience of their political systems. The reversal of democratic progress, 
the waning of democratic appeal, and a growing sense of democratic vulnerability may even 
  
 
132 
 
raise the possibility of international conflicts between democratic and autocratic actors. In-
deed, there are worrying signs. However, many of the trends that are now becoming evident 
have a long pedigree. Enhancing understanding of these trends would facilitate the manage-
ment of unpredictability. 
The surprising election and referendum results in the transatlantic area, the Brexit negotia-
tions, the scandals and investigations in Washington, and the still unsettled nature of the 
Trump administration’s foreign policy have resulted in at least a momentary loss of transat-
lantic confidence. This is a further defining feature of the “waiting game”. In an era of height-
ened uncertainty, waiting has to be strategic in nature. Pursuing the agenda to which we have 
grown accustomed during the past decade – combatting climate change and fostering trans-
atlantic free trade, for example – has to be put on the backburner, or pursued within alternative 
constellations because the all-important leadership from Washington is missing. Some expect 
that keeping a low profile on these issues will save them for the post-Trump period. Admin-
istrations come and go, and power changes hands along the long continuum of relatively 
stable yet oscillating US global engagement. However, those who are tempted to wait for the 
Trump era to be over should acknowledge that the administration’s agenda also represents 
longer-term trends that could well endure into the future. Such trends include rising economic 
nationalism and the increasing conditionality of US commitments. 
Contemporary times are defined by contradictory trends. On the one hand, after a steady flow 
of bad news, the EU seems to have recovered some momentum after various crises on and 
around the continent. This is partially a reaction to the Trump victory and Brexit, which bear 
family resemblances, at least in terms of marking a trend of growing cultural and economic 
nationalism. The regaining of some confidence signals that liberal institutions continue to en-
dure, and that the underlying spirit of peace through integration can still be sold to voters. 
Similarly, liberal values that have come to characterise the republic also remain strong in the 
US. This is exemplified in the persistence of the rule of law, the judicial system having proved 
capable of checking some of the most controversial policy proposals of the Trump administra-
tion. The free press has also continued to highlight shortcomings in governance despite facing 
extraordinary criticism from the White House and the proliferation of “fake news” emanating 
from domestic and foreign sources. 
On the other hand, great-power politics and geopolitical contestation based on narrower zero-
sum understandings of self-interest seem to be making a comeback. Meanwhile, authoritarian 
political orders appear to have strengthened their appeal around the world. As a result, the 
task of sustaining and refining the liberal order seems increasingly difficult. A sense of mud-
dling-through has replaced the strong belief in the liberal telos – very few people would sub-
scribe to the “end of history” thesis today. To a degree, this could be healthy. It puts the onus 
on active political leadership instead of waiting for an inevitable future and relying on less 
proactive measures. The security challenge posed by geopolitical contestation and transna-
tional terrorism, together with the increasing sense of vulnerability of Western democracies, 
both serve as wake-up calls. 
Paradoxically, the current “waiting game” is thus also characterised by the need to take action 
– to change, to mitigate and to adapt. Indeed, in this sense, recent years have witnessed 
increased activity in Europe and in the Nordic-Baltic region. Challenges to the region’s stability 
have been tackled by investing resources in harder forms of security, countering hybrid 
threats, and building defence capabilities and security networks, even across the NATO 
boundary. The countries in the region are now better prepared to face the challenges of build-
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ing up independent, networked and collective defence mechanisms. This active stability pro-
motion includes bilateral and trilateral relationships, as in the case of the deeper cooperation 
between Sweden and Finland, with further links to the US and NATO.  At the same time, there 
has been a steady development of mutual ties between NATO and the EU.    
However, there are a number of challenges that need to be managed. The re-emergence of 
major power politics is a global phenomenon. Active stability promotion – e.g. in the Nordic-
Baltic region – requires a degree of win-win thinking. The strengthening zero-sum tendencies 
and expansionist policies of the strong (and the daring) are both reasons behind and conse-
quences of the malaise affecting the liberal international order. On the one hand, major trans-
formations of world orders have historically entailed large-scale violent contestation. Such 
regressive cycles would inevitably have ramifications in Europe and in the Nordic-Baltic re-
gion, where societal prosperity is dependent upon a stable international environment. On the 
other hand, many of the rising powers – such as China, India and, to a degree, Russia – are 
major beneficiaries of the liberal rule-based order. These actors’ willingness to radically alter 
the foundations of their own economic prosperity and domestic stability would seem to be 
counterintuitive. 
The biggest non-Western economic beneficiary of the liberal international order, China, nei-
ther represents nor endorses its key values. Democratisation expectations have dissipated 
and the system of government is still authoritarian. The Chinese legal system remains under 
political direction and liberal political rights are hardly endorsed or respected. However, the 
geopolitical challenge is still mainly geoeconomic, and limited to the maritime regions, the Silk 
Road projects and the cyber domain. The more assertive approach adopted by Russia in 
Europe is interpreted by some as proof that a more illiberal state can be tempted to challenge 
regional security norms. However, the counter-measures taken so far should be enough to 
check the current level of challenge. Nevertheless, a darker future can also be envisioned. 
The prospect of bilateral deals between great powers – such as Russia and the US or Russia 
and China – raises concerns in the light of historical experiences in Europe. 
Yet, dynamics that challenge the liberal international order are not only external to its Western 
core. President Trump's forceful rhetoric on burden sharing and his suggestions that US com-
mitments are conditional have been noted in Europe with concern, and have fuelled a dual 
effort to strengthen transatlantic security institutions. To achieve the two-per-cent defence-
spending pledge agreed to by NATO members at the 2014 Wales summit, European allies 
and partners are increasingly investing in defence across the board. This reversed a trend 
that had prevailed since the 1990s. At the same time, the development of common EU de-
fence capabilities has gathered new momentum, driven by strong public calls for European 
strategic independence, most notably by Chancellor Merkel after the G7 meeting in May 2017. 
The idea of a stronger European leg of NATO is also being entertained. All these processes 
could be viewed as synergic, contributing to collective defence and more effective integration 
between NATO and the EU. These recent developments have been received positively in the 
US, which is increasingly emphasising the idea of an ally or partner taking care of its own lot, 
and being a strong contributor to defence collaboration and a provider of regional stability. 
These concerns are also related to the prioritisation of threat perceptions, and to the question 
of who has most say in ranking priorities in the transatlantic realm. The American prioritisation 
of threats appears to be changing. The United States is a global power with a global outlook. 
Its vast network of allies includes states that have their own unique regional threat percep-
tions. In Europe these include Russia and terrorism, in the Middle East Iran and its Shiite 
affiliates, and in Asia North Korea and China. It seems that the new Trump administration 
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does not prioritise the complete list of threats in the same manner as many European states 
do. Most notably, at least the White House has been looking for ways of collaborating with 
Russia, even recognising some of its interests. The trepidation among America’s European 
allies and partners is not necessarily the key determinant of the US regional policies in the 
White House (although it may play a bigger role in the calculus of Pentagon and Congress). 
These developments are likely to increase anxieties given that European allies and partners 
have become used to the US strategic preoccupation with Europe, trusting the American slo-
gan “Europe whole and free”. These anxieties may feed the need to find alternative solutions, 
and increase tensions amongst foreign-policy elites in the regions of Europe that feel exter-
nally exposed. 
Finally, the degree of change in the transatlantic relationship does not depend solely on the 
committed leadership on both sides of the ocean. The political strains in the relationship may 
be further accentuated by the strengthening appeal of a populist nationalist ethos. The emer-
gence of these politico-cultural sentiments and their diffusion from one side of the Atlantic to 
the other (and vice versa) could potentially undermine the liberal character of the transatlantic 
community, instead fuelling conflict dynamics both within societies and across assumed cul-
tural boundaries. Such divisions also produce fissures that could be further amplified and 
exploited by external actors through disinformation campaigns in the run up to elections, for 
example. Moreover, the balance between domestic forces has become particularly pertinent 
in contemporary America. Although the President has extensive power over foreign and se-
curity policies, many in Congress (particularly in the Senate) currently harbour more traditional 
foreign-policy inclinations. Key government departments and agencies can (and will) guard 
against radical ruptures, and steer administrations (Trump’s included) towards the long-pre-
vailing US foreign-policy consensus. 
For the time being, the overall situation seems to reflect elements of both continuity and 
change, which is challenging for policy planners, who have to wait for clarity. In terms of nur-
turing the commonly held value base and trade cooperation, bold initiatives are unlikely to 
bear fruit in the short term. At the same time, in the security sphere the European drive for 
strategic rethinking of the EU-NATO relationship provides a much-needed sense of direction. 
There is no time to lose, given that the European security environment is characterised by 
uncertainty. Regression into power politics and spheres of influence remains a possible, alt-
hough unlikely, future scenario. Even the remote possibility of this should provide the West 
the impetus to re-imagine the transatlantic relationship in a manner that would support the 
emergence of a reformed liberal order, a normatively and strategically desirable outcome for 
“post-post-Cold War” Europe. 
Engagement in the waiting game 
 
The United States remains – in the words of former Secretary of State Madeleine Albright – 
the “indispensable nation” when it comes to security and stability in the Nordic-Baltic region 
and Europe more broadly. The need to engage in and strengthen cooperation across all levels 
(from high politics all the way to civil society) will persist, regardless of who is at the helm in 
the White House. 
Irrespective of the potential for disruption that Trump as a president sui generis presents, 
there are considerable continuities in America’s global engagement, especially when it comes 
to guaranteeing its military ascendancy, maintaining its security commitments in Europe and 
the Asia-Pacific region and continuing the battle against transnational terrorism. It is also pos-
sible that future US presidents will revert to an American foreign policy that is more traditional 
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in terms of US dedication to the normative, institutional and economic foundations of the lib-
eral international order. The foreign-policy pendulum of international engagement has histor-
ically swung back and forth in the United States, and the Trump presidency may yet turn out 
to be a cyclical aberration. 
It should nevertheless be borne in mind that the United States that emerges at the end of 
President Trump’s incumbency – whenever that may be – will not be the same as it was on 
January 20, 2017. Not only will the surrounding world have changed – more or less dramati-
cally – so will the nature and conventions of the debates taking place within the US over 
America’s place in that world. For instance, it is highly likely that calls for more equitable 
burden-sharing within its broad network of alliances along with a less benign attitude to eco-
nomic interdependence and globalisation will persist after Trump’s term(s) in office. Moreover, 
political polarisation in the country shows few signs of dissipation. In fact, it is possible that 
divisions will widen not only on the traditional liberal/conservative axis but also along educa-
tional, ethnic and racial lines as part of the inevitable process of demographic change. The 
more positive possibility is that the Trump presidency will provide “lessons learned” and foster 
attempts by future leaders to return to pragmatic arbitration and bipartisanship. 
In the short term, however, the Trump presidency offers both challenges and opportunities to 
Europe more broadly and Finland in particular. It is becoming increasingly clear that as the 
proverbial transactionalist, President Trump has little time for or interest in engagement in 
complex organisational forums and long-winded institutional processes – the United Nations 
being the most obvious case in point. Even if his presidency inches in a more traditional di-
rection, this reticence towards multilateral solutions and organisations is likely to remain a 
mainstay of the administration. In fact, Republican presidents in general have approached 
multilateral forays with more reservation than their Democratic counterparts. 
While engaged in the “waiting game”, Finland and its European partners would do well to 
remember that aloofness is not a substitute for engagement. Despite potential policy and 
value divergence between the European Union and the United States on issues such as cli-
mate change and trade policy, there is a need to find avenues of cooperation that can be 
harnessed to sustain the transatlantic link through the potentially turbulent times ahead. This 
requires a deft touch on the part of European policymakers to adopt a combination of strategic 
patience and selective sector-based proactivity. 
On the one hand, the Trump presidency does open up opportunities for cooperation that could 
be framed as a policy triumph or economic gain for the US administration, which the President 
could then sell as a victory to his domestic constituents. Illustrative examples in the security 
sphere include NATO burden-sharing and the development of European defence capabilities, 
as well as efforts to combat the threat of transnational terrorism and devise new ways of 
countering hybrid influencing. 
On the other hand, America’s benevolence as a liberal hegemon – a leader that maintains a 
guarantor role for the institutions of the liberal international order even if this does not always 
serve its immediate national interests – has waned, at least for the time being. It is incumbent 
upon Europeans to take a stand against the United States (as they have in the past) on issues 
that are of importance to them, especially when America is charting a course that is detri-
mental to European interests and core values, and to the stability of the international order in 
general. In such cases, declaration and policy need to be proportional to the magnitude of the 
disruptive action. 
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In fact, although the temptation might sometimes be considerable, it is most likely to be coun-
terproductive to enter into escalatory public rows with the present administration. Not only 
does Trump’s leadership style draw on public spectacles, such high-profile disagreements 
might merely accentuate the “values gap” between the two shores of the Atlantic, or within 
respective societies. They might also render it more difficult for more moderate actors within 
the Trump administration (e.g. Tillerson, Mattis and McMaster) and different government de-
partments and agencies (e.g. the State Department and the Pentagon) to push their agendas 
forward in Washington and to cooperate with Europeans. 
The liberal international order is extremely important for Finland as a small internationally 
networked state, and its building blocks are worthy of defence whenever feasible. This pre-
sents a conundrum that can be reconciled by looking at each issue of contention on its own 
terms and utilising the European Union (or other multilateral constellations) as forums in which 
Finland can seek to defend the building blocks of the rule-based multilateral order with like-
minded states. 
The increasingly bilateral bent in America’s foreign policy means that state-to-state – as well 
as leader-to-leader – contacts may be prioritised more than in the past. Although not condu-
cive to important multilateral cooperation, this could open up opportunities through innovative 
bilateral diplomacy, which would not necessarily have been available during a more traditional 
presidential administration. However, it is still worth keeping in mind that the relationship be-
tween Finland and the United States is fundamentally asymmetric. 
When it comes to security and trade ventures with the United States, Finland should drive 
home the message that US interests are especially well served by cooperation: Finland keeps 
its promises, takes care of its own lot and is willing engage the US in fair trade that also 
benefits Americans. This is a message that the US President and his administration could sell 
to domestic supporters. 
American interlocutors, including President Trump and more recently Secretary of Defence 
Mattis, have made it clear in public addresses that they have respect for Finland and value 
Finnish expertise in issues pertaining to its near abroad. The interest of the United States in 
the Nordic-Baltic region has also increased as the geopolitical situation in Europe has evolved 
over the last few years. Although heightened tensions per se are of concern, the situation 
could also prove fortuitous for Finland if handled correctly. Paradoxically, this may well be the 
time for pragmatic initiatives and forays vis-à-vis the US.  
*** 
In light of the above, the report sets forth the following general rules of thumb upon which 
Finland could draw while engaging in the “waiting game” with the United States and its Euro-
pean allies and partners. As a whole, they outline the elements of an approach that combines 
the virtues of strategic patience with selective sector-based proactivity.  
Guard against overreaction: Finland should guard against overreacting to the rhetoric and 
policies pursued by a single presidential administration. America’s foreign policy has exhibited 
considerable continuity throughout the post-World War II era and, barring outliers such as 
scepticism about climate change and isolationist nationalist rhetoric, even the policies of the 
Trump administration are likely to remain within the bounds of US long-term international en-
gagement. 
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Compartmentalise and frame win-win formulations: Finland should advance a clear set of 
priority areas that can be compartmentalised to cater to America’s increasingly transactional-
ist and bilateral approach. These sector-based cooperative forays should be framed as ben-
eficial for the US when possible, especially in terms of economic growth and job creation. 
Such proposals are more likely to get the Trump team’s seal of approval. These win-win for-
mulations could further produce transactional benefits that flow from connecting one set of 
issues with another. 
Pursue areas of confluence: Finland can play a proactive role in Europe to make the case 
that existing avenues of cooperation with the United States should be maintained as far as 
possible, and new ones considered and explored, regardless of the present presidential ad-
ministration. This is the case, in particular, when it comes to cooperation in the realm of com-
mon defence, responding to transnational terrorism, as well as tackling cybercrime and hybrid 
threats. A message of cooperation in these areas of confluence would also be easy for Pres-
ident Trump to sell to his domestic constituents. 
Strengthen regional security and stability: Finland should continue to conduct a foreign policy 
aimed at actively strengthening overall security and stability in the Nordic-Baltic region, which 
entails facilitating coordination and open dialogue between all relevant regional and global 
actors whenever possible. This can be done by engaging the US, in cooperation with other 
partner states, in forums in which America has shown interest, also during the first year of the 
Trump presidency. Such constellations include NORDEFCO, NATO-EU cooperation, the 
Northern Group and the Arctic Council, for example. 
Continue to use multilateral forums: In key areas that are important for Finland but harbour 
the potential of creating differences with the US, Finland should utilize the buffering potential 
of multilateral forums. In particular, it could enlist the help of its European Union partners and 
the Union’s institutions as potential safeguards against any negative effects of bilateralization, 
transactionalization and disruptive policies pursued by the US. 
Utilise backchannels: When a European front is unavailable or undesirable, Finland could 
utilise channels to officials in the White House and Trump’s cabinet who are more sensitive 
to Finnish and European concerns than the President and some of his less accommodating 
advisors. Discussions with American officials on lower levels of government should pave the 
way for the continuation of cooperation when the political climate in Washington changes in 
a more globally engaged direction. 
Nurture bilateral links on multiple levels: Finland should continue to nurture existing bilateral 
links with American interlocutors, and establish new ones when it is deemed to be in the 
interest of strengthening Finland-US relations. This should be done on the highest levels with 
presidential and ministerial-level contacts, and range across all relevant levels in government 
ministries. Finland should also invest in maintaining strong cooperative links to both houses 
of Congress, which can function as indispensable conduits for channelling European and 
Finnish views into American political debates. In areas in which the federal government is not 
forthcoming, cooperation could still be fostered with states, cities, private-sector actors and 
civil society. 
Wait out the storm: In areas in which the United States is unwilling to engage, including cli-
mate change and multilateral trade agreements (especially TTIP), it is likely better to wait out 
the current turn in the cycles of US global engagement, and restart these processes in the 
relevant formats when a more forthcoming interlocutor enters the White House. 
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Stand up for values: When America’s policy behaviour compromises Finland’s core principles 
and values, it should – in bilateral talks with the US or in cooperation with its European and 
global partners – remind the United States of the importance of adhering to legitimate inter-
national norms and institutions. 
Formulate a clear message: in the end, four simple dictums should form the core of the nar-
rative in Finland’s strategic communication with the United States: 
Finland is a reliable partner now and will remain so in the future.  
Finland has historically delivered what it promises, and will continue to do so. 
Finland is part of the Western community of nations committed to the norms and values of 
the rule-based international order.  
Finland is further committed to maintaining, strengthening and investing in its own security 
and is able to take care of its own lot, and this commitment fosters peace and stability in its 
neighbourhood.  
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